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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Frank W. Hanft*
JUDICIAL REVIEW

A. Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record
The Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company had an agent at
each of two stations. It applied to the North Carolina Utilities
Commission for permission to consolidate the agencies with the
time of one agent divided between the two stations. The commission denied the application and the superior court affirmed the commission's order, but in State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. 1 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
superior court. In so doing the Court set out the statutes requiring that the commission make no decision "unless the same is supported by competent material and substantial evidence upon consideration of the whole record," 2 and authorizing reversal of a
commission decision unsupported by such evidence "in view of the
entire record." 3 The Court noted the undisputed evidence of the
railroad that on a normal day the existing full time agent at one of
the stations involved had nothing to do for more than half of the
day, and at the other station had nothing to do for more than six
of the eight hours he was on duty. In the light of this and other
similar evidence the Court concluded that the commission's findings
to the effect that the public convenience and necessity could not be
met under the railroad's proposal were not supported by the evidence.
The decision has the support of well considered cases. The
United States Supreme Court in a landmark case4 held that where
the applicable statutes' require the reviewing court to look to the
whole record in determining whether an NLRB decision is supProfessor of Law, University of North Carolina.
268 N.C. 242, 150 S.E.2d 386 (1966).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-65(a) (1965).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-94(b)(5) (1965).
'Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
.Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e) (B) (5), (6), 60 Stat. 237
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (B) (5), (6) (1964); Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 § 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (1964).
*
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ported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court in applying the
test must look, not just to the evidence supporting the board's decision, but also to the evidence the other way. "The substantiality
of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly
detracts from its weight."' What could happen in the absence of
the rule that the whole record must be considered in determining
whether an agency decision is supported by substantial evidence is
vividly illustrated by an example ascribed to an appellate judge:
"[I] f one discredited witness said the cat was black, and 10 unimpeached witnesses declared it to be white, there was substantial evi-17
dence to support a finding by the agency that the cat was black."
The principal case is also supported by an earlier North Carolina
decision involving the closing of an agency at a station.8 The undisputed evidence showed an annual loss at the station of 572 dollars
even crediting the station with all revenues derived from shipments
originating or received there, and that there was no possibility of
expanding the business or revenues at the station. Nevertheless the
commission denied the application to close the agency station. The
Court held that the commission's order was not supported by competent, material and substantial evidence in view of the whole
record, although one large receiver of carload shipments had testified that if there were no agent at the station inconvenience and
delay would result.
A dictum in Petree v. Duke Power Co.9 is in contrast with the
above rule that in deciding whether an agency's findings are supported by substantial evidence on the whole record the reviewing
court will take into account the evidence the other way and see if
in the light of it the supporting evidence is still substantial. The
Court said, "It is so well settled that if there is any evidence upon
which the Commission can base its findings they must be upheld
we need cite no authorities." This is precisely the view that the
"whole record" rule was designed to abolish.' ° However, the Petree
'Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). The
"whole record" requirement is discussed in 4 DAvis, ADMINISTRATiVE LAw
TREATISE § 29.03 (1958).
" STASON & COOPER, THE LAW OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS, 416 (3d
ed. 1957).
' State ex ret. Util. Comm'n v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 233 N.C. 365,
64 S.E.2d 272 (1951).
p268 N.C. 419, 420, 150 S.E.2d 749, 750 (1966).
°Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951); 4
DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.03 (1958).
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case involved an appeal from a compensation award by the Industrial Commission. The statute providing for the appeal states that
the award "shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of
fact." The appeal is for errors of law.'1 The section does not
contain a provision comparable to that governing appeals from the
Utilities Commission authorizing reversal for lack of competent,
material and substantial evidence "in view of the entire record."' 12
It is true that the Court has held that if the Industrial Commission's
3
findings are unsupported by competent evidence this is reversible
as an error of law."4 But, as stated in the above dictum, the Court
has repeatedly adhered to the view that if there is any competent
evidence in support of the Commission's findings they must be upheld. 16
There seems to be no valid reason why findings of the Industrial
Commission should be accorded greater weight than those of the
Utilities Commission; why the findings of the latter should be subject to the "whole record" rule but those of the former should not.
Moreover, there is a basis on which the "whole record" rule can
be applied by the Court to the findings of the Industrial Commission. North Carolina has a statute making provision for judicial
review of the decisions of administrative agencies of the state.'
This general judicial review statute provides that it is applicable
"unless adequate procedure for judicial review is provided by some
other statute."' 7 The Court has held that judicial review provided
by another statute is adequate "only if the scope of review is equal
to that under" the above general judicial review statute.' 8 This
"1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-86 (1965).
"2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-94(b)(5) (1965).
" Logan v. Johnson, 218 N.C. 200, 10 S.E.2d 653 (1940). Such was
the holding in Petree v. Duke Power Co., 268 N.C. 419, 150 S.E.2d 749
(1966) from which the dictum quoted in the text was taken.
'

Smith v. Southern Waste Paper Co., 226 N.C. 47, 36 S.E.2d 730

(1946).

" Penland v. Bird Coal Co., 246 N.C. 26, 97 S.E.2d 432 (1957) ; Thomason v. Red Bird Cab Co., 235 N.C. 602, 70 S.E.2d 706 (1952).
:N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to -316 (1964).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-307 (1964).
18Jarrell v. Board of Adjustment, 258 N.C. 476, 128 S.E.2d 879 (1963).
A writ of certiorari had been obtained to review the decision of a zoning
board of adjustment. The Court said, "While G.S. 160-178 provides expressly for a review 'by proceedings in the nature of certiorari', this is an
'adequate procedure for judicial review' only if the scope of review is equal
to that under G.S. Chapter 143, Article 33, 143-306 et seq.' Id. at 480, 128
S.E.2d at 883. The Court concluded that the finding of fact upon which the
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would seem to mean that the general judicial review statute provides the minimum scope for judicial review.19 That statute provides for reversal of an agency decision if it is "unsupported by
competent, material and substantial evidence in view of the entire
record," etc.2" A review under which the reviewing court must
affirm the agency decision if any competent evidence sustains it is
more restricted in scope than that under the "entire record" rule
and therefore would seem to be inadequate under the general judicial review statute and to be replaced by its "entire record" rule.
The Court's apparent position that the judicial review in another statute is adequate only if it is-equal in scope to that under
the general judicial review statute appears well advised. Particular
statutes, each providing for review of some one administrative
agency of the state, vary widely for no apparent reason except that
they were separately drafted at different times by different draftsmen. Making the scope of the judicial review provided in the general review statute a minimum would produce more uniformity. One
result would, of course, be to make the "whole record" rule of the
general review statute applicable to other agencies even though their
particular statutes do not go that far. Such a result seems compatible with well considered legislative policy favoring the "whole
record" rule since it is provided for not only in the general judicial
review statute but also in the statutory provisions for review of the
licensing boards of the state21 and in the recently revised statute
for the regulation of public utilities,22 as well as in the Federal
Administrative. Procedure Act.2 3
B. Appeal as in the case of Consent References
The needless variety in particular North Carolina statutes each
providing for judicial review of some one administrative agency is
illustrated by the statute providing for an appeal to the superior
court from an action by the N.C. State Board of Dental Examiners
board based its decision was not supported by competent, material and substantial evidence in view of the entire record as required by N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 143-315(5) (1964).
" North Carolinza Case Law--Administrative Law, 42 N.C.L. Rnv. 600,
603 (1964).
' 0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-315(5) (1964).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 150-27(5)
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-94(b) (5)(1964).
(1965.
23 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (B) (5), (6) (1964).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

depriving a dentist of his license. The appeal is on the record and
shall be heard "as in the case of consent references." 24 In N.C.
State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Grady25 the Court held that this
means that the reviewing court like the referee is to make its "own
independent determination of the truth of the matters in dispute."'
This scope of judicial review goes to the opposite extreme from
that requiring the court to sustain the agency if there is any competent evidence to support its decision, and requires the court to
decide on the facts for itself. It is hard to see why greater weight
should on judicial review be accorded the decisions of, for example,
the State Board of Certified Public Accountant Examiners or the
State Board of Barber Examiners2 7 than the State Board of Dental
Examiners.
C. JurisdictionalDeterminations
When on judicial review the question arises whether an administrative agency had jurisdiction to make the decision involved, the
scope of the review is greatly expanded" over that usually afforded.
In Hicks v. Guilford County2 9 the Industrial Commission found a
juror to be an employee of the county and awarded benefits under
the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act. The Court on
appeal pointed out that whether the employer-employee relationship
existed is jurisdictional and therefore the finding of the commission
"is not conclusive but is reviewable by the court on appeal."8 0 The
Court then held the juror not to be an employee of the county within
the Workmen's Compensation Act and did so by looking to the law
concerning the selection and functioning of jurors. 1
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-94(b)(5) (1965).
2-268 N.C. 541, 151 S.E.2d 25 (1966).
"Id. at 543, 151 S.E.2d at 27 (1966).

These bodies are included in the statute providing procedure for licensGEN. STAT. § 150-9 (1964), with its more restricted provision for judicial review, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150-27(5) (1964).
28 The reviewing court, for example, must itself consider the evidence
in the record and find the jurisdictional facts without regard to the agency's
finding. This rule and its application are discussed by Hanft, Administrative
Law, North Carolina Case Law, 44 N.C.L. RIv. 889, 892 (1966).
',

ing boards, N.C.

"267 N.C. 364, 148 S.E.2d 240 (1966).
"Id. at 365, 148 S.E.2d at 242 (1966).
"The same result was reached by the same process in Board of County
Comm'rs v. Evans, 99 Colo. 83, 60 P.2d 225 (1936), followed without discussion in Seward v. County of Bernalillo, 61 N.M. 52, 294 P.2d 625 (1956).
By the same process the opposite result was reached in Industrial Comm'n v.

Rogers, 122 Ohio St. 134, 171 N.E. 35 (1930).
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PROCEDURAL R.EQUIREMENTS-LIBERAL ATTITUDE
A liberal attitude toward administrative agency procedures was
expressed in two cases involving appeals from the Utilities Commission. In State ex rel. Util. Comm'an v. Southern Ry.32 the Court
sustained the commission's disapproval of an increase in switching
charges by twenty-nine railroads where their evidence was insufficient. In so doing the Court quoted with approval:
The notion that commissions of this kind should be closely restricted by the courts, and that justice in our day can only be had
in courts, is not conducive to the best results .... All doubts as
to the propriety of means or methods used in the exercise of a
power dearly conferred should be resolved in favor of the action
of the commissioners in the interest of the administration of the
33
law.
In State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co.,3 4 the
commission granted an applicant a certificate of public convenience
and necessity permitting it to operate a mobile radio service for
communication with persons in automobiles, and required the telephone company serving the area to interconnect its system with the
mobile system of the applicant. The superior court reversed, and
the Court affirmed the reversal. The Court held that the certificate
of the telephone company included such mobile service, and another
applicant may not be granted a certificate where the telephone company is ready, able and willing to render the service; further that
the commission had no statutory authority to order the interconnection of the two systems.
The Court noted that the commission is required by statute to
apply the rules of evidence applicable in civil actions "insofar as
practicable."3 5 Nevertheless, said the Court, procedure before the
commission is not as formal as that in the superior court. On the
question of applicant's ability to serve, the commission could take
into account facts arising after the hearing and shown by exhibits
filed thereafter, when the adverse party has had notice that such
exhibits have been filed with the commission for inclusion in the
record. The adverse party then has the right to demand reopening
" 267 N.C. 317, 148 S.E.2d 210 (1966), on rehearing 268 N.C. 204, 150
S.E.2d 337 (1966).
" 267 N.C. at 324, 148 S.E.2d at 215-16 (1966).
"267 N.C. 257, 148 S.E.2d 100 (1966).
"N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 62-65(a)

(1965).
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of the hearing in order to permit cross-examination and rebuttal
evidence. However the adverse party, the telephone company, had
sought no such reopening.
ZONING ORDINANCE-VARIANCE BY BOARD oF ADJUSTMENT

Austin v. Brunneme"

involved an application for a permit to

erect an automobile paint and body repair shop. The county zoning

ordinance prohibited the erection of any building in the zoned areas
except those specifically permitted. The ordinance provided that the
Board of Adjustment could, under circumstances and conditions
specified in the ordinance, modify or vary its provisions. The board
on appeal from the building inspector denied the permit on the
ground that the building would violate the ordinance since automobile paint and body shops were not in any permitted classification,
and that no sufficient reason was shown why the ordinance should
be modified. The Court, however, pointed to another provision of
the ordinance empowering the board to authorize variance from the
terms of the ordinance in hardship cases within prescribed conditions and limitations. The Court reasoned that variances under this
provision were not a change or modification of the ordinance. The
provision for such variances is as much a part of the ordinance as
any other provision. The case was ordered remanded to the board
to exercise its discretion in the matter.
The Court treated as valid the provision for variance from the
terms of the ordinance, but did not discuss the validity of the provision authorizing the board to modify or vary the terms of the
ordinance itself. 7 There is authority for the view that even the
latter provision would not be invalid as a delegation of legislative
power where the ordinance provides a sufficient standard to be followed by the board and its action is subject to judicial review for
failure to exercise its discretion in accordance with provisions therefor.3 8
°266 N.C. 697, 147 S.E.2d 182 (1966).
The Court did make the cryptic statement, "Any changes in the zoning
regulations can be made by the Board of Commissioners." Id. at 700, 147
S.E.2d at 184 (1966).
" Huebner v. Philadelphia Say. Fund Soc., 127 Pa. Super. 28, 192 Atl.
139 (1937); 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAw AND PRAcricE §§ 4-19 (3d ed. 1965).
In St. John's Roman Catholic Church v. Board of Adjustments, 125 Conn.
714, 723, 8 A.2d 1, 5 (1939) the court quoted with approval, "'A board of
appeals ...

is created to keep the law, running on an even keel, by varying,
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EXERCISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION BY COURT

In the case of In re Varner 9 the Court stated that on appeal
from a county board of education's order denying reassignment of
a pupil to another school the superior court is to hear the matter de
novo as if it were before the court in the first instance, and that
the court has the same powers to make the reassignment as does
the board.

CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLEADING AND
PARTIES)
MartinB. Louis*
INTRODUCTION
The General Assembly of North Carolina has recently adopted
the Proposed New Rules of Civil Procedure, which will change
the state's civil practice considerably. "These Rules are derived
in large part from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as
are the rules of many other states.1 The Federal Rules need little
introduction or commendation. They have been tested in the courts
for almost thirty years and have earned almost unanimous acclaim.
The late Judge John J. Parker, one of North Carolina's most distinguished jurists, said of them:
It is now almost universally conceded that these rules have given
to the federal courts in their civil jurisdiction the best code of
practice that is to be found anywhere in this country, or for that
2
matter anywhere in this world.
within prescribed limits and consonant with the exercise of a legal discretion, the strict letter of the zoning law, in cases of claims having real merit
which can be granted consistently with the spirit and purposes of the general
plan.' "

266 N.C. 409, 146 S.E.2d 401 (1966).
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
See generally 1 BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACrICF AND PROcEDunu, § 9 (Wright ed. 1960). Over twenty states have in essence adopted
the Federal Rules. Many others have borrowed from them.

'Parker, Book Review, 57 HARV. L. REv. 735, 736 (1944).
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North Carolina procedure had been almost unmarked by this reform
movement.3 Accordingly, it seems appropriate here to contrast
briefly the two systems in order to highlight the significant new
approach to procedure taken by the new rules.
Procedure is awesomely omnipresent in North Carolina decisions. Few lack at least one point of practice. Indeed there are endless pages of annotations under those provisions of the Code governing demurrer, nonsuit, instructions to the jury, new trial and appeal
and error. Such preoccupation with procedure, and its baneful consequences, was condemned by Roscoe Pound in 1906 in his famous
address, "The Cause of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice." 4 Regrettably, one would be hard pressed to discern in the latest volumes of the North Carolina Reports significant
improvement in the conditions he recounted some sixty years ago.
The hard truth is that such preoccupation is the mark of a legal
system's immaturity. North Carolina had, of course, passed beyond
Maine's famous observation that "[s]o great is the ascendancy of
the Law of Actions in the infancy of Courts of Justice, that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the
interstices of procedure."' And it could not foolishly boast, as did the
fictitious Baron Surrebutter, that the rules of pleading had been so
refined "that nearly half the cases coming recently before the Courts
have been decided upon points of pleading."' It is fair to say, however, that its Code procedure was still struggling, with no promise of
imminent success, to grow beyond its adolescence almost one hundred years after its birth. Elsewhere in the common law world,
procedure was receding quietly into the background and more efficiently performing its principal function of facilitating the disposition of cases on their merits. Consequently, judges could devote
'Only the little used pre-trial conference provision of the present Code
can be traced to the influence of the Federal Rules.
' Reprinted by the American Judicature Society (1956). This speech is
in large part an attack on the procedure of its day. It assails such familiar
practices as the "sporting theory of justice" which "awards new trials or
reverses judgments, or sustains demurrers in the interest of regular play,"
rather than "substantive law and justice"; "the injustice of deciding cases
upon points of practice"; the complacent patchwork amendment of the Code;
"the lavish granting of new trials," and "the waste and delay caused by...
obsolete procedure."
'MAINE, EARLY LAW AND CusTom 389 (1883).
'Hayes, "Crogate's Case: A Dialogue in Ye Shades on Special Pleading Reform," reprinted in 9 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw
417, 427 (3d ed. 1966).
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most of their time to the substantive law, in which, as Judge Craven

has noted, "[t] here are enough problems.., to occupy all of us all
of our time."7
This preoccupation also brought in its wake serious delay and an
immense squandering of legal resources that a state so lacking in
lawyers, judges and per capita income as North Carolina could ill
afford. Consider, for example, the verbal effusiveness of attorneys
setting forth in their pleadings their opening statements to the jury
and the time expended in the resultant judicial editing process ;' the
right of every plaintiff to a second day in court if his case is bad
enough or his attorney not confident enough;9 the right of an attorney to demand a new trial if he chooses to remain silent in the
face of a material variance until it is too late to save the trial in
progress ;o the need for countless new trials because a jury is considered more receptive to misstatements of law than the attorney
for the losing party;" the inability to join persons having closely
related claims in a single action ;1" the requirement that an attorney
' Address by the Hon. J. Braxton Craven, Jr., Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Colloquium on the Proposed New Rules of Civil Procedure for North Carolina, University of
North Carolina, School of Law, November 30, 1966.
' In North Carolina attorneys read their pleadings to the jury instead of
making an opening statement. Justice Higgins has described this practice
as "banjo work." Dowd. v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 263 N.C. 101,
105, 139 S.E.2d 10, 14 (1964). See generally Brandis, Civil Procedure
(Pleading and Parties), Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 43 N.C.L.
R v. 873 (1965); Brandis and Bumgarner, The Motion To Strike Pleadings
in North Carolina, 29 N.C.L. REv. 3, 4 (1950).
'The dismissal of a plaintiff nonsuited for insufficient evidence is ordinarily without prejudice. See Walker v. Story, 256 N.C. 453, 124 S.E.2d 113
(1962). Plaintiff may also take a voluntary nonsuit anytime before the announcement of the verdict. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-224 (1953).
"°Afailure to object to materially variant evidence is not a waiver or
implied consent to the trial of the unpleaded issue, as it is in most jurisdictions today. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b). The objection may be raised in
North Carolina by motion for compulsory nonsuit at the close of plaintiff's
evidence. Whichard v. Lipe, 221 N.C. 53, 19 S.E.2d 14 (1942); Note, 41
N.C.L. REv. 647 (1963). If there is no allegation whatsoever to support the
proof, this defect may be raised sua sponte on appeal for the first time. See
Little v. Stevens, 267 N.C. 328, 148 S.E.2d 201 (1966).
" A party does not waive errors in the trial judge's charge by failing
to call them to his attention before the jury goes out. Instead he may
sharpshoot the charge for errors after verdict goes against him. See generally Paschal, A Plea for a Return to Ride 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in North Carolina, 36 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1957).
" McINToSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTIcE AND PROCEDURE § 644 (2d
ed. 1956)

[hereinafter cited as McINTosH]. Thus immediate dismissal is

required if an infant's action for personal injuries is joined with a parent's
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author a novel as well as a brief on appeal, though he is less efficient
than the Xerox machine, that has elsewhere replaced him."8
Such a grueling process must often bring the disadvantaged litigant to his knees and persuade even the privileged to shun the "justice" of the courts. In theory it should also offer generous rewards to
attorneys that bill their clients by the hour. In 1853 Dickens decried such "justice" in his novel Bleak House. Within a score of
years English civil procedure gladly shed most of these cumbrous
trappings, which almost a century later still burdened our own.
Finally, this procedural fetish often unjustly deprives litigants
of a hearing on the merits of their claims. Every procedural system
must contain such doctrines as variance, waiver, limitations and res
judicata. But their invocation should ordinarily require a genuine
offense to the underlying goal they seek to effect-the efficiency,
order and stability of the judicial process. Recognition and implementation of this truth is the most significant contribution of modern procedure. It has eliminated many of the snares in which attorneys are inevitably caught and has also increased considerably
the occasions on which, though initially caught, they may free
themselves and continue. Notable examples are the simplification of
pleading and appellate procedure, the liberalization of amendment
and relation back and the requirement that procedural defects must
be raised immediately.
These welcome developments heretofore'received a cool reception
in North Carolina. Allowance of relation back is niggardly;14 allowaction for loss of services. Campbell v. Washington Light & Power Co.,
166 N.C. 488, 82 S.E. 842 (1914). Especially egregious are the Court's
newly developed rules forbidding crossclaims for contribution between joint
tortfeasors and crossclaims or third party claims for contractual indemnification. E.g., Greene v. Charlotte Chem. Lab., Inc., 254 N.C. 680, 120 S.E.2d

82 (1961). Prof. Brandis has referred to these rules as "overly technical,

illogical, unrealistic, not required by statute, and in defiance of more modem
and efficient notions now well accepted in many other jurisdictions, most
notably in the federal courts." Brandis, Civil Procedure (Pleading and
Parties), Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 44 N.C.L. REv. 897, 915

(1966).

" Appellant may not simply reprint relevant sections of the transcript of
testimony at trial. His attorney must summarize the evidence in narrative
form. N.C. Sup. CT. R. 19(4). Failure to do so will result in dismissal of
the appeal. Standard Amusement Co. v. Tarkington, 251 N.C. 461, 111
S.E.2d 538 (1959).
", An amendment will not relate back if the complaint is so seriously
defective that it is labeled a statement of a defective cause of action, George
v. Atlanta & Charlotte Ry., 210 N.C. 58, 185 S.E. 431 (1936), or if a
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a nce of belated procedural objections is generous ;15 protection of the
right to amend is seriously deficient;1 and enforcement of the
minutiae of pleading and appellate procedure 17 is strict. It would at
least be understandable if this adherence to strictissimi juris constituted a felt, carefully articulated appreciation of the societal needs it
properly embraces. For aught that appears in the decisions, however, it was apparently based on nothing more profound than unquestioning adherence to the ways of the past. But, as Justice Holmes
observed so long ago with respect to the law's overly indulgent
recherche du temps perdu:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.' s
demurrer is sustained before it is tendered. Webb v. Eggleston, 228 N.C.
574, 46 S.E.2d 700 (1948). Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c), by which an
amendment relates back any time it arises out of the same transaction or
occurrence.
I" Serious defects in the statement of a claim may be challenged for the
first time on appeal through a demurrer ore tenus. Stamey v. Rutherfordton
Elec. Membership Corp., 247 N.C. 640, 101 S.E.2d 814 (1958); see gen'erally MclNTOSn § 1194 (Supp. 1964). By contrast modern procedure treats

procedural defects as waived if not raised immediately by demurrer or answer. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 531 (2d ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as
CLARK].

Furthermore, modern procedure treats objections to materially

variant evidence waived if not made 'immediately, FED.. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
North Carolina does not. See note 10 supra.
" Although the Supreme Court has liberally articulated the rules governing amendment, it has apparently never found an abuse of discretion in a
lower court's denial of leave to amend. See Consolidated Vending Co. v.
Turner, 267 N.C. 576, 148 S.E.2d 531 (1966), discussed infra.
"In Pruitt v. Wood, 199 N.C. 788, 156 S.E. 126 (1930), the Court
voiced its impatience with the frequent violations of its appellate rules and
stated that future cases would be dismissed without explanation of the authority of that opinion. Since that time Shepard's Citations shows approximately ninety citations to that opinion. Admittedly many of these citations
were to other aspects of it. Nevertheless, is it not time to inquire whether it
is the rules, rather than the attorneys, that are primarily at fault? Consider
by contrast to North Carolina's incredibly complex appellate procedure the
usual federal practice, whereby appellant merely gives notice of appeal, reprints relevant portions of the record, including the testimony, in an appendix and writes a brief. WRIGHT, FEDERAL Cou Ts 408-09 (1963). There
is no reason why North Carolina cannot eschew its current appellate rigmarole in favor of the simplified modern practice. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina, however, constitutionally controls its own appellate procedure,
and reform must, therefore, await its enlightenment. Covington v. Hanes
Hosiery Mills Company, 195 N.C. 478, 142 S.E. 705 (1928).
" Holmes, The Path of the Law, reprinted in 10 HARv. L. REv. 457,
469 (1897).
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Some will say these observations are too hard. The demands
made upon the courts are awesome and they will inevitably err. To
this plea I must demur. It is not that North Carolina decisions so
frequently miss the mark, but that they miss so widely. In evaluating them, it is too often sufficient merely to cite the twentieth century."0 What possible defense is there to results, excepting those
specifically ordained by statute, that adopt or blindly follow, as the
simplest hornbook would readily disclose, the almost universally
abandoned practices of the dark ages of the law?2" And why do these
decisions so often omit citation to, let alone discussion of, the vast
body of contrary modern precedent?" Finally, why do the courts
persist in these obvious errors, long after they have been patiently
and temperately exposed in the pages of this journal, invariably to
no avail? Regrettably there are no ready answers to these questions;
there are only the serious doubts that the need to put them creates.
I have dwelt at length on these problems in order to point up the
serious failings of our present system and the justifications for the
wholesale legislative 2 renovation that has recently taken place.
Other states have, of course, been similarly plagued by such
problems. But many of them more speedily heeded the inevitable voices of reform. In concluding I reprint one reformer's words,
which, though uttered in the nineteenth century, will have embarrassing relevance in North Carolina until 1969.
CROGATE: But what I want to know is whether there are no
courts, where you can get justice, or something like it, without any special pleading.
SUR. B. Oh, yes. In consequence of an idle and absurd clamour
on the part of the public, some inferior courts were established a short time back to enable the common people to sue
for small debts and damages under twenty pounds; and in
these courts, the proceedings are wholly free from the refinements of special pleading.
See, e.g., cases or rules cited notes 10-15 supra.

201Ibid.
' Ibid.

"In 1959 a bill to give the Supreme Court of North Carolina procedural
rule making authority, the means by which most states have adopted new
rules of procedure, died in committee, after passing one house of the General Assembly, because the Court demanded constitutional, rather than statu-

tory, authority, over which the General Assembly would have no control.
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CROGATE: But, if special pleading is a good thing, why is it
done without in these courts?
SUR. B. Because of the expense and delay which the forms of
correct pleading would occasion, and because neither practitioners nor judges could be expected to understand the system properly; and moreover, Mr. Crogate, in these trifling
matters, the great object is to administer substantial justice
in the simplest form and at the least expense.
CROGATE: Well, in my ignorance, I should have thought that
2
would have been the object in great cases as well as small. 3
REPLIES AND THE PLEADINGS OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION

At common law a complaint disclosing on its face the defense of
the general statute of limitations 4 was not demurrable. The defense
25
Plaintiff
had to be raised by a plea in bar or in the answer.
26
if he
and
reply,
a
called
now
was required to file a replication,
failed therein to deny defendant's allegations or to allege that the
statute of limitations had been tolled by some circumstance, such as
his infancy or defendant's absence from the jurisdiction, his replication was demurrable.
Although the reasons for the common law rule had effectively
ceased at the time the Field Code was written, 7 North Carolina and
" Hayes, Crogate's Case: A Dialogue in Ye Shades on Special Pleading
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 417,
429 (3d ed. 1966).
' CLARK 522; Atkinson, Pleading the Statute of Limitations, 36 YALE
L.J. 914, 919 (1927) [hereinafter cited as ATKINSON].
" Where the period of limitations is a condition precedent of the cause of
action, such as when it is built into a statute or contract creating the underlying substantive right, the disclosure of its running on the face of the complaint may be challenged by demurrer. Gaskins v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.,
260 N.C. 122, 131 S.E.2d 872 (1963); CLARx 522 n.82.
" At common law each party was required to continue pleading until the
case was at issue; that is, until one party demurred to or denied the other's
allegations. SHIPMAN, COMMON LAw PLEADING 31 (3d ed. Ballantine 1923)
[hereinafter cited as SHIPMAN].
2 Ordinarily a complaint disclosing on its face the existence of an affirmative defense to the claim asserted exhibits a demurrable defect of substance. Scott v. Statesville Plywood & Veneer Co., 240 N.C. 73, 81 S.E.2d
146 (1954). Its dismissal is, therefore, an adjudication on the merits. Davis
v. Anderson Indus., 266 N.C. 610, 146 S.E.2d 817 (1966). But when the
disclosed defense is the statute of limitations, plaintiff can often establish
circumstances tolling the running of the statute. To avoid cutting off plaintiff's right to allege such circumstances, the common law forbade the use of
a demurrer. ATKINSON 921. Instead it required plaintiff to allege these
circumstances in his replication if defendant pleaded the statute of limitaReforms," reprinted in 9
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many other Code states chose to adhere to it.23 Others, now the
majority, foreswore it and allowed a demurrer or motion to dismiss.29 In fact, in many courts today a hearing on the defense,
even when not disclosed on the complaint's face, may be provoked
immediately by means of a motion for summary judgment.30
The North Carolina Code, unlike the common law and other
versions of the Code, does not require plaintiff to reply to new matter.3" He may at his discretion reply," but if he does not he is
tions. Plaintiff could have been required to anticipate the defense in his
declaration, but he would often have forgotten to do so and, as a result,
his action would have been dismissed on the merits. The common law
wisely held, therefore, that such allegations were unnecessary and were to
be treated as surplusage if pleaded. CRuK 251-52.
The demurrer could have been used if plaintiff had thereafter been permitted to amend. ATKINSON 922. But amendment at common law was
burdened with technical limitations. Allowing it in this situation also would
have suggested that the defect was not substantive, as similar disclosed
demurrable defenses were. Furthermore, at early common law defendant
could assert only one defense. CLARK 13. If he chose the statute of limitations, he hardly cared whether he raised it by demurrer or plea in bar. Later,
however, when he was allowed to plead all his defenses, he was understandably reluctant to prepare and disclose his entire answer before plaintiff
demonstrated his ability to avoid the defense disclosed on the face of his
declaration. Thus equity and many common law and code jurisdictions began
to permit demurrers. CLARK 522; ATKINSON 922-26. In addition they also
allowed plaintiff, by amended complaint or new action, to allege circumstances tolling the statute. Gilmer v. Morris, 46 Fed. 333 (C.C.M.D. Ala.
1891); Newhall v. Hatch, 134 Cal. 269, 66 Pac. 266 (1901); Bonnifield v.
Price, 1 Wyo. 223 (1875); ATKINSoN 922. Since the North Carolina Code
did not otherwise bar this improved procedure, its provision forbidding the
use of demurrers was unnecessary.
The common law also advanced two other insubstantial objections to
permitting demurrers in this situation. First it was said that although the
demurrer searched the record, it did not search the back of the declaration,
on which the date of filing or service was inscribed. ATxINsoN 920-21.
Secondly, it was held that matters of time alleged in a pleading were not
"material." True, they were not material for purposes of variance or denial.
But could they not have been material for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading? FED. R. Civ. P. 9(f) now makes them material for
this latter purpose.
"North Carolina and a few other states codified the rule. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-15 (1953); ATKINsoN 921 n.61. Others adhered to it by judicial
construction. ATKINSON 924.
" ATKINSON 925. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a motion
to dismiss when the statute of limitations is disclosed on the face of the
complaint.

1A

BARRON & HoLTzorF,

§ 281
(Wright ed. 1960).
"O
FED.
R. Civ. P. 56.

" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 11-140 (1953)

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

provides that plaintiff must reply

to an answer containing a counterclaim that is served upon him or his attorney. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-141 (1953) states that plaintiff may demur to an

answer containing new matter.

" There is no language in the Code allowing plaintiff, at his option, to
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assumed to have denied or avoided all new matter in defendant's
answer. 33 The Code authorizes the trial court, at defendant's request, to order plaintiff to reply. 4 And when the bar of the statute
of limitations is disclosed on the face of the complaint, the court
should ordinarily so order.3 5 But few have sought to use this deviceO8 and, not surprisingly, many began to resent the seeming impossibility of making plaintiff "put up or shut up" before trial.
Thus, the courts began to dispose summarily of such cases before
trial in formal pre-trial conference 7 on motion for judgment on
the pleadings 8 and on motion to dismiss in special hearings just
before trial began.3 9
Such a hearing was-held in Little v. Stevens,4 ° where the plaintiff, a Tennessee resident, sued defendant in North Carolina for
injuries arising out of an automobile accident in Tennessee. The
applicable Tennessee period of limitations was one year; the applicable North Carolina period, three years; and the cause of action
file a reply and similar statutes, such as the Federal Rules, have been construed to bar a reply filed without the Court's permission. Beckstrom v.
Coastwise Line, 13 F.R.D. 480 (D. Alas. 1953). The North Carolina practice, however, permits plaintiff to file a reply if he desires. Olmstead v. City
of Raleigh, 130 N.C. 243, 41 S.E. 292 (1902); James v. R.R., 121 N.C. 530,
28 S.E. 537 (1897). Because North Carolina practice permits the pleadings
to be read to the jury, many plaintiffs choose to file replies. See note 8
supra.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-159 (1953) provides in part that "the allegation
of new matter in the answer, not relating to a counterclaim, or of new
matter in reply, is to be deemed controverted by the adverse party as upon
a direct denial or avoidance, as the case requires."
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-141 (1953). If plaintiff does not avoid the defense in his reply, defendant may demur under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-142
(1953), and the demurrer, I believe, should be sustained. This question was
left open by the Court in Reid v. Holden, 242 N.C. 408, 416, 88 S.E.2d 125,
131 (1955).
" Cf. Fitzgerald v. Shelton, 95 N.C. 519 (1896).
" The annotations to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-141 (1953) and MCINTOSH
§ 1264 cite no cases involving such a motion. This is not conclusive, however. The trial court's ruling on such a motion is discretionary and few
would, therefore, attempt to reverse it on appeal.
"' Speas v. Ford, 253 N.C. 770, 117 S.E.2d 784 (1961). In effect this is
equivalent to a hearing before trial on a motion to dismiss. See note 39 infra.
.. City of Reidsville v. Burton, 269 N.C. 206, 152 S.E.2d 147 (1967);
Gillikin v. Bell, 254 N.C. 244, 118 S.E.2d 609 (1961); Mobley v. Broome,
248 N.C. 54, 102 S.E.2d 407 (1958); Reid v. Holden, 242 N.C. 408, 88
S.E.2d 125 (1955). None of these cases, or those cited in note 37 supra, or
note 39 infra, indicate that plaintiff attempted, or was barred from attempting, to establish at the hearing circumstances tolling the statute of limitations.
"Rowland v. Beauchamp, 253 N.C. 231, 116 S.E.2d 720 (1960).
, 267 N.C. 328, 148 S.E.2d 201 (1966).
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accrued more than a year before the action was commenced. The
parties apparently agreed that a recently enacted North Carolina
statute barred the action if barred in Tennessee.4" But the trial court
specifically found,' and plaintiff, therefore, presumably proved,
facts that seemed to toll the Tennessee statute of limitations. 43 The
trial court, however, ruled without explanation44 that the statute had
run.
On appeal the Supreme Court refused to consider the merits of
plaintiff's contentions. Instead it held that the trial court's findings
were unavailing because plaintiff had failed to file a reply alleging
the ultimate facts on which they were based, 5 and, as it was ordained
on Mt. Sinai, proof without allegation is as unavailing as allegation
without proof. As a result plaintiff's substantial claim for personal
injuries 40 was effectively extinguished without a hearing on the
"'This statute, to which the Court directed the major part of its opinion
(although neither party questioned its interpretation in his brief), is found
in the 1955 amendment to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-121 (Supp. 1965) and provides "that where a cause of action arose outside of this State and is barred
by the laws of the jurisdiction in which it arose, no action may be maintained in the courts of this State for the enforcement thereof, except where
the cause of action originally accrued in favor of a resident of this State."
But for this provision the longer North Carolina statute of limitations
would have been applied under ordinary conflict of laws principles. Sayer v.
Henderson, 225 N.C. 642, 35 S.E.2d 875 (1945). This aspect of the case
will be discussed in the Conflict of Laws section of this Survey.
"'The trial court indicated it would hold a special hearing just before
trial to consider this issue, the parties waived jury trial and the trial court
included findings of fact in its judgment. Record, pp. 12-15, Little v. Stevens,
267 N.C. 328, 148 S.E.2d 201 (1966).
"'The court found that defendant left Tennessee about three months after
the cause of action accrued. Record, p. 13. This departure, plaintiff alleged,
tolled the statute of limitations under TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-112 (1955).
The trial court also found that plaintiff had previously instituted against
defendant in Tennessee a timely action that was dismissed on June 28, 1963,
on defendant's plea in abatement. Record, pp. 12-13. TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 28-106 (1955) provides, like N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-25 (1953), for the commencement of a new action within one year after a dismissal of a timely
action upon any ground other than the merits. Since plaintiff commenced
his new action within a year on November 21, 1963, and the plea in abatement
had not concerned the merits (it apparently was based on insufficient process), his action, he contended, was not barred.
"Although the trial court made findings of fact, it made no conclusions
of law other than the statement that plaintiff's action was barred. Record,
p. 14. Presumably it accepted defendant's contentions, as stated in his brief,
that neither Tennessee saving provision was applicable. The merits of these
contentions are irrelevant since the Court refused to consider them. It suffices to say that they are clearly debatable, as the Court itself seemed to concede. Little v. Stevens, 267 N.C. 328, 338, 148 S.E.2d 201, 208 (1966).
"Id. at 338, 148 S.E.2d at 208.
,O
The amount claimed was $45,000. It was of little solace to plaintiff
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merits. If it were plaintiff's fault, then he has grievously answered
for it.4 7 In fact, it was not. The Court actually made very questionable new law in utter disregard of a controlling statute. Furthermore, it did so in deciding an issue that had not been raised in the
briefs or record on appeal and apparently not even in the trial court.
The Court's starting point was the settled proposition that summary procedures may be invoked if a reply has not been filed. It
cited no authority in point,48 however-and there apparently is none
-for its second proposition that plaintiff, in the absence of a suitable reply, cannot establish at the summary hearing circumstances
tolling the statute of limitations. 9 There is no warrant or necessity
for this rule. A reply to any new matter gives welcome notice to
defendant and may also permit the immediate disposition of plaintiff's claim. But defendant may avoid surprise through discovery ;8O
and he may smoke out plaintiff by asking the court to order a reply
or by invoking summary proceedings. Given these possibilities, the
draftsmen of the North Carolina Code chose on balance to make a
reply to new matter optional in order to avoid the endless pleadings
of the common law. 51 They provided specifically, therefore, in G.S.
§ 1-159 that plaintiff is deemed to have denied or avoided all new
matter in order to bar the very result the Court now reaches. This
that his claim for property damage in the amount of $400, for which Tennessee provided a longer statute of limitations, was not barred.
"' To be more precise, plaintiff must answer for the fault of his attorney,
a fact that courts conveniently overlook in their purges of procedural error.
' The Court did cite a seemingly approving dictum in Stubbs v. Motz,
113 N.C. 458, 459, 18 S.E. 387 (1893). This dictum has never been followed, was based on authority not in point and completely overlooked a
contrary provision of the Code, now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-159 (1953).
,9 In apparent reply to early criticism of her opinion, Justice Sharp added
to the version that appeared in the North Carolina Advance Sheets a citation
to MCINTOSH § 373 (Supp. 1964), which citation appears at 148 S.E.2d
208, and suggested that the author, Dean Dickson Phillips of the University
of North Carolina School of Law, supplies "the rationale of this procedure."
Ibid. But Dean Phillips suggests only that if a reply is not filed, summary
procedures may be invoked. He does not state, or even intimate, that plaintiff will be barred at the hearing from proving circumstances tolling the
statute of limitations.
" Some courts might also grant a motion by defendant for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars. Cf. Hanson v. Hanson, 203 Misc.
396, 119 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1953) (compelling plaintiff to state whether a con'tract was oral or in writing in order to raise the statute of frauds-in effect
compelling plaintiff to plead matter in avoidance in his complaint if the
contract was admitted to be oral).
" CLARK 687-88. It should be noted that in many code states, a reply to
new matter is mandatory. Id. at 689 n.7.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[V'ol. 45

provision was hardly intended to provide plaintiff with an impenetrable cloak of silence. But it clearly did intend to permit him to
establish his case once his silence was broken. Furthermore, it is
irrelevant that plaintiff disclosed the defense on the face of his complaint. That fact may justify the termination of his conditional
privilege of remaining silent, but it cannot penalize him for relying
on it initially. The Court's decision thus effects a pro tanto repeal of
G.S. § 1-159, a phenomenon made even more anomalous by the fact
that the Court did not even bother to cite or discuss it in its opinion.
Furthermore, the record and briefs show no objection by defendant at any time to plaintiff's proof without allegation. The question was apparently raised by the Supreme Court on its own motion.52 Most modern courts would hold that the defect was waived
at trial.5 s The need for such a rule is especially compelling here. At
worst a variance or missing allegation will ordinarily necessitate a
wasteful new trial.5 4 But here it extinguished plaintiff's claim altogether. If the Court is inclined to legislate in this area, here is legislation all would applaud.55
Finally, the Court ignored the universally followed rule, 55 which
" This fact does not appear in the Court's opinion. It is of course possible that defendant raised the question in his oral argument.
"E.g., Dacus v. Burns, 206 Ark. 810, 177 S.W.2d 748 (1944); George
v. Jensen, 49 N.M. 410, 165 P.2d 129 (1946).
"'When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as
if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any
party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does
not affect the result of the. trial of these issues. .

.

.' This rule, although

derived from Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, and identical therewith, is but
declaratory of a rule long obtaining in this jurisdiction that absence
of a pleading to support proof is waived when a party litigates the
issue without objection."
Id. at 413-14, 165 P.2d at 131. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b) codifies this twentieth
century realization that proof without pleading is, in the absence of immediate objection, availing. The New Rules of Procedure for North Carolina
adopt this welcome rule.
"If plaintiff's evidence is excluded because of the absence of a suitable
allegation, he may take a voluntary nonsuit and begin a new action within a
year. If plaintiff is nonsuited for this reason after resting his case, he may
similarly begin again within a year. N.C. GEIN. STAT. § 1-25 (1953).
" As note 53 supra shows, courts have often applied this rule without
the benefit of a specific statute.
"'Murphy v. Queens Citizens Bank of Clovis, 244 F.2d 511, 512 (10th
Cir. 1957) ("The Court of Appeals has no duty to search the record for
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57

it too often honors only in the breach, that a new issue, especially
one of procedure only, will ordinarily not be considered for the first
time at the appellate level. The wisdom of this rule is clearly applicable here. Had the question of variance been raised below, the

trial court might have permitted plaintiff to amend.58 On appeal,
however, it is ordinarily inconvenient for the appellate court to hear
evidence in order to make this discretionary ruling. Here, however,
given the Court's determination to make law at any cost, how simple
it would have been to permit plaintiff to amend. 9 That the Court
error upon a ground neither briefed nor argued"). Vestal, Sua Sponte
Considerationsin Appellate Review, 27 FoiwDrAm L. REv. 477 (1958). Exceptions to this rule are made when defects of subject matter jurisdiction are
disclosed, Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley,,211 U.S. 149 (1908), or
manifest injustice might result. Wayne v. New York Life Ins. Co., 132
F.2d 28, 37 (8th Cir. 1942). But even matters affecting the merits
may be waived. Cf. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Howell, 222 F.2d 637 (5th Cir.
1955); Black, Sivalls & Bryson v. Shondell, 174 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1949).
Here, however, the question raised was one of procedure only. It did not
affect the merits. Indeed it"
served to prevent their consideration. As such
who would contend that the Court needed to raise the question on its own
motion to prevent a miscarriage of justice?
"'North Carolina adheres in principle to the rule that new issues may
not be raised for the first time at, the appellate level. MCINTOSH § 1800

(Supp. 1964). This principle should embrace badly pleaded complaints that
omit essential facts or allegations, especially if these omissions are proved
at trial. Some cases even state that an attack on a complaint containing
such a defective statement must be made by demurrer immediately. Davis v.
Rhodes, 231 N.C. 71, 56 S.E.2d 43 (1949). Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court, without regard to doctrinal consistency, Note, 39 N.C.L. REv. 83
(1960), permits challenges to procedural defects of this type for the first
time on appeal through a demurrer ore tenus. Stamey v. Rutherfordton Elec.
Membership Corp., 247 N.C. 640, 101 S.E.2d 814 (1958); McINTOS H § 1194
(Supp. 1964). The result in this case is, at first blush, consistent with the
rule followed in Staney and similar cases, since plaintiff improperly omitted,
I shall concede arguendo, the essential allegation that the statute of limitations had been tolled. Two important factors not present in Stamey were
present here, however. First, the very question had already been heard on
the merits, despite the missing allegation and without objection by defendant. Second, the case was not remanded to the trial court where plaintiff
would have an opportunity to apply for leave to amend. Given the presence
of these two factors here, what possible reason was there for such a belated
inquiry into the quality of the pleadings, other than a misplaced adherence
to the punctili6s of common law procedural literalism?
"Cf. Dacus v. Bums, 206 Ark. 810, 177 S.W.2d 748 (1944) ("Had
appellant made timely objection by demurrer to the complaint or otherwise,
the complaint would have been amended at that time").
" The Supreme Court may allow amendment "for the purpose of furthering justice." N.C. Sup. CT. R. 20(4). Here it should have done so on its
own motion. Plaintiff could hardly have anticipated the need for amendment himself, since the issue necessitating it was apparently raised by the
Court for the first time in its opinion.
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failed under such compelling circumstances to do this or anything
else in order to reach the merits is tragic and frightening.
Nevertheless, the Court's action is clear. Hereafter plaintiff's
attorneys are advised to file a reply whenever their complaint shows
on its face a non-demurrable affirmative defense and the defense
is pleaded by defendant. Plaintiffs need not reply, however, to any
other new matter. The Code clearly protects their privilege here to
remain silent.
AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS

In recent years the Supreme Court has extended the outer limits
of a trial judge's discretion to allow amendment of pleadings."' It
has also regularly reversed trial judges that fail to exercise their
discretion. 2 But it has unfortunately refused to examine the exercise of discretion itself." This year was no different. The Court
reaffirmed the principle that an amendment before trial changing the
cause of action is permissible if it arises out of the same transaction.' It continued to reverse trial judges who dismiss complaints
containing defective statements without giving plaintiff an opportunity to seek leave to amend. 5 Finally in Consolidated Vending
Co. v. Turner0 it again affirmed a discretionary denial of leave to
amend under circumstances that would have persuaded many other
appellate courts to reverse. In this case the first trial had ended in
a hung jury. On the eve of the second trial the judge stated that
he would exclude certain evidence, admitted at the first, 7 of a setoff
to plaintiff's claim, apparently because defendant's answer lacked
allegations establishing a suitable foundation for it.,, Defendant im0The statute of frauds, as well as the statute of limitations, immediately
comes to mind. McINToSH § 1190.
"1Perkins v. Langdon, 233 N.C. 240, 63 S.E.2d 565 (1951).

§ 1285 (Supp. 1964).

MCINTOSH

"E.g., Murray v. Benson Aircraft Corp., 259 N.C. 638, 131 S.E.2d 367
(1963); MCINTOSH § 1189 n.55.10 (Supp. 1964).
" Perfecting Service Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales Co., 214 N.C. 79, 140
S.E.2d 763 (1965); see Klopfer v. State of North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213
(1967).
oLGilliam Furniture, Inc. v. Bentwood, Inc., 267 N.C. 119, 147 S.E.2d
612 (1966).
"Walker v. Sprinkle, 267 N.C. 626, 148 S.E.2d 631 (1966).
"267 N.C. 576, 148 S.E.2d 531 (1966).
"Id. at 579-80, 148 S.E.2d at 533-34. The first ruling was not binding,
of course, because, inter alia, a mistrial had been declared.
" Defendant's evidence was eventually excluded for this reason. Id. at
581, 148 S.E.2d at 534-35.
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mediately sought leave to amend his answer, but his application was
denied. The Supreme Court affirmed without comment except for
the statement regularly made in such cases that no manifest abuse of
discretion had been shown.69
From here the abuse seems manifest. How could plaintiff have
been prejudiced by an amendment permitting the introduction of
evidence already admitted in a previous trial? How could defendant
have been accused of non-excusable delay or neglect when the evidence had previously been admitted and its exclusion on the eve of
the second trial was undoubtedly a surprise to him? Perhaps answers to these questions exist, but they were not provided. Therefore, given this prima facie case of an abuse of discretion, the Court
should have reversed. As the Supreme Court of the United States
has observed: "[B]ut outright refusal to grant the leave without
any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of
discretion, it is merely abuse of that discretion."7 °
I am unable to find a single case in which the Court has reversed
a discretionary denial of leave to amend.7 Furthermore, cases reversing other discretionary rulings are extremely rare. It is difficult
to explain this fact. T2 The power to reverse is not disputed and
there are enough examples of its exercise elsewhere. 78 Moreover,
the Court must realize that trial judges who would be reversed for
dismissing complaints containing defective statements 74 can, and
probably do, immunize the same arbitrary acts from reversal simply
by going through the motions of denying an application for leave to
amend. How then can the Court reverse in the first situation and almost automatically affirm on the very same facts in the second? It
is not sufficient to say only that in the first the trial judge fails to
Id. at 581, 148 S.E.2d at 534.
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
' There are cases in which it should have. E.g., Perfecting Service Co.
v. Product Dev. & Sales Co., 214 N.C. 79, 140 S.E.2d 763 (1965).
" Some believe this reluctance is based upon the Court's unarticulated
feeling that such a finding is a serious affront, distinguishable from mere
disagreement over a point of law, to the integrity of the trial judge involved.
The Court's failure to reverse for this reason may, on the other hand, be
an affront to justice. Furthermore, in other jurisdictions trial judges, who
are presumably no more thin-skinned or indifferent to their reputations,
manage to survive such alleged reproofs.
, See generally the federal cases collected in 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE
15.10, n.2 (2d ed. 1966).
"See notes 62 and 65 supra.
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exercise his discretion, but in the second he does. The only difference may be the application of a different label.
In most jurisdictions today trial judges are being given greater
discretionary power. Consequently appellate courts must exhibit
greater willingness to police its exercise. Otherwise it can become
an expanding power to act arbitrarily. This policing function is
especially important in North Carolina because its strictly enforced
rules governing pleading and proof create a great need for liberal
allowance of amendments.
Furthermore, the Court should look with special care when defendant is denied leave to amend because he then cannot, like plaintiff, take a nonsuit and file the amended pleading in a new action.
Appellate review of orders denying leave to amend presents special problems in North Carolina because trial judges do not write
opinions. There is no reason, however, why they cannot be required
to include in such orders a brief statement of reasons. The possibility of appellate scrutiny of this statement would itself curb arbitrary propensities and overly hasty conclusions.75 It would also serve
to identify situations in which the trial judge, under the guise of
exercising discretion, erroneously denied leave to amend because of
a mistake in the applicable law.
ALTERNATIVE JOINDER OF PARTIES

Two decades ago Professor Brandis demonstrated that North
Carolina's permissive joinder rules were seriously dated and that
adoption of the flexible, modern approach of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure was highly desirable."6 This approach is itself based
upon nineteenth century English reforms 77 and their American state
counterparts. 78 New York described it in 1935 as follows:
7"In the instant case and others applications for leave to amend are
often made orally under the pressure of adverse rulings and denied orally
on the spot without comment. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant, p. 2, Davis v.
Anderson Indus., 266 N.C. 610, 146 S.E.2d 817 (1966) (trial judge sustained
demurrer ore tenus at start of trial and denied applications for leave to
amend and to take a voluntary nonsuit orally, instantly and without comment).
"0Brandis, Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina,
25 N.C.L. REV. 1 (1946); Brandis, A Plea for Adoption by North Carolina
of the Federal Joinder Rules, 25 N.C.L. REv. 245 (1946).
"' See generally, JAmES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 412 (1965); Sunderland,
Joinder of Actions, 18 MIcH. L. REV. 571 (1920).
" Notable American reforms took place in California, Illinois, New
20.01[2] (2d ed.
Jersey and New York. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
1963).
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Complete freedom should be allowed in the joinder of causes of
action as in the joinder of parties, and it is submitted that the
correct approach to the joinder both of parties and causes of
action is the English one. May the matters conveniently be tried
together? The problem is to combine as many matters as possible
to avoid multiplicity and at the same time not unduly to complicate the litigation for the jury.79
How short, sweet and irrefutable this is. And how strange it
must sound to those still dedicated to the meaningless search for
causes that affect all parties and parties united in interest. That these
quests will be resolutely pursued in North Carolina until 1969, almost a century after their intellectual interment, is an embarrassing
demonstration of the efficacy of local law reform.
To be sure, there were a few forward movements, most notably the Court's allowance of alternative joinder of defendants
in Conger v. Insurance Co.80 Although this decision merely embraced well-accepted modern practice8 1 and the Code's specific allowance of alternative joinder,"2 it was praiseworthy because of the
unfamiliarly progressive judicial posture it evidenced. Similarly
praiseworthy, therefore, is the Court's recent holding in Filter Co. v.
Robb' that a defendant may require the joinder of an additional
plaintiff whose claim is alternative to the original plaintiff's.84 Once
again Justice Sharp, who wrote the equally excellent opinion in
Conger, was compelled to perform some delicate linguistic surgery
on the requirement that all causes must affect all parties, and once
again the operation was a complete success. Regrettably the Court
chose to distinguish on seemingly irrelevant grounds, rather than to
" First Annual Report of N.Y. Judicial Council 44 (1935), quoted in
Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Beaunit Mills, Inc., 4 App. Div. 519, 167 N.Y.S.2d
387 (App. Div. 1957).
80260 N.C. 112, 131 S.E.2d 889 (1963); 42 N.C.L. REv. 242 (1963).
Payne v. British Time Recorder Co. [1921] 2 K.B. 1; CLAEK 394-96.
8
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-69 (1953).
267 N.C. 583, 148 S.E.2d 580 (1966).
, Plaintiff Filter Co. sued Robb for the balance due on an account.
Robb claimed his contract was with Hunter and successfully moved to join
him as an additional plaintiff. Plaintiff Filter Co. alleged that Hunter had
acted only as its agent and the trial court sustained Hunter's demurrer for
misjoinder of parties and causes. The Supreme Court in reversing noted
that complete justice could not be done unless Hunter was joined. He could
then avow an interest as principal and remain or admit he was an agent and
be dismissed. In fact Hunter may have been a necessary party, in which
case the inability to join him would have been intolerable.
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overrule, an earlier, contrary decision ;5 but fortunately the distinction will ordinarily be unimportant."0
These decisions hopefully evidence a liberalizing trend in the
Court's interpretation of the Code's joinder provisions and a potentially friendly reception of the modern joinder provisions of the
new Rules of Civil Procedure. They may also lead to a welcome relaxation of current rules restricting the joinder by a single
plaintiff of alternative and seemingly conflicting causes of action.sT
Finally they may also evidence a growing inclination on the part of
the Court, or some of its members, to look to scholarly discussion of
procedural questions.'8
NEW

MATTER AS A JUDICIAL ADMISSION

In Champion v. Waller 9 a unanimous Court held that plaintiff
may employ, in defending against a motion for compulsory nonsuit,
favorable allegations of new matter in defendant's answer even
though such allegations have not been introduced in evidence. 90 This
is quite sound9 1 and in accord with the majority rule.9 2 The decision
should have served to clarify the confusion on this point in the North
Carolina cases. 3 Unfortunately Justice Lake cited no authority for
" Foote v. Davis & Co., 230 N.C. 422, 53 S.E.2d 311 (1949). The dis-

tinction given was that the additional defendant there had been brought in

on plaintiff's, and not defendant's, motion. Justice Sharp declined to demon-

strate the difference this makes. None is apparent. If alternative joinder
of plaintiffs is proper, it should not matter whether the alternative plaintiffs join initially or the alternate plaintiff is brought in on his own motion
or the motion of either party. Regrettably, by failing to overrule Foote, the
Court left the propriety of most of these alternatives open to doubt. My own
estimate is that Foote is no longer authoritative.
" Ordinarily defendant should want to join the alternate claimant and
settle the matter in one trial. But if defendant feels for strategic reasons
that his chances for victory are better in separate actions, he would remain
silent. Plaintiff, under the Foote rule, could not then join the alternate
claimant.
"'E.g., Hunnicutt v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 255 N.C. 515, 122 S.E.2d 74
(1961) (holding that "repugnant" allegations neutralize each other).
"' In both Conger and Filter Co. Justice Sharp cited approvingly to articles by Professor Brandis urging these results. See note 76 supra. See also
Brandis and Graham, Recent Developments in the Field of Permissive

of Parties and Causes, 34 N.C.L. Rnv. 405 (1956).
Joinder
'0 268-N.C. 426, 150 S.E.2d 783 (1966).
" Id. at 428, 150 S.E.2d at 785.
" STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 177 (2d ed. 1963). The
author notes that in some cases the Court has held that favorable "nonresponsive" allegations in the answer must be introduced in evidence.
MCCORMicK, EVIDENCE 508 (1954).
'a STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 177 (2d ed. 1963); Brandis,
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this proposition and also ignored directly contrary cases, particularly
the unanimous holding of the Court earlier the same year in Edwards v. Hamill9 4
Is it possible that the right hand does not know what the left is
doing? Or was the contrary rule not sufficiently erroneous to offset
Justice Lake's familiar aversion to the overruling of past decisions?" Or was he unable to muster a majority for this drastic
action? Whatever the reason for this egregious oversight and whatever comfort the Court finds in the availability of conflicting rules
from which to pick and choose in support of its reaction to a particular case, the situation is small comfort to attorneys and trial judges.
Furthermore, this is not an unfamiliar problem. As Professor
Brandis has noted:
There is inconsistency in the North Carolina cases. I have
said a good many times, and not wholly facetiously, I assure you,
that I can offer even money that you can name any point of
North Carolina civil procedure you can think of, and if I can
find as many as two cases on it, I can find some inconsistency.
Now, by and large, what we do is to continue two conflicting
lines of authority on the same question. We do not overrule.
Only those nefarious gentlemen in Washington unsettle the law
and unhallow tradition by overruling prior cases. We just keep
plugging away with both our lines of authority, and this, I must
say, maintains balance, if not stability, and of course satisfies all
of the requirements of stare decisis.9 6
The presence of this problem in our decisions to such a degree
evidences a fundamental failing in the Court's conception of the law
and its function with respect to it. Choosing at will between conflicting decisions is incompatible with the rule of law; it is ad hoc
justice and to some not law at all.97 As Justice Frankfurter once
remarked, a court must not "sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing
justice according to considerations of individual expediency." 98 And
Civil Procedure (Pleading and Parties), Survey of North Carolina Case
Law, 44 N.C.L. REv. 889, 919 (1966).
"'266 N.C. 304, 145 S.E.2d 884 (1966) (non-responsive allegations must
be introduced in evidence), discussed by Brandis, note 93 supra.
" Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hospital, Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 25, 152 S.E.2d
485, 499 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
" Address by Henry Brandis, Jr., Colloquium on the Proposed New Rules
of Civil Procedure for North Carolina, University of North Carolina, School
of Law, November 30, 1966.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 39 (1963).
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949).
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to countenance such conduct in the name of stare decisis is like
robbing Peter to pay Paul.
On the other hand, the judicial function clearly involves more
than the perfunctory application of immutable rules. Courts most
constantly reexamine the past with the understanding that the responsibility for correcting mistakes or outmoded rules on which
persons have not acted in substantial reliance9 is theirs and not the
legislatures'. This task is especially vital in this day of vast social
and economic change. Decisional law is responsive to such change,
and it is no longer necessary, fashionable or acceptable for courts
to mask this fact. Thus when the Supreme Court finds questionable
cases in point, it should either affirm, distinguish 0 0 or disavow them
openly. Its current willingness to allow conflicting authority to
stand is plainly objectionable.

CONFLICT OF LAWS
Seymour W. Wurfel*
The year 1966 brought some increase in the number of cases
involving conflict of laws problems which reached the North Carolina Supreme Court. Whether this reflects merely a general expansion of litigation or possibly a new awareness on the part of the bar
of conflict of law issues is debatable. These cases fell into the
classifications herein considered.
COLLATERAL ATTACK OF SISTER STATE JUDGMENT

Thomas v. Frosty Morn Meats, Inc.' presents an interesting
aspect of the constitutional mandate that full faith and credit shall
be given in each state to the judicial proceedings of every other
state. Plaintiff, a resident of New York obtained a default money
"Even in cases involving possible substantial reliance on past decisions,
the Court may, and sometimes should, overrule prospectively. E.g., Rabon

v. Rowan Memorial Hospital, Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 21, 152 S.E.2d 485, 499
(1967).

"'0Needless to say, I do not approve the use of meaningless distinctions to effect the pro tanto overruling of cases. See, e.g., note 85 supra.

* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
1266 N.C. 523, 146 S.E.2d 397 (1966).
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judgment in New York against defendant, a North Carolina corporation. This judgment recited that summons and complaint were
"... personally served on the defendant ... by ... the Sheriff of
Lenoir County, North Carolina." Plaintiff sued on this unpaid in
personam New York judgment in North Carolina and it was stipulated that the original cause of action arose in New York. The defendant asserted that there was no valid service, no jurisdiction of
the defendant and that the New York judgment was void. Defendant's motion for judgment of nonsuit was granted, but the judgment was reversed on appeal.
The North Carolina Supreme Court said:
want of jurisdiction of the person is an affirmative defense in a
suit on a foreign judgment and the burden is on defendant to
establish it, unless it affirmatively appears from plaintiff's pleadings or the judgment sued on that the court had no jurisdiction
There is a decided trend in favor of in perof defendant ....
sonam jurisdiction based on . . . personal service beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the forum state. Most of the states have
by statute so provided in certain circumstances, and the courts
have held that such statutes do not violate due process; this is
especially true in actions against foreign corporations. 2 . . . The
fact that defendant, a North Carolina corporation, was served
with process beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the New York
court is not, nothing else appearing, sufficient to establish want
of jurisdiction of defendant by the New York court, as
against the principle that jurisdiction will be presumed until the contrary is shown. The validity and effect of a judgment of another state must be determined by the laws of that
state. It does not appear that the court below had before it the
judgment roll and proceedings in the New York case nor that it
considered the laws of New York, as interpreted by court decisions of that state, in passing upon the jurisdictional question. The
basis upon which decision to nonsuit was placed, the service of
summons outside the state of New York, is inconclusive in the
light of the record before us. The defendant will have the opportunity, when the cause comes on again for hearing, to show, if it
can, from the proceedings had in the New York court and the
laws of that state that there was no legal and valid service of
process.3
'Citing McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) and
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
S266 N.C. 523, 526-27, 146 S.E.2d 397, 400.
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The broad language that ". . validity . .. of a judgment of
another state must be determined by the laws of that state" surely
does not purport to restrict the rule of the Supreme Court of the
United States regarding domicile as a foundation for jurisdiction.
In Tilt v. Kelsey, the United States Supreme Court in a probate
matter held, "it is open to the courts of any state, in the trial of a
collateral issue, to determine, upon the evidence produced, the true
domicil of the deceased." 4 Again in Williams v. North Carolina
the United States Supreme Court in considering divorce jurisdiction said, "when we are dealing as here with an historic notion
common to all English-speaking courts, that of domicil, we should
not find a want of deference to a sister State on the part of the
court of another State which finds an absence of domicil where such
a conclusion is warranted by the record." 5
Presumably Thomas is intended to extend only to situations
where domicile is not an essential jurisdictional fact and only to
instances where the jurisdiction-acquiring procedure prescribed by
the sister state and its exercise of such purported jurisdiction does
not violate principles of federal due process of law. So limited,
Thomas then seems to comport with the formula adopted by the
United States Supreme Court in Adam v. Saenger where it declared; "since the existence of the federal right (to have full faith
and credit accorded to the California judgment) turns on the meaning and effect of the California statute, the decision of the Texas
court on that point, whether of law or of fact, is reviewable here....
The question presented by the pleadings is the status of a crossaction under the California statutes, not under those of Texas."
In Adam the California cross-complaint statute was found not to
violate due process and the Texas court was held to have erred in
refusing to give full faith and credit to the California judgment
rendered on the cross-complaint.
In its opinion in Thomas, the North Carolina Supreme Court
did not cite Tilt, Williams nor Adam. The question of res judicata
was not reached since there was no contest of the jurisdictional
issue in the New York court.
The action taken of reversing and remanding was entirely ap' 207 U.S. 43, 53 (1907).
:325 U.S. 226, 234 (1945).
303 U.S. 59, 64 (1938). Cf. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 378 U.S. 540 (1964).
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propriate since the North Carolina Court was careful to preserve the
right of the defendant upon a retrial, by affirmative evidence to
establish, if such was the fact, that under the circumstances the
exercise of in personam jurisdiction by the New York court violated
due process of law. This issue is left open for determination by
the North Carolina courts, subject to review by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
THE NORTH CAROLINA "BORROWING STATUTE"

In Little v. Stevens," plaintiff, a resident of Tennessee, and defendant had an automobile accident on April 18, 1962 in a shopping
center parking lot in Shilby County, Tennessee in which plaintiff
sustained personal injury and property damage. Suit was brought
in North Carolina on November 21, 1963. Defendant left Tennessee
in July 1962 and was present in North Carolina from that time
until after suit was filed. The Tennessee statute of limitations requires
that personal injury actions must be filed within one year after the
cause of action accrues, and property damage actions within three
years. Defendant pleaded the Tennessee statute of limitations and
the trial court dismissed the personal injury cause but retained the
property damage suit. An appeal from this judgment afforded the
North Carolina Supreme Court a needed opportunity to clarify the
effect of G.S. § 1-21 as amended by Pub. L. 1955, ch. 544.
In its original purport before 1955, G.S. § 1-21 was essentially
a tolling provision extending the time in which actions could be
brought beyond those specified in other sections of the North Carolina statute of limitations. In pertinent part it reads:
If, when the cause of action accrues . . . he is out of the state,
action may be commenced . . . within the times herein limited,
after the return of the person into this State, and if, after such
cause of action accrues... such person departs from and resides
out of this State, or remains continuously absent therefrom for
one year or more, the time of his absence shall not be a part of
the time limited for the commencement of the action.
The opinion points out that in Bank v. Appleyards the court
held the effect of G.S. § 1-21, in that form, was to prevent the
North Carolina statute of limitations from running where a cause
'1267 N.C. 328, 148 S.E.2d 201 (1966).
S238 N.C. 145, 77 S.E.2d 783 (1953).
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of action accrued against a person then without the state until that
person, came into the state if he had never before resided here, or
returned here if he had been temporarily absent. Thus even if a
plaintiff's claim had been barred for thirty years in the state of its
origin it was revived by the entry or re-entry of the defendant into
North Carolina and could be sued upon thereafter in North Carolina
for the full period of the North Carolina limitation.
It was to cure this result that the Legislature in 1955 added to
the end of G.S. § 1-21 this language:
Provided, that where a cause of action arose outside of this
State and is barred by the laws of the jurisdiction in which it
arose, no action may be maintained in the courts of this State
for the enforcement thereof, except where the cause of action
originally accrued in favor of a resident of this State.
G.S. § 1-21 with this addition, received initial judicial attention
in the Federal District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina in Snyder v. Wylie.9 There, by a highly sophisticated process it was held the amendment was only a limitation on the tolling
statute and not a borrowing statute. The North Carolina Supreme
Court after considering Snyder and saying "that admiration for its
artistry tempts its adoption,"' rejected its reasoning and conclusion.
The Court after examining the legislative history of the proviso
and ascribing to its language its ordinary meaning concluded it is
"a limited borrowing statute which bars all stale foreign claims."' ,
In disposing of Little the Court then said:
Since we hold that our statute borrows the one-year period
prescribed by Tennessee, defendant's plea based thereon imposed
upon plaintiff the burden of showing that he could have maintained his action in Tennessee on... the date on which this suit
was instituted.... Plaintiff has not, in any pleading, set out facts
which would repel defendant's plea in bar. . . . 'Proof without
2
allegation is as unavailing as allegation without proof."

This decision, fortunately, renders nugatory the sophistry of
Snyder. It leaves North Carolina with a borrowing statute under
which, as to non-resident plaintiffs, the North Carolina statute of
:239
F. Supp. 999 (W.D.N.C. 1965).
10 267 N.C. at 334, 148 S.E.2d at 205.
11 d. at 336, 148 S.E.2d at 207.
'1
2 Id.
at 336, 337, 338, 148 S.E.2d at 208.
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limitations or that of the loci, whichever is shorter, applies. Under
it, presumably a plaintiff who is a resident of North Carolina at the
time the action accrues may file suit at any time within the North
Carolina statute of limitations. Unfortunately, this latter point is
obscured by apparently inconsistent statements. First the opinion
states: "the proviso .. .bars the maintenance here of all foreign
claims by nonresidents which are barred in the state in which they
arose."'" Next the opinion reads: "If ... the proviso be treated as
a limited borrowing statute, no action barred in the state of origin
may be litigated here."' 4 Still later the Court says "we conclude we
have a limited borrowing statute which bars all stale foreign
claims."' 5 However, the purport of the 1955 proviso is that a plaintiff who is a North Carolina resident at the time the action accrues is
limited only by the North Carolina statute of limitations and not by
that of the loci. Hopefully, it may not take one more judicial opinion
to give full effect to what appears to have been the clear legislative
intent.
FoRum NON CONVENIENS

Though the case which motivated it was decided considerably
earlier than 1966,'1 this opportunity should not be missed to invite
the attention of conflicts enthusiasts to a current law note which
deals comprehensively with the treatment accorded in North Carolina to the doctrine of the inconvenient forum as a ground for declining to exercise jurisdiction.'
LAw GOVERNING OUT-OF-STATE TORTS

The recent assault upon the traditional lex loci delicti as determinative of the substantive law applicable to out-of-state torts's slackened in 1966. Presumably this is only a temporary lull and plaintiffs questing "deep pockets" will resume the attack. 9
The Court continued to stand fast in the two cases coming before it. In neither was any. contention to the contrary raised. In a
23 Id. at 333, 148 S.E.2d at 204.
1

I1d. at 334, 148 S.E.2d at 205, 206.
Id. at 336, 148 S.E.2d at 207
18
Belk v. Belk's Department Store, 250 N.C. 99, 108 S.E.2d 131 (1959).
'145 N.C.L. REv. 505 (1967).
18
Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).

See Wurfel, Conflict of Laws, North Carolina Case Law, 43 N.C.L.
Rxv. 895, 899 (1965) and 44 N.C.L. REv. 923-27 (1966).
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suit resulting from an automobile collision with a train at a crossing
in Ohio the Court opened its opinion with this terse observation:
Since the accident out of which this action arose occurred in
Ohio, the law of Ohio governs the rights and duties of the
parties.... The law of North Carolina governs the procedure
to be 20followed in the trial of the action in the courts of this
State.
In a truck-caterpillar collision case arising out of the construction of the beltway around Washington, D.C., the Court with equally commendable brevity said:
The accident in which plaintiff was injured occurred in Virginia.
The action having been instituted in North Carolina, liability
must be determined according to the substantive law of Virginia,
of which we must take judicial notice. G.S. 8-4... .21
FAMILY LAW

Marlowe22

In In Re
the original marital domicile was Florida.
The husband obtained a divorce for the adultery of the wife. The
Florida decree awarded custody of two young children to the mother
with right to visitation in the father, and recited that "the property
settlement and separation agreement entered into by ... the parties
is... made a part of this final decree ...." Both parties remarried,

the husband moved to North Carolina, and the wife, having separated from her second husband, left the children with their father
in North Carolina and went to live with her parents in Texas.
The wife after five months instituted a habeas corpus proceeding in North Carolina to regain custody of the children. The respondent father offered no evidence and the trial judge signed an
order awarding custody to the mother, which in part read: "the
courts of this State must give full faith and credit to the divorce
decree of the State of Florida for that said decree does not appear
to be an interlocutory order but a final order." 3 The transcript
showed the trial court indicated he would hold inadmissible evidence
of (1) the alleged unfitness of the mother because of incidents occurring before the Florida decree and which were known to the
respondent husband at the time; (2) the fitness of the husband to
::Young v. R.R., 266 N.C. 458, 462, 146 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1966).
2 1Thames

v. Teer Co., 267 N.C. 565, 567, 148 S.E.2d 527, 529 (1966).
22268 N.C. 197, 150 S.E.2d 204 (1966).
2 Id. at 198, 150 S.E.2d at 206.
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exercise custody since the date of the decree; (3) the unfitness of
the mother except after the Florida decree; (4) what would be in
the best interests of the children except after the Florida decree.
Respondent husband excepted to these statements and appealed.
The Court reversed and remanded, saying the trial judge
was correct in holding that the Florida decree of divorce was
final, but the control and custody of minor children cannot be
determined finally. Changed conditions will always justify inquiry by the courts in the interest and welfare of the children,
and decrees may be entered as often as the facts justify.4 ... The
Florida decree awarding ... custody to the petitioner is entitled
to full faith and credit as to all matters existing when the decree
was entered and which were or might have been adjudicated
therein.... The decree has no controlling effect in another State
as to the facts and conditions arising subsequent to its rendition. 2
Upon remand, the trial court was ordered to determine whether:
...circumstances have so changed since the entry of the Florida
decree that it will be for the best interest of (the children) to be
placed in the custody of the respondent. If no change of condition is found to have occurred, justifying the change of custody,
the petitioner will be entitled to an order in accord with the
Florida decree. 28
There may be more here than meets the eye, but it does seem
the legal views expressed by the trial and appellate courts are not
divergent except perhaps for an ambiguity as to what the trial court
meant by "final," and the materiality of evidence as to the present
custodial suitability of the husband. If on remand again "No evidence was offered," all the trial court could do would be to enter
another order awarding the petitioner wife custody. The Supreme
Court opinion seems, in the interest of the children, to be an exhortation to the respondent to offer evidence of change of circumstances
occurring after the entry of the Florida decree. That such an offer
of proof was not made in the initial proceeding in the trial court
appears to be unusual. Possibly such an offer would have been futile,
but why was it not made?
The basic proposition of law here reaffirmed, that a custody
2
1Id. at 199, 150 S.E.2d at 206.
21Id. at 199, 200, 150 S.E.2d at 206.
26 Id. at 200, 150 S.E.2d at 206.
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award is always open to revision upon a showing of change of circumstances subsequent to the award, is unassailable.
The other family law case,2 7 also with a Florida background,
presented an interesting blend of contract, choice of law and public
policy problems. The decisive question was raised by the wife, as
plaintiff and appellant: is a separation agreement executed in Florida
prior to the wife's return to North Carolina to live enforceable in
this state in the wife's action for alimony without divorce, when
such contract, though valid under Florida law, did not comply with
G.S. § 52-12 (now reenacted as G.S. § 52-6), providing for a privy
examination and certificate of the examining officer that the contract
is not unreasonable or injurious to her?
The trial court answered this in the affirmative and dismissed
plaintiff's complaint seeking an increase in the amount of child support over the 120 dollars a month provided for in the separation
agreement. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, with a
number of interesting observations.
The Court noted at the outset that since the agreement was
signed in Florida where plaintiff and defendant were both residents
at the time, its validity and construction were to be determined by
the law of Florida, on the basis of the general rule that a contract
is to be construed according to the law of the place where it is made.
The Court then recognized decisions that deal with contracts to be
performed in another state and hold that the law of the place of performance governs generally as to matters relating to performance.
The Court declined to follow these cases, however, finding no authority to apply the doctrine to a separation agreement, and pointing
out that while the agreement in question implied that the wife intended to leave Florida, she was not required to do so.
It would seem that since the agreement was binding on plaintiff
under Florida law, her request for an increase in child support would
have to be denied. The Court went on, however, to consider favorably plaintiff's contention that the agreement could not be enforced
in this state, despite its validity under the applicable law of Florida,
because it violated the public policy as then declared in G.S. § 52-12.
The Court said that while an agreement like the one at issue would
not be rejected as void solely because of failure to comply with the
privy examination provision, it would be set aside if it was estab"'Davis v. Davis, 269 N.C. 120, 123, 152 S.E.2d 306, 309 (1967).
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lished that it was unreasonable or injurious to the wife. After
noting the burden of proving this question of fact was on the party
attacking the validity of such agreement, the Court remanded the
case with the following instructions:
If it be found as a fact upon competent evidence that the agreement when executed was unreasonable or injurious to the wife,
then it will not be recognized as valid and enforceable in this
state. If it be found as a fact that it was not unreasonable or
injurious to the wife, it will be recognized as valid and enforceable as if in full compliance with the North Carolina statute.
The settled public policy of North Carolina is concerned with
substance rather than form.28
This novel ruling seems to say that the public policy of North
Carolina as now enunciated in G.S. § 52-6 is to enforce foreign separation agreements which do not comply with the statute if they are
found to be reasonable and noninjurious to the wife when executed,
but to strike them down if such agreements upon examination are
found to have been unreasonable or injurious to the wife when executed. The statute certainly enunciates no such public policy regarding separation agreements executed between North Carolina domiciled spouses. Quaere, does a direction to engage in specific fact finding on the merits in each case have anything to do with "settled
public policy" as that term is used in the language of conflict of
laws?
The Court went on to point out, as "worthy of exploration by
counsel prior to the next hearing," that Florida law permits modification of the amount of payment for the support of the wife provided in a separation agreement and that in North Carolina separation agreements are not final as to the amount to be provided for
the support and education of minor children. These judicial observations, appear to afford a by-pass around the public policy bramble
here established in connection with the extra-state reach of G.S.
§ 52-6, at least for this particular case.
WHAT LAW GOVERNS LIABILITY FOR PAYMENT OF A
PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX?

In Bank v. Wells,29 a case of first impression in North Carolina,
the Court fashioned and clearly enunciated a new conflicts rule. The
28
Id. at 126, 152 S.E.2d at 310.
2-267 N.C. 276, 148 S.E.2d 119 (1966).
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decedent died domiciled in Nevada, having devised to North Carolina residents pursuant to a general power of appointment certain
real property situated in North Carolina and administered under a
North Carolina trust. The Nevada executor and two ancillary administrators from North Carolina sued one of the appointees in this
state to have him pay a pro-rata share of the federal estate tax, the
will containing no express direction regarding apportionment. The
Court first upheld the constitutionality of § 2207 of the Internal
Revenue Code which entitled the plaintiffs to recover the tax, there
being no will provision to the contrary. While the Court could have
stopped there, it went on to set out a new conflicts rule which also
allowed the plaintiffs to win under the Nevada apportionment
statute:
When questions of apportionment of estate taxes arise in courts
of a state of the situs of a trust whose assets are includible in
decedent's gross estate for tax purposes, the law of the situs re32
fers to the law of decedent's domicile to resolve the questions.
In reaching this result the Court adopted the New York Conflicts rule on this issue."3
INTRINSIC FRAUD IS NOT SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK

The vehicle for a lucid distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
fraud was a case in which no multi-state element was present. Since
this opinion sharply distinguishes between intrinsic fraud for which
a foreign judgment may not be collaterally attacked and extrinsic
fraud which may be attacked collaterally, its inclusion is deemed
appropriate.
In Johnson v. Stevenson,34 the testators had left a life estate to
their son and his wife with remainder to the son's grandchildren in
a will probated in 1940. Plaintiff, the testators' daughter, received
nothing and never filed a caveat to the will. A quarter of a century
later she brought this separate action to impress a constructive trust
for her benefit on certain real estate then distributed and now held
by defendants, alleging that the execution of the will was procured
0 Id.
1, Id.
2Id.

at 280, 281, 282, 148 S.E.2d at 122, 123.

at 285, 148 S.E.2d at 125.

at 288, 148 S.E.2d at 126.
aIn re Gato's Estate, 97 N.Y.S.2d 171, 276 App. Div. 651, aft'd, 301
(1950).
93 N.E.2d 924S.E.2d
N.Y. 653, N.C.
214 (1967).
200, 152
'269
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by "undue influence" consisting of "fraudulent acts." Affirming the
action on the trial court in sustaining the defendants' demurrer, the
Court held that since the right of direct attack by caveat gave her a
full and adequate remedy, equitable relief by way of constructive
trust was not available to her.
The Court went on, however, to discuss the difference between
extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, noting decisions in other courts which
allow an heir to establish a constructive trust collaterally despite the
probate of a will where it is proved that the decree of probate was
obtained by extrinsic fraud, as a result of which the plaintiff was
deprived of an opportunity to caveat. 35 Several examples of extrinsic fraud, which can only be attacked by independent action,
were set out by the Court: false representations causing plaintiff to
defer filing a caveat until the time limit therefor had elapsed ;6 false
statements made in procuring probate of the will, as a result of
which the heir did not receive notice of the proceedings in time to
file a caveat ;"7 false statements purporting to show service of notice
on next of kin;38 and intentional failure to disclose to the probate
court the existence of a pretermitted heir.39
Intrinsic fraud, on the other hand, must be attacked by motion
in the cause in which the judgment was rendered, and relates to
matters pertaining to the judgment itself, such as perjury, and not
to the manner in which the judgment is procured whereby the losing
party is deprived of having an adversary trial of the issue.40 Since
the plaintiff alleged no fact which tended to show any fraud in connection with the probate of the will or any interference with her
right to caveat, the Court held she had not pleaded extrinsic fraud
as distinguished from intrinsic fraud and thus had not stated a
cause of action.
This case may prove to be useful in multi-state situations.
THAT SLIPPERY WORD "REsIDENT"

A final case of conflict of law interest deals with the perennial
problem of legally defining the word "resident."4 While the Court
35Id. at 204, 205, 152 S.E.2d at 218.
"oCaldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, 23 P.2d 758 (1933).
Zaremba v. Woods, 17 Cal. App. 2d 309, 61 P.2d 976 (1936).
s
Seeds v. Seeds, 116 Ohio St. 144, 156 N.E. 193 (1927).
89Purinton
v. Dyson, 8 Cal. 2d 322, 65 P.2d 777 (1937).
40269 N.C. 200, 205, 152 S.E.2d 214, 218.
"Insurance Co. v. Insurance Co., 266 N.C. 430, 146 S.E.2d 410 (1966).
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was primarily concerned with construing the word resident as used
in an insurance coverage clause in a situation where all the significant facts occurred in North Carolina, the case should have some
bearing on questions of definition concerning the family grouping of
"resident" and "domociliary" in the conflicts sense.
Here the automobile liability insurance policy extended coverage
to any "relative" of the insured, and defined relative to mean "a
relative of the named insured who is a resident of the same household." The insured's 29 year old son, who had had an accident and
whose "residence" in his father's house was denied by the insurance
company, was leading a somewhat unsettled life at the time. Although he had left home at age 18 to work in Virginia, he returned
after a year, staying several months until his marriage when he left
again. Thereafter, he entered the Army for two years, and then,
after separating from his wife, went to Greenville, South Carolina
for a year. On his return to this state, he worked at a mill in
Shelby, staying at his sister's house. When he changed work shifts
after five months, he moved back to his father's house to take advantage of more convenient transportation arrangements. Although
he had found a room in Shelby which he planned to inhabit, he was
still living in his father's house at the time of the acident which
occurred two weeks after he had last moved in. Throughout this
entire period, apparently, he had used his home as his permanent
4' 2
mailing address, and "thought of his father's house as his home."
The trial court had found the son to be a resident of his father's
household and thus covered by the policy, and the Supreme Court
affirmed. The Court pointed out that while the word "resident" is
in common use, "it is difficult to give an exact, or even a satisfactory
definition, for the term is flexible, elastic, slippery, and somewhat
ambiguous."4 3 Thus, the Court said, when an insurance company
chooses to use a slippery word to define those covered by the policy,
"it is not the function of the court to sprinkle sand upon the ice by
strict construction of the term." 4 Insurance policies, the Court
noted, should be construed to be as inclusive as is reasonable. If
the application of this principle should result in coverage somewhat
broader and more inclusive of the "slippery" area than the company
,2 Id. at 433, 146 S.E.2d at 412, 413.
,Id. at 437, 146 S.E.2d at 415.
"Id. at 438, 146 S.E.2d at 415.
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contemplated, the Court said, "the fault lies in its own selection of
the words by which it chose to be bound."'45' The key to this problem, the Court added, "is that the phrase 'resident of the same household' has no absolute or precise meaning, and, if doubt exists as to
the extent or fact of coverage, the language used in an insurance
policy will be understood in its most inclusive sense."4 6
The possible application of this treatment of "resident" to conflicts cases not involving insurance is made clearer when it is realized
that the judicial tendency to favor definitions which result in allowing insurance protection cannot be considered a controlling policy
rational in this case. At the time of the accident the son was driving
a dealer's car with a view towards purchase, and the dealer's insurer
would have been liable by the terms of its policy unless the driver
himself could collect from another fund. Thus, an insurance company was going to have to pay no matter how the term "resident"
was defined, and there was no particular need to construe the word
loosely. It is therefore possible that the Court's definition here may
have some relevance outside the insurance context.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Daniel H. Pollitt* and Frank R. Strong**
Compared with the period reviewed a year ago, that now under
review discloses both similarities and differences. Procedurally, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina continued to be concerned with
the reach of major decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the administration of state criminal justice. Right to counsel, protection against unreasonable search and seizure, and the
voluntariness of confessions precipitated considerable litigation.
Escobedo and Mapp were in full operative effect; Malloy and especially Miranda were casting their lengthy constitutional shadows.
'5 Ibid.
"Id. at 439, 146 S.E.2d at 416.
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
** Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
Professor Pollitt prepared the sections on Freedom of Religion and
Procedural Rights. Professor Strong prepared the sections of Federalism,
Personal Rights, Political Rights, Property Rights and Separation of Powers.
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At the same time, other cases presented older procedural rights in
new postures. Substantively, the year just past witnessed much
greater involvement with federalistic issues and somewhat less with
property rights. Civil rights issues were conspicuous by their absence, problems in religious liberty took their place, the issue of
equality in political representation entered a new phase, and the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers generated further enunciation of the delicate role played by the judiciary in its relation to
the legislative assembly.
FEDERALISM

Division of powers between a central government and political
subdivisions is quite typical of nations of large land area. In a very
meaningful sense, federalism is the territorial expression of the doctrine of separation of powers. A federalized government is a complicated one, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter was wont to observe. Attention to federal-state relationships often obscures the importance of
state-state relationships in a federal system. Article IV of the
Constitution of the United States, especially the full faith and
credit clause, deals with this aspect of federalism, and to it must be
added the fourteenth amendment by virtue of one aspect in the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the ubiquitous due process
clause. Pennoyer v. Neff1 and Allgeyer v. Louisina2 are the
germinal decisions. The former treats of the limits of state judicial
jurisdiction, the latter of the limits of state legislative jurisdiction.
Combined, the two limitational concepts can be thought of as involving territorial due process, to distinguish this aspect from procedural and from substantive due process. Federal-state relationships, in turn, are of several dimensions. During most of the
nineteenth century the great constitutional issue was the extent to
which the states could tax and regulate interstate commerce in the
absence of Congressional preemption. For this century the crucial
issue in federalism has of course been the constitutional extent of
Congressional power under the grants to Congress in article I, sec.
8 and section 5 of the fourteenth amendment; yet the range of
state power in an era of active federal power continues to be a much
litigated matter. And, important as are the issues of federalistic
195

U.S. 714 (1877).

165 U.S. 578 (1897).
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legislative power, the middle portions of this century are witness
to fundamental conflicts in viewpoint regarding the legitimate scope
of federal judicial power vis-a-vis the states.
Decisions of federalistic classification, for the period under review, were more noteworthy for their range than for their intrinsic
importance. The extent to which the full faith and credit clause
requires North Carolina courts to honor the judgments and decrees
of the courts of sister states was involved in Thomas v. Frosty
Morn Meats, Inc.- and In re Marlowe.4 These decisions are considered elsewhere in this Survey.5 A third decision of conflicts
coloration will be considered later in this section because the primary
issue was the constitutionality of a Congressional tax enactment.
Although Gulf Oil Corp. v. Clayton' is headnoted solely to the
commerce clause, the trial court and the Supreme Court recognized
it as a hybrid, involving as much a question of territorial due process. Technically, the issue was the includability in the net income
base, to which would be applied the statutory allocation formula, of
dividends paid to Gulf Oil Corp., a Pennsylvania corporation, by
four subsidiary corporations in each of which Gulf owns fifty per
cent or more of the voting stock. The facts showed that "no benefit
inured to plaintiff by reason of the corporate kinship" and "no
products from any of the subsidiaries ever had any connection whatever with North Carolina."' In granting to Gulf relief from an
additional assessment made by the Commissioner of Revenue on the
basis of inclusion of the dividends from the subsidiaries, the trial
court relied upon Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina where an
earlier corporate income tax statute of this state had been held unconstitutional in its application to a New York corporation manufacturing in North Carolina and selling abroad. Examination of
the Supreme Court opinion discloses that the difficulty there was
directly with the allocation formula; contrary to the corporation's
contention the business was held to be unitary in character, thus
-266 N.C. 523, 146 S.E.2d 397 (1966).
'268 N.C. 197, 150 S.E.2d 204 (1966).
Wurfel, Conflict of Laws, North Carolina Case Law, 45 N.C.L. REv.
842, 848 (1967).
'267 N.C. 15, 147 S.E.2d 522 (1966).
Id. at 18, 147 S.E.2d at 524.
8283 U.S. 123 (1931).
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creating for North Carolina a tax base consisting of the total net
income from buying, manufacturing, and selling.
Affirming the trial court in the instant case, the Supreme Court
of North Carolina correctly found in the opinion in Hans Rees' Sons
the governing constitutional theory for resolving the issue before it
despite the technical difference:
Thus, it is only when the parent and subsidiary are engaged in a
'unitary business' that G.S. § 105-134(2) (a) may be constitutionally applied without reference to whether dividend income is attributable to transactions within the taxing state. In purporting to tax
dividends from subsidiaries 'having business transactions with or
engaged in the same or similar type of business as the taxpayer,'
the Legislature was undoubtedly attempting to describe a unitary
business in terms of its two most common indicia. In its application to such a business, the statute is clearly constitutional. We
do not assume that the Legislature intended it to refer to any
situation to which its application would be unconstitutional. 9
Because clearly based upon the commerce clause as well as the
fourteenth amendment, the Gulf case also classified as one involving
state taxation of interstate commerce. In the only other case of this
classification decided during the period now reviewed, the Commissioner of Revenue enjoyed better results. Excel, Inc. v. Clayton'°
involved the constitutionality of North Carolina sales taxes imposed
upon sales by a domestic equipment manufacturer to three federally
licensed common carriers of freight. In each instance, the equipment
was purchased for use by the carriers in trucking terminals outside
of North Carolina; sales were f. o. b. taxpayer's North Carolina
plant, with delivery accompanied by waybills showing out-of-state
destination; and movement interstate was by the purchasing carriers
themselves. Two of the three purchasers were foreign corporations;
their orders and remittances were all made from offices outside this
state. The third carrier, a domestic corporation like Excel, Inc.,
ordered and remitted intrastate. Imposition of sales taxes was
sustained in all three situations, against the contention that the sales
were immune by virtue of statutory recognition of limitations upon
North Carolina's taxing power to be found in the Constitution of
the United States."
267 N.C. 15, 23-24, 147 S.E.2d 522, 528-29 (1966).
N.C. 127, 152 S.E.2d 171 (1967).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164, 13 (17) (1965).

0269
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There is no question of North Carolina's power to tax the sales
made to the domestic carrier; intent to use the goods out-of-state
does not immunize the sales from state taxation.' 2 In the other two
instances the sales bear many of the earmarks of the interstate sale.
Immune from state taxation until the unsettling decision of McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co.' 3 nearly thirty years ago,
the tax status of the interstate sale has since been a puzzle.' 4 However, the facts of Excel saved the Court from the necessity of struggling with that constitutional quagmire. For here shipment in response to interstate orders is not made across state lines; in actuality,
the purchasers take delivery in North Carolina. The sales are thereby
stripped of their interstate character, and are accordingly subject to
taxation by North Carolina.' 5
First National Bank of Nevada v. Wells' 6 presented some federalistic issues of state-state relationships but essentially it forced
the Court into a determination of the validity of a section of the
federal estate tax. The overriding question was whether North
Carolina domiciliaries, devisees of North Carolina real estate, could
be forced to bear aliquot parts of the federal tax on the estate, which
constituted the source of the devises. Pearl Wells, beneficiary of a
testamentary trust created by her deceased husband, had before her
death exercised the power given her by the trust instrument to appoint the trust corpus but had failed to indicate in her will how the
tax burden was to be borne by those taking from her. Resisting
apportionment were the three devisees of North Carolina real estate,
despite an order to this effect by a court of Nevada, of which the
testatrix had been a domiciliary, and the clear direction of 26 U.S.C.
§ 2207. Defendants' contentions were that the Nevada court order
was ineffective for lack of judicial jurisdiction over them and that
the federal statute was unconstitutional as violative of the tenth
amendment.
Taking the second contention first, the Court correctly treated
"Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933)
13309 U.S. 33 (1940).

(property tax).

"General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964); Norton
Co. v. Department of Revenue; 340 U.S. 534 (1951); Freeman v. Hewit,
329 U.S. 249 (1946); McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
Dep't of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp., 313 U.S. 62 (1941).
"267 N.C. 276, 148 S.E.2d 119 (1966). This case is also discussed by
Wurfel, Conflict of Laws, North Carolina Case Law, 45 N.C.L. Rnv. 842,
851-852 (1967).

860

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.45

Fernandez v. Wiener'17 as decisive. The tenth amendment is a
slender reed upon which to rely, for it does not operate to restrict
those powers, both express and necessary and proper therewith,
which art. I, sec. 8 has delegated to the Congress. There is no
question of the power of Congress to lay an excise tax qua tax, even
though it may have incidental regulatory effect, nor of Congressional
power to make suitable provision for its collection. With respect
to the Nevada court order, defendants won a pyrrhic victory; the
order itself was held to be of no effect because of lack of judicial
jurisdiction over defendants, yet the Nevada apportionment statute
on which the order was based was ruled to be the proper State law
to apply because it was the law of the testatrix's domicile. Legislative jurisdiction in Nevada, despite the validity and applicability of
8
federal statute law, was rested upon Riggs v. Del Drago,"
in which
the United States Supreme Court sustained the New York apportionment statute as not conflicting with 26 U.S.C. § 2207 and hence
not in contravention of the supremacy clause.
9
The opinions in Dilday v. Board of EducationY
disclose Justice
Sharp for the Court majority and Justice Lake for himself sparring
over the transcendental question of the authority of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the interpretation of provisions of the
Constitution of the United States which apply to the states. The
occasion for the great debate arose from an effort of citizens and
taxpayers of Beaufort County to prevent the county board of education from using the proceeds of publicly-voted bonds to construct a
consolidated and integrated high school. Along with assertions that
statutorily prescribed procedures had not been followed by the board,
plaintiffs contended that the bonds were voted in the belief that the
new high school would be a consolidated school for white children
only. This intent may be granted, Justice Sharp says, but "It is a
dream which anyone familiar with the Federal decisions should
know cannot be realized." The reference is basically to Brown v.
2
Board of Education.
" Then follow these statements:
The Constitution of the United States takes precedence over the
Constitution of North Carolina, and, for all practical purposes,
the Federal Constitution means what the Supreme Court of the
'

326 U.S. 340 (1945).

18317 U.S. 95 (1942).

267 N.C. 438, 148 S.E.2d 247, 148 S.E.2d 513 (1966).
'8347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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United States says it means. It boots a [sic] little that the members of the Board of County Commissioners, the Board of Education, and the majority of their constituents share the conviction
that the Brown case did violence to the Constitution as it was
understood by its authors and by those who ratified it. The
Brown case is binding upon us.2 1
This passage was too much for Justice Lake; the proposition
"that a court of last resort can do no wrong," he said, is "a dangerous fallacy." Insisting that the language of the supremacy clause
is clear and explicit, the Justice drives home his point of disagreement by contending that "the Constitution does not declare a decision of the United States Supreme Court to be the supreme law
of the land. On the contrary, it declares that such decision is not
the 'law of the land' if it is in conflict with the Constitution, itself."2 2 He concedes that all courts, state and federal, "must now
decide cases . .. as if the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Brown v. Board of Education... were a correct interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but I cannot concur in the statement that it is so ... "
The issue in judicial federalism thus presented is as old as the
Virginia-Kentucky Resolutions. John Marshall made no claim in
Marbury v. Madison2 4 that the Constitution means, in an in rem
sense, what the Supreme Court of the United States says at any time
that it means, nor did Joseph Story assert such power in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee.25 During the nineteenth century the United States
Supreme Court's supremacy in the interpretation of the federal constitution was challenged North as well as South. Since Brown restirred the controversy, opposition has taken the form of legislative,
executive, and judicial assertions of the constitutional right of a state
to interpose its sovereignty between its people and "lawless" decisions
of the Supreme Court. Far from shaken by doubt, however, the United
States Supreme Court has in our time claimed the very authority
that Justice Sharp attributes to it. The occasion was the legal aftermath of the tragedy at Little Rock. In Cooper v. Aaron,2" the Court,
its unanimity emphasized by the form in which the opinion was
21267 N.C. 438, 451, 148 S.E.2d 513, 521-22 (1966).
Id. at 456, 149 S.E.2d at 347.
23 Ibid.
2'5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1804).
2,14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
"358 U.S. 1 (1958).
2
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given, formally took the step from Marbury which a century and a
half had come to accept in practice despite continuing, intermittent
challenge. Asserted the nine Justices:
This decision [Marbury v. Madison] declared the basic principle
that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law
of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment by this Court in the
Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the
Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States 'any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwith27
standing.'
There the matter rests-an issue undoubtedly resolved for all foreseeable future, as Justice Sharp assumes, yet still capable of stirring
vigorous denial as evidenced by Justice Lake's exceptions to the
majority's forthright recognition of the facts of constitutional life.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of re'2 s
ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
There were two unusual claims to Religious Freedom in the
period covered by this survey.
State v. Bullard9 was a "narcotics" charge. The police found
peyote in the possession of Bullard, and he admitted to possession
but explained that as a member of the Neo-American Church, the
use of peyote was an integral part of his religious ceremonies. The
trial judge charged the jury that "even if you should find that this
defendant was a member of a religious sect whose rites made use of
marijuana or peyote," the court charges you that "this would not
constitute a defense or a legal excuse for such possession. 81 0 The
appeal argued that this charge to the jury was an interference with
religious freedom. 3 ' The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected
this contention:
:7 Id.

'U.S.

at 18.
CONST.

amend. XIV.

'267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966).
oIbid.

"The California and Arizona courts have reversed or dismissed narcotic
convictions when the person in possession (an Indian) used the payote as
part of his religious practices. Arizona v. Atlakai, Criminal No. 4098,
Coconino County, July 26, 1960; People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964).
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The defendant may believe what he will as to peyote and
marijuana and he may conceive that one is necessary and the
other is advisable in connection with his religion. But it is not a
violation of his constitutional rights to forbid him, in the guise of
his religion to possess a drug which will produce hallucinatory
symptoms similar to those produced in cases of schizophrenia,
his position cannot be susdementia praecox, or paranoia, and
32
tained here-in law nor in morals.
The second "Freedom of Religion" case is In re Williams.33 A
minister, called to testify in a criminal case concerning information
he had obtained inhis professional capacity, refused to do so because it "would be in violation of his professional ethics and of his
dignity as a minister of an established religion."3 4 The Court recognized that the "free exercise of religion is impaired ... by governmental compulsion of that which one's religious belief forbids"; but
added that "the freedom to exercise one's religious beliefs is not absolute" and must yield in the face of "a compelling state interest."3' 5
The Court affirmed the contempt conviction because: "The effective
operation of its courts of justice is obviously a compelling state interest;" and because while religious beliefs are not lightly to be brushed
aside, they must yield to the interest of state "in doing justice between the state and one charged with a serious offense."'
Most religious denominations put a seal on the confessional and
prohibit the minister from divulging anything he learns in confi7
dence from a penitent in the course of his professional obligationsY.
This religious mandate is generally recognized by the courts, and
there are few decided cases in the appellate courts for many years
back. Those that exist recognize that the court compulsion to testify
is a "violation of the fundamental law, which guarantees perfect
'38
freedom to all classes in the exercise of their religion."
The only recent analogous situation is when a Jehovah Witness
is summoned as a juror and refuses to perform his duties out of
"267 N.C. 599, 604, 148 S.E.2d 565, 569 (1966).
269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317 (1967). See the discussion of a different
aspect of this case under the heading Right To Notice and Hearing.
31 Id. at 77, 152 S.E.2d at 325.
"Id. at 79-80, 152 S.E.2d at 326.
36 Id. at 81, 152 S.E.2d at 327.
"'Reese, Confidential Communicatiow.s To the Clergy, 24 OHIO STATE
L.J. 55, 68 (1963).
8

' STOKES AND PFEIFER, CHURCH AND

556 (1964).

STATE IN THE UNITED STATES,
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religious scruples-a literal application of the Biblical admonition
"Judge not that you will not be judged." A federal court balanced
the first amendment rights to religious freedom against the seventh
amendment rights to trial by jury, and found the former more precious."a A Minnesota court reached an opposite result, finding the
balance in favor of the state's right to compel jury duty to effectuate
the constitutional right to a trial by jury.40 The Supreme Court of
the United States summarily reversed.41
PERSONAL RIGHTS

Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Criminal defendants continued, in the period under review, efforts
to upset sentences on the contention that their length made them
cruel and unusual within the meaning of the constitutional prohibitions.42 Of the three reported cases, the principal one was State v.
Bruce.4" Here the defendant challenged imposition of two life sentences to run consecutively, one for kidnapping and one for rape.
In State v. Davis44 imprisonment oh each of a total of nine counts
under four indictments had been challenged; State v. Taborn45 concerned sentences of quite unequal length meted out to three defendants tried under identical bills of indictment charging the common
crime of armed robbery.
Failure attended these efforts of accused, as was true in State v.
Stubbs,4" discussed in the review of the immediately prior period. 7
In all the judicial reasoning was identical; to quote from State v.
Bruce, "We have held in case after case that when the punishment
does not exceed the limits fixed by the statute, it cannot be con48
sidered cruel and unusual punishment in a constitutional sense."
With due deference, this formulation of the law, which makes statute
rather than constitution the measure of personal right, must again be
3 United States v. Hillyard, 52 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Wash. 1943).
In Re Jenison, 265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d 515 (1963).
"In Re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963).
"N.C. CONsT. art. I. § 14, and U.S. CONST. amendment VIII are all but
identical in wording.
" 268 N.C. 174, 150 S.E.2d 216 (1966).
"267 N.C. 126, 147 S.E.2d 570 (1966).
"268 N.C. 445, 150 S.E.2d 779 (1966).
48266 N.C. 295, 145 S.E.2d 899 (1966).
Strong, Survey of North Carolina Case Law: Constitutional Law, 44
N.C.L. Rrv. 934, 937 (1966) [hereinafter cited as STRONG].
8268 N.C. 174, 184, 150 S.E.2d 216, 224 (1966).
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challenged as a flat contradiction of the basic doctrine of American
constitutional law that legislative action, like that of the other
branches of government, is subject to the fundamental law of state
and federal constitutions. In the review of constitutional decisions
a year ago it was suggested that this unfortunate formulation arose
from cross-citation of decisions like Bruce and Stubbs with decisions
involving the different problem of longer imprisonment on resentence
following success in upsetting the original conviction.
A student
evaluation of Stubbs in the same volume of the Review laid the
trouble at the door of judicial assumptions of the unreviewability on
appeal of trial-court sentences if within the range provided by
statute. 50
In the principal recent case, State v. Bruce,51 the Court went
abroad for precedent in support of its position. Both Chavigny v.
State5r2 and State v. McNally53 were factually similar to Bruce in
that they also involved consecutive life sentences. But it is significant that in each of those opinions the rule laid down was that if the
statute prescribing sentence does not violate the constitution, then
any sentence in conformity to it cannot be deemed excessive. Such
was the formulation of the rule by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in State v. Salisbury54 but subsequently overlooked.
Perhaps this is only a tempest in a teapot, inasmuch as it is inconceivable that the Court intends in this context to challenge established constitutional doctrine. But even as a problem in correct
formulation of legal rule, there is a further complicating difficulty.
For it is also accepted constitutional doctrine that although a statute
may be valid on its face it can be so administered as to produce unconstitutionality. Normally, administration is the responsibility of the
executive branch whereas here it lies with the judiciary. Yet this
makes no difference on the constitutional level; the judicial branch,
no less than the executive and legislative branches, is subject to
constitutional limitation. Both the Connecticut and Florida courts
explained their statement of the controlling rule by observing that
,'5 STRONG 938-939.
oNote, 44 N.C.L. Rv. 1118 (1966).
See note 9 supra.
5 112 So. 2d 910 (Fla. App. 1959), cert. den., 114 So. 2d 6 (Fla. Sup.
Ct. 1959), cert. den., 362 U.S. 922 (1960), 163 So. 2d 47 (Fla. App. 1964)
(motion to vacate second sentence).
152 Conn. 598, 211 A.2d 162 (1965).
'230 N.C. 589, 55 S.E.2d 185 (1949).
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any sentence conforming to a valid statute cannot be constitutionally
excessive "since it is within the power of the legislature and not the
judiciary to determine the extent of the punishment which may be
imposed on those convicted of crime."55 But reliance upon separation of powers cannot relieve the judiciary of responsibility for its
own adherence to direct constitutional restrictions like that against
cruel and unusual punishment. Here, as in other areas of constitutional law, it is essential to understand the vital distinction between
direct and indirect limitations on governmental power.56
Possibly the entire matter continues to qualify as a tempest in a
teapot inasmuch as the constitutional guarantee in issue "has been
concerned with type, as opposed to length, of sentence." Yet in an
age of burgeoning constitutional protection of the person and his
essential liberties, it would be a mistake to measure the future by the
past. 57 Even North Carolina's past has something to offer. The
student evaluation of Stubbs, to which reference has already been
made, uncovered State v. Driver5 s "where the court held clearly
that a five-year sentence for wife beating was cruel and unusual and
that there could be no such anomaly as an 'unconstitutional judgment of an inferior Court affecting the liberty of the citizen, not the
subject of review by the Court of Appeals, where every order or
judgment involving a matter of law or legal inference is reviewable.' " 9 Most attempts of the convicted to upset sentences on the
ground of excessiveness will probably fail; on the other hand, such
challenges deserve a more careful scrutiny than the Supreme Court
of North Carolina has given them in recent years.
POLITICAL RIGHTS

Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, of the
lower federal courts, and of state courts are rapidly giving definitive
"State v. Bruce, 268 N.C. 174, 185, 150 S.E.2d 216, 225 (1966) [quot-

ing from the Connecticut case].
" This distinction is the subject of Strong, Judicial Review: A TriDimensional Concept of Administrative-Constitutioul Law, 69 W. VA. L.
RZnv. 249 (1967).

" Nemeth v. Thomas, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 2320 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 1966),

is a straw in the wind. A sentence of 606 days in the workhouse for an
indigent scofflaw unable to pay $3,335 in traffic fines was held violative of
the eighth amendment transmuted into the fourteenth.

878 N.C. 423 (1878).
"Note, 44 N.C.L. Rzv. 1118, 1123 (1966).
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content to the requirement of Reynolds v. Sims"° that state legislative assemblies be apportioned as nearly as is practicable according
to population. Collateral issues are now emerging as courts and
commentators probe the full implications of one of the major Supreme Court determinations of this century. One of these issues
which has precipitated considerable litigation concerns the applicability of the Reynolds requirement to local elective bodies such as
city councils, county boards of commissioners, school boards, etc.e 1
This question was one of several at the constitutional level presented to the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Hobbs v. Moore
County.2 In continuing litigation over administrative organization
of the schools in Moore County, certain citizens and taxpayers challenged the validity of the Assembly's latest legislative solution.3
That solution called for a county-wide election to determine whether
the three school administrative units, into which the county had been
divided, should be merged; and, should the merger be approved, as it
has been, for interim appointment and election thereafter of a Moore
County Board of Education of seven members. All seven were to be
named at large, but five were to be residents, respectively, of each
of the five districts into which the county had been divided by legislation of the early forties.' Reference to the earlier law discloses
that that division was by townships, the first district to consist of a
single township and the other four of two townships each.
Plaintiffs contended, inter alia, that the latest statutory provision
is void under the interpretation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment in Reynolds v. Sims and earlier apportionment decisions. Devoting only a short paragraph to the contention,
the Court found no merit in it. "Under this Act, every member of
the Board of Education is to be elected by the voters of the entire
county voting at large. Since two of the seven members are, themselves, to be 'at large' members, it follows that three of the seven
members comprising the entire Board may be residents of the same
" 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
6
A good general discussion, including consideration of the earlier decisions, is Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions
on Counties and Other Forns of Municipal Government, 65 COLum. L. REv
21 (1965).
0 267 N.C. 665, 149 S.E.2d 1 (1966).
68
N.C. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 1051.
",N.C. Sess. Laws 1943, ch. 76.
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election district referred to in this statute, if the people of the county,
voting at large, see fit to elect them."6 5
If Reynolds is to apply to local elective bodies," plaintiffs seemed
to have a stronger point than the Court conceded to them. Census
data for 1960 reveal great population disparity among the separate
townships, and among the pairing of townships, under the districting of the county by the 1943 statute.6 7 This being so, the residency
requirement effects malapportionment in fact despite the provision
for county-wide election. Professor John Sanders had in 1965 called
attention to the constitutional hazard in the "district residence-at
large nomination and election" system then employed by 36 North
Carolina counties for selection of county commissioners ;68 and by
action at the Extra Session of 1966 the General Assembly had made
provision for the reapportionment of such county boards.6 9 Contemporaneous with the Moore County decision in this state were
determinations, one state 0 and one federal, 71 in each of which legislative patterns for local bodies, identical with that for Moore County,
were invalidated as inconsistent with Reynolds v. Sims on a showing
of population disparity in the residence districts. Surprisingly, how267 N.C. 665, 676, 149 S.E.2d 1, 8 (1966).

"Determination

of this question, anticipated in four appeals to the Su-

preme Court decided during the Term just ended, did not eventuate. In
Moody v. Flowers and Supervisors of Suffolk County v. Bianchi, 35 U.S.L.
WEEK 4459 (May 22, 1967), the decrees of the respective lower federal

courts were vacated and remanded for jurisdictional reasons; in each of the
other two, decision of the question was found unnecessary to disposition of
the appeal. Dusch v. Davis, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4461 (May 22, 1967), revers-

ing Davis v. Dusch, 361 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1966); Sailors v. Kent County
Bd. of Educ., 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4462 (May 22, 1967), affirming Sailors v.
Board, 254 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Mich. 1966).

4,788
Dist. 4 Greenwood
2,058
2,565
McNeills
8,895
4,418
10,953
Dist. 5 Sand
5,476
6,983
426
Mineral Spgs
5,419
Dist. 3 Deep River
10,895
Ritters
2,000
2,426
U.S. Census of Population: 1960-North Carolina, Final Report P.C. (1)35A, Table VII. The addition of Little River township to District 4, subsequent to 1943, does not materially affect the population distribution inasmuch as its 1960 population was 688.
" Sanders, Equal Representatiom and the Board of County Commissioners, in POPULAR GOVERNMENT (April, 1965).
" N.C. Extra Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 153-5.1-5.8.
" Montgomery County Council v. Garrott, 243 Md. 634, 222 A.2d 164
(1966) (county council).
" Davis v. Dusch, 361 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1966) (city council).
"'Dist. 1 Carthage
Dist. 2 Ben Salem
Shef
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ever, the Supreme Court of the United States has now found in
such patterns no inconsistency with the equal protection clause, assuming arguendo the applicability of the Reynolds principle to local
72
bodies of the elective type.
PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

Coerced Confessions (In General)
For at least one hundred forty years, long before the insertion of the Fourteenth Amendment into the Constitution of the
United States, it has been the well settled law in this State that
when one is on trial for an alleged criminal offense, a confession
or admission by him may not be admitted in evidence, over his
objection, unless it was made voluntarily and understandingly,
not induced through use by the police of 'the slightest emotions
of hope or fear.' 73
In the period of this survey, as in most periods, there were a
number of "coerced confession" cases.7 Typically, a policeman
would testify that the accused had confessed to the crime, the accused
would object, and the trial judge would hold a hearing having first
excused the jury. In each case in the survey period the trial judge
found that the confession was voluntary, and permitted the policeman to continue his testimony. In each case the Supreme Court
held that the trial judge finding was supported by evidence. Normally, in each case, there was ample evidence all apart from the confession indicating that the accused had in fact committed the crime.
A few of the decisions are illustrative.
In State v. Camp,75 the defendant admittedly shot and killed one
"Dusch v. Davis, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4461 (May 22, 1967), cited note
66 supra. In Sailors, also cited note 66 supra, the Court again assumed
arguendo the applicability of Reynolds but found the Board of Supervisors
to be essentially an appointive one, not elective.
"'Justice I. Beverly Lake in State v. Gray, 268 N.C. 69, 77, 150 S.E.2d
1, 7-8 (1966).
" State v. Temple, 269 N.C. 57, 152 S.E.2d 206 (1967); State v. McKethan, 269 N.C. 81, 152 S.E.2d 341 (1967); State v. Childs, 269 N.C.
307, 152 S.E.2d 453 (1967); State v. Gray, 268 N.C. 69, 150 S.E.2d 1
(1966); State v. Bruck, 268 N.C. 174, 150 S.E.2d 216 (1966); State v.
Spears, 268 N.C. 303, 150 S.E.2d 499 (1966); State v. Bullock, 268 N.C.
560, 151 S.E.2d 9 (1966); State v. Carter, 268 N.C. 648, 151 S.E.2d 602
(1966); State v. Stafford, 267 N.C. 201, 147 S.E.2d 925 (1966); State v.
Conyers, 267 N.C. 618, 148 S.E.2d 618 (1966); State v. Lynch, 266 N.C.
584, 146 S.E.2d 677 (1966); State v. Preasley, 266 N.C. 663, 147 S.E.2d
33 (1966); State v. Camp, 266 N.C. 584, 146 S.E.2d 693 (1966).
" 266 N.C. 626, 146 S.E.2d 643 (1966).
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Pritchard in his front yard in an altercation over the ownership of a
rifle. After the killing the defendant went to the home of a neighbor,
and called the police. When the police arrived, the defendant took
them to the body, and explained that the deceased had come to his
home, claimed ownership of the rifle, and become abusive. The defendant asked him to leave, and the deceased had done so. The
deceased then returned, made threats, and the defendant pointed the
rifle at him. Whereupon the deceased reached for the glove compartment of his car, and defendant shot and killed him. The police
also testified that the defendant had admitted that on an earlier
occasion he had threatened to kill the deceased. The defendant, who
pleaded self-defense, denied having made this last statement. The
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, pointing out that "there is
nothing in the record to suggest that the statement was not made
voluntarily, and the record shows affirmatively that the defendant
sent for the officers after the killing and told them about it on the
way to the scene of it.""
A second illustrative case is State v. Stafford." There, Captain
Goodwin of the Raleigh Police Department testified that the accused
had made the following statement: that he had visited the Brawley
Jewelry Company on several occasions, and on June 1, had concealed
himself on the roof until closing hours. Then he gained access to
the store by cutting a hole in the roof, and had filled a paper bag
with watches from the display counters. He then had left Raleigh
by bus, to Wilson, Rocky Mount, and Norfolk, Virginia, selling the
watches along his route. The Captain further testified that he had
warned the prisoner of all his rights, and stated that he had offered
no promises, inducements, or threats.
The defendant, however, objected to the confession, and testified
that he was threatened, that he was refused permission to talk to his
sister or a lawyer, and that he was promised probation if he confessed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction because there was
ample evidence to support the trial judge findings that the defendant's "statement was made freely and voluntarily, without any
promise, threat, undue influence, coercion or duress." The Court
Id. at 629, 146 S.E.2d at 644 (1966).

~267 N.C. 201, 147 S.E.2d 925 (1966).
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noticed that "defendant has a long record of violations" and that "it
is not likely that one with his long experience with the courts would
believe that a police officer, rather than a judge, would determine
the question of probation.""8
Although the Supreme Court almost always affirms the findings
of the trial judge that the confession is made voluntarily after proper
warnings, the Supreme Court does insist that the trial judge make
these findings. Thus, in State v. Conyers, 9 the defendant was found
guilty of breaking and entering an occupied household at night with
the intent to ravish and carnally know an occupant.8" The defendant
was identified by a cap which was left in the house, and the police
officers testified at the trial that the defendant had made an oral and
written confession after being informed of his rights. The defendant
denied the cap was his, denied having made an oral confession, and
testified that he had signed the written confession upon certain inducements, without having read it. The trial judge found that "the
statement and admissions ... were freely and voluntarily made. .. "
The Supreme Court reversed and ordered a new trial on the theory
that "The court did not make findings of fact. The statements in
the court's ruling are conclusions." '
Similarly, the Supreme Court insists that the trial judge try the
"voluntariness" issues out of the presence of the jury. In State v.
82
Carter,
the defendants were charged with robbery by holding up
a grocery store with a sawed-off shotgun. The store-keeper identified the defendants, and upon their arrest the shot-gun, and a length
of cord used to bind the store-keeper, were found in their possession.
Defense counsel objected to the introduction of a signed confession,
and requested permission to question the voluntariness of the confession "in the absence of the jury." The Supreme Court reversed
the conviction because the trial judge denied this request. It held
that "the court should have sent the jury out and, in its absence, inquired into the circumstances under which the statements were
given." 83
"Id. at 203, 147 S.E.2d at 926-27 (1966).
8"267 N.C. 618, 148 S.E.2d 569 (1966).
oThe occupants were not disturbed; in fact they did not even wake up.
8±267 N.C. 618, 622, 148 S.E.2d 569, 572 (1966).
82268 N.C. 648, 151 S.E.2d 602 (1966).
8 Id.
at 652, 151 S.E.2d at 605.
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Coerced Confessions (Under Miranda)
The cases discussed above had this in common: the police testified that the defendant had been warned and had then confessed
voluntarily; the defendant testified to the contrary, that he had
confessed under pressure or promise of leniency. Miranda v. Arizona,"4 was designed to end this process of trial by "oath swearing."
It holds that no statements (either exculpatory or inculpatory) are
to be admitted into evidence if taken from one "in custody" unless
there has been a four-fold warning: (1) that the suspect has a right
to remain silent; (2) that anything the suspect says may be used
against him; (3) that he has a right to counsel; and (4) that if he
cannot afford counsel, counsel will be appointed to represent him.
If the suspect chooses not to say anything, all questioning must
cease. If the suspect asks for counsel, all questioning must cease
until counsel arrives. If the suspect makes a confession, and subsequently repudiates it, "a heavy burden rests on the Government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or
appointed counsel." 5
The Supreme Court chose to make its Miranda ruling prospective only, i.e., "only to cases in which the trial began after the date
of our decision."" State v. GrayO' was the only case that reached
the North Carolina Supreme Court wherein the trial began after
June 13, 1966, the Miranda date. Gray and his cousin were charged
with breaking and entering the house of T. A. Weaver and stealing
$5.00 in money, an old clock, and several picture frames. The cousin
received a suspended sentence after pleading guilty and testifying
that he and the accusel had committed the crime. The defendant,
then a high school boy, pleaded not guilty, and after trial was
sentenced to not less than four nor more than six years in the state
prison. In addition to the testimony of the cousin, the owner of the
house testified that the accused had returned the stolen articles to
him with an apology and asked that the charges be dropped. There
was also confession evidence.
The arresting officer testified that he had informed the accused
"'384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Id. at 475.
"Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
'1268 N.C. 69, 150, S.E.2d 1 (1966).
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of his (1) rights to silence, and (2) to retained counsel, and warned
him that (3) anything he said could be used against him. The
officer continued his testimony by saying that the accused thereupon
freely and voluntarily confessed to the crime. The accused denied
making any confession. His testimony was that his cousin had given
him the stolen articles, and that when he was informed that they
were stolen, he returned them to their rightful owner. The brother
of the accused testified that he was present when the interrogation
took place, that he did not hear any warnings by the police officials,
and that he did not hear any confession.
The Supreme Court held that whether or not a confession had
been made was a factual issue for the jury; and whether or not it
was voluntary was a factual issue for the trial judge. The Supreme
Court further ruled that there was evidence here to support the decisions against the accused. Thus far, the Court applied the law as
it stood prior to Miranda. But the fourth part of the four-fold
Miranda warning admittedly was not given here, and the question
before the Supreme Court was whether a confession is admissible if
the arrested suspect is not told "that if he was an indigent person
counsel would be appointed to represent him."" The Court held
that it was not erroneous here to fail to give the accused the fourth
part of the four-fold Miranda warning because:
there is nothing in the record to show, and it has not been
contended by the defendant, either in the trial court or before us,
that this defendant was an indigent entitled to have counsel appointed for him at the time of his arrest and conversations with
the officers. It cannot violate this defendant's constitutional right
against self-incrimination for the officers in their interrogation to
fail to advise him of rights which some other person might have
89
but which he does not have in view of his own circumstances.
The facts of record are fragmentary. The arresting officer testified that at the time of the arrest he advised the mother, who was
present, that her son was entitled to counsel and she replied that
8
In Miranda, the Supreme Court discussed this point in footnote 43 as
follows:
While a warning that the indigent may have counsel appointed for
him need not be given to the person who is known to have an attorney or is known to have ample funds to secure one, the expedient
of giving a warning is too simple and the rights involved too important to engage in ex post facto inquiries into financial ability when
there is any doubt at all on that score.
89268 N.C. 69, 83, 150 S.E.2d 1, 11-12 (1966).
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"she did not have any money to spend on that boy." The Court also
pointed out that bond was posted the night of the arrest, and that
the accused was represented at trial by two retained counsel.90
The dissenters on the Supreme Court of the United States in
Miranda worried that the decision would have a grave and adverse
impact on law enforcement because (1) confessions are essential for
the apprehension of criminals, and (2) the four-fold warning requirement would dry up confessions. The thirteen North Carolina
cases covered in this survey should alleviate this fear. In all but
one of the thirteen cases there was ample evidence all apart from
the confession to support the conviction." This evidence took the
form of identification by the victim, testimony of bystanders who
observed the crime, finger-print evidence, the possession of stolen
property, and so on. Nor is there any indication in any of these
cases that a warning of rights will prevent the defendant from confessing. In all the cases the supervisory courts believed the testimony of the police officials that they had warned the accused that
he need not say anything, that anything he said could be used against
him, and that he was entitled to counsel; and that thereafter, the
accused had freely admitted their guilt. The trial judges' finding that
this testimony by the police officials was supported by the evidence
was upheld by the appellate Court.
All indications are that Mirandawill not have an adverse impact
on the apprehension of criminals. But the indications also are that
it will not eliminate any pre-existing problems. In State v. Gray,
" Gray petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States to review his
conviction and asserted error under Miranda in that the North Carolina
court required him to prove indigency instead of requiring the state to prove

financial ability. Gray also asserted error in that the North Carolina court
engaged in "ex post fact inquiries into financial ability" which, he alleged,

is not permissible under Miranda when "there is any doubt at all on that
score." The United States Supreme Court denied the petition for the writ
of certiorari. Gray v. North Carolina, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3882 (U.S. Feb.
13, 1967).
"lState v. Lynch, 266 N.C. 584 S.E.2d 677 (1966) was the one case
where the confession was the only evidence connecting the accused with the
crime. There, a "colored boy" entered a bakery in Asheville as a customer,
then putting a handkerchief over his mouth, he pointed a pistol at the
cashier and took around forty-five dollars from the cash drawer and ran.
The cashier could not identify the defendant as the one who held her up.
Other witnesses to the event testified that the "boy" was "smaller and
younger" than the defendant. The trial judge, after hearing, admitted an
oral confession into testimony, and the jury found defendant guilty. He was
sentenced to prison for "not less than nine nor more than ten years." The
Supreme Court reversed for reasons unrelated to the confession.
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the only post Miranda case, the arresting officer testified that the
accused had been warned of his rights, and that the accused thereafter confessed. The accused, supported by the members of his
family then present, testified to the contrary-that he had not been
warned, and that he had not confessed. If the United States Supreme Court should decide to eliminate this "oath-swearing" type
of decision process, it will have to consider extending the McNabbMallory rule, now applicable in the federal courts, to the states. It
will have to rule that no confession obtained from an arrested suspect will be admissible unless the accused has been taken without
delay to a magistrate and there informed by a judicial officer of his
rights.
Right To Counsel
"The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries,
but it is in ours." Mr. Justice Black in Gideon v. Wainwright.
2
the United States Supreme Court
In Gideon v. Wainwright,"
held that the fourteenth amendment required that indigents charged
with crime be supplied with counsel appointed by the state.
Although Gideon concerned a felony conviction, the Supreme
Court did not say whether its ruling was restricted to felony cases,
and has refused since Gideon to explain whether or not the rule
applied to misdemeanor situations.'s The North Carolina Supreme
Court was faced with this problem twice during the period of this
survey, and similarly refused to lay down any hard and fast rule.
State v. Bennett 4 involved a conviction for breach of the peace
in violation of the Charlotte City Code and a fine of $25.00. The
Supreme Court denied appellant's contention that it was error on
the part of the Recorders Court to refuse to assign him counsel.
The Court said:

The Statute with reference to the appointment of counsel for
indigent defendants charged with misdemeanors leaves the matter to the sound discretion of the presiding judge. Some misde9' 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
" In this present term the Supreme Court refused to review an Arkansas
case wherein the defendant had been tried without counsel and sentenced to
nine months imprisonment on a misdemeanor charge. Winters v. Beck, 35
U.S.L. WEEK 3139 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1966).
9'266 N.C. 755, 147 S.E.2d 237 (1966).
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meanors and some circumstances might justify the appointment
of counsel, but this is not true in all misdemeanors. The facts of
an individual case would determine the action of the court and it
is not intended that anything in this opinion shall restrict or require the appointment of counsel in any given case.9 5
State v. Sherron90 was the other misdemeanor case. Sherron
was at a drive-in restaurant with friends and had an altercation. He
got out of the car and threw a soft drink bottle at the occupants,
hitting the car window. He was charged with the misdemeanors of
malicious injury to personal property and assault upon a female; he
was sentenced to prison for ninety days. He alleged it was error for
the trial judge to fail to appoint counsel to represent him. The
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction citing the Bennett decision.
The Court seemed influenced by "defendant's unquestioned guilt,"
the "very considerate sentenced imposed," and by the fact that appellant "would have nothing to gain if awarded a new trial."97
Another question in the "right to counsel" area is whether this
98
right exists at the pre-trial stages. In Escobedo v. Illinois,
the
Supreme Court held that an accused suspect has a constitutional
right to consult with his retained counsel in the police station. In
Massiah v. United States,9 the United States Supreme Court held
that it was a denial of the sixth amendment right to counsel to
interrogate an accused, free on bail while awaiting trial, in the absence of his counsel. In Hamilton v. Alabama1° and White v.
Maryland,1 ' the Supreme Court held that the right to counsel exists
at the preliminary hearing. In Hamilton, the accused had pleaded
not guilty at the preliminary hearing, and the Alabama court affirmed the conviction because there was no showing that the petitioner had been "disadvantaged in any way by the absence of counsel." A unanimous United States Supreme Court reversed because:
Id. at 756, 147 S.E.2d at 238.
"268 N.C. 694, 151 S.E.2d 599 (1966).
"The Sherron case was appealed from the court in Durham. A student
survey of misdemeanor cases in the City of Durham, made under the direction of Professor Penegar in a Criminal Law Seminar, shows that the
presence or absence of counsel makes a good deal of difference there in
terms of the number of cases dismissed prior to trial, in terms of the percentage of acquittals, and especially in terms of sentence imposed.
"378 U.S. 478 (1964).
"377 U.S. 201 (1964).
100368 U.S. 52 (1961).
101 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
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"When one pleads guilty to a capital charge without benefit of counsel, we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted ...
The degree of prejudice can never be known."1 ' 2 In White, the
petitioner had pleaded guilty at the preliminary hearing without the
advice of counsel, and the Maryland court affirmed the conviction
because the preliminary hearing was not a "critical stage in a criminal proceeding." The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that (1) there was prejudice here because the plea of guilty was
commented on at the subsequent trial, and (2) that in any event,
"we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted: only the
presence of counsel could have enabled this accused to know all the
03
defenses available to him and to plead intelligently."
This is the North Carolina decision in State v. Cason. ° The
defendant was permitted to waive preliminary hearing without the
benefit of counsel. The North Carolina court affirmed the conviction
and distinguished White v. Maryland and similar cases because here,
"no plea was entered." 03
Judicial Conduct and Comment
The trial judge occupies an exalted station. jurors entertain
great respect for his opinion, and are easily influenced by any
suggestion coming from him. As a consequence, he must abstain
from conduct or language which tends to discredit or prejudice
the accused or his cause with the jury.1°6
There were several cases in the period of this survey wherein it
was alleged that the trial judge had departed from the "cold neutrality" required by law, and consequently denied the defendant a fair
trial.
In State v. Belk, 0 7 the complaining witness told the police that
he had been given a ride by three strangers in a white buick and
robbed. The police stopped a white buick and arrested the three
occupants, after spying in the back seat found the possessions stolen
from the complaining witness. At the trial, in his summation to the
jury, the trial judge referred to the defendants as "three black cats in
102368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961).
U.S. 59, 60 (1963).
267 N.C. 316, 148 S.E.2d 137 (1966).
Id. at 316, 148 S.E.2d at 138.
...
State -v.Carter, 233 N.C. 581, 582, 65 S.E.2d 9, 10 (1951).
°268 N.C. 320, 150 S.E.2d 481 (1966).
103373
10.
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a white buick."'0 8 The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, holding that this expression "injected a prejudical opinion of the court into the instructions given by the court. This entitles the defendant to a new trial."' 10 9
In State v. Davis," there was a colloquy between the judge and
defense attorney which culminated when the judge said: "you sit
down, you just hush." The Court held that this was not a "felicitous
choice of words," but affirmed the conviction because "there is nothing in the record to indicate . ..that there is any probability the
challenged words of the trial judge had any effect upon the jury
prejudial to the defendant.""'
In State v. Sullivan,"2 the defendant was a citizen of Maryland
and argued that he had been denied an impartial and fair judge
during his trial, as evidenced by the judge's comment at time of
sentence:
North Carolina has been made a picking place for criminals
from Maryland. They are riding down here regularly from Maryland, robbing people who are trying to make an honest living. I
find this true in about every court I hold. 1 3
The North Carolina Supreme Court denied that this statement indicated a bias and concluded that "the fact that the court imposed
only a five year sentence when a total of forty years imprisonment
was permissible, refute his [the defendant's] claim that he was not
4
treated fairly.""1
Indictment and Trial By Jury
In all controversies at law ... the ancient mode of trial by jury
is one of the best securities of the rights of the people, and ought
to remain sacred and inviolable." 5
There were several "trial by jury" cases during the period
covered by this survey, both civil and criminal.
The civil case was In re Wallace."' There, a Mary Wallace
"08I. at 325, 150 S.E.2d at 484.
100 Id. at 325, 150 S.E.2d at 485.
110 266 N.C. 633, 146 S.E.2d 646 (1966).
"'Id. at 635, 146 S.E.2d at 647.
268 N.C. 571, 151 S.E.2d 41 (1966).
"'Id.at 572, 151 S.E.2d at 42.
"Id. at 572, 151 S.E.2d at 42.
...
N.C. CONST., art. 1, § 19.
1 267 N.C. 204, 147 S.E.2d 922 (1966).
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died, and her administrator put the home (with all its belongings)
up for sale. Nonnie Hadlock purchased the house (with all the belongings) and discovered within the house the sum of $1,283.95 in
cash. The administrator seized the money by legal process and
turned it over to the probate court. In the subsequent litigation, the
assistant clerk of the superior court adjudicated that the money
found was not part of the personal property which was sold with
the house. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, because
the issue of whether or not the money was included within the personal property was an issue of fact, and an "issue of fact must be
tried by a jury."
State v. MasonW-7 was the criminal case restating the essentiality
of a trial by jury. Mason was charged with the misdemeanor of
wilfully failing to support his illegitimate child. This crime has two
elements: fatherhood and wilful refusal to support. Here, the defendant denied fatherhood and the trial judge, with the consent of
defendant's attorney, charged the jury that it could find defendant
guilty if it found he was the father. The trial judge did not charge
concerning wilful refusal to support. The North Carolina Supreme
Court reversed because defendant had a right to a jury determination on both elements of the crime and, further, because he had not
waived this right since "an attorney has no right in the absence of
express authority to waive or surrender by agreement or otherwise
the substantial rights of his client.""'
State v. Knight" 9 concerned not the right to jury trial, but its
composition. When the jury was convened that tried this case, the
clerk excused a total of 63 persons because they were either engaged
as nurses, attorneys, railroad conductors, printers, doctors, railroad
engineers, linotype operators, volunteer firemen, ministers, National
Guardsmen, train dispatchers, or city firemen. This was in accordance with state law. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed
the conviction and the exclusion of these groups for three reasons:
first, because there was no showing that the defendant was a member of an excluded class and therefore prejudiced by the exclusions;
second, because there was no showing that members of the excluded
class "would bring to the deliberations of the jury a point of view
117 268 N.C. 423, 150 S.E.2d 753 (1966).
Id. at 426, 150 S.E.2d at 755.
119269 N.C. 100, 152 S.E.2d 179 (1967).
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not otherwise represented upon it" ; 20 and third, because "there is
a reasonable ground for the Legislature to believe that the public
interest and general welfare will be better served by the grant of the
exemption than by subjecting the members of the exempted class to
the duty imposed upon other members of the community."'"
State v. ChildsP2 also concerned the exclusion of certain persons
from jury duty, i.e., those opposed for reasons of conscience to the
death penalty. In a rape case, where death was one of the possible
verdicts, the trial judge granted the state's peremptory challenge for
cause for this reason. Appellant argued that this was error because
"jurors who believe in capital punishment are more prone to convict
than those who do not so believe; and that to exclude jurors who do
not believe in capital punishment denied him a fair and impartial
jury from a cross-section of the community."'"
The Supreme
Court, quoting from decisions and annotations elsewhere, denied
12 4
these arguments.
McClure v. State 5 relates to the essentiality of a grand jury
indictment. McClure was indicted for violation of G.S. § 14-26
(carnal knowledge of female virgins between twelve and sixteen
years of age). This is punishable in the discretion of the court, but
imprisonment cannot exceed ten years. At the advice of counsel,
McClure pled guilty to violation of G.S. § 14-22 (assault with intent
to commit rape) and was sentenced to imprisonment for a term not
less than twelve nor more than fifteen years. In post conviction
proceedings, the North Carolina Supreme Court vacated the judgment because the essential elements of the two crimes are not identical and the defendant had never been charged with the crime for
which he was sentenced. The Court held: "There can be no trial,
conviction, or punishment for a crime without a formal and sufficient
accusation. In the absence of an accusation the court acquires no
jurisdiction whatever, and if it assumes jurisdiction trial and conviction are a nullity."' 2 6
120 Id. at 105, 152 S.E.2d at 182.
"1 1d. at 106, 152 S.E.2d at 183.
1-- 269 N.C. 307, 152 S.E.2d 453 (1967).
122
fId. at 318, 152 S.E.2d at 461.
124The case is noted in 45 N.C.L. REv. 1070 (1967).
1-5267 N.C. 212, 148 S.E.2d 15 (1966).
2

1 6

Id. at 215, 148 S.E.2d at 18.
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Due Process and Double Jeopardy
No person shall... be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor be 2deprived
of life, liberty, or
7
property without due process of law.
One element of due process is the requirement that a criminal
statute must be definite as to the persons within the scope of the
statute and the acts which are penalized. If the statute is so vague
and uncertain "that a reasonable man would be compelled to speculate at his peril whether the statute permits or prohibits the act he
contemplates committing, the statute is unconstitutional."' 28
State v. Furio, 29 is one of these "void for vagueness" situations.
The city of High Point made it unlawful for any person to construct
or maintain along any street or highway a sign, billboard, motion
picture screen, etc., upon which is displayed "any nude, or semi-nude
pictures or any pictures or words which are vulgar, indecent or
offensive to the public morals."' °
Furio operated a drive-in movie, and the screen was visible from
the highway. He was charged with violation of the High Point
ordinance in that he exhibited movies which projected "nude and
semi-nude pictures of men and women." The Court reversed the
conviction because the ordinance presents too many problems of
construction "to the court seeking to apply it and to the person, firm
or corporation seeking to determine what he or it may do without
violating its provisions." The Court gave illustration by asking
questions including the following: "Does the prohibition against the
display of semi-nude pictures apply to pictures not generally regarded as 'vulgar, indecent or offensive' such as a billboard advertisement of bathing suits or a moving picture of a swimming meet?
Does the ordinance forbid the posting upon a billboard of a New
Year's greeting bearing the customary symbol of the new year? '
Another essential of due process is that the defendant not be
18 2
prejudiced by a joint trial. This is illustrated in State v. Lynch,
where two men were put on trial for the crime of robbery. Lynch
denied guilt, and the evidence against him consisted of a confession
...U.S. CONST.

amend. V.

State v. Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 122 S.E.2d 768 (1961).
129 267 N.C. 353, 148 S.E.2d 275 (1966).
10Id. at 355, 148 S.E.2d at 276.
3 Id. at 359, 148 S.E.2d at 279.
..266 N.C. 584, 146 S.E.2d 677 (1966).
128
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which he had repudiated. The co-defendant confessed, and in his
confession implicated Lynch as the leader of the two. When the
confession of the co-defendant was introduced into evidence, counsel
for Lynch objected. It was admitted into evidence, the judge charging the jury that this confession was not to be considered as evidence
against Lynch. The North Carolina Supreme Court found no fault
in this: "While the jury may find it difficult to put out of their
minds the portions of such confessions that implicated the co-defendant(s), this is the best the court can do; for such confession is
clearly competent against the defendant who made it."1 '
Subsequently in the trial, a police officer testified that Lynch had
confessed, and he was asked by the state if he had read to Lynch
the confession of the co-defendant. Defense counsel objected to the
mention of the co-defendant confession in connection with Lynch,
but the trial judge over-ruled this objection, and the police officer
continued his testimony. The North Carolina Supreme Court held
this to be error: "Lynch should be awarded a new trial at which his
guilt or innocence will be determined by evidence against him and
not by evidence incompetent as to him but devastating in its impact
upon his case.

'134

There was also a double jeopardy case of more than usual interest. In State v. Case,1" 5 the defendant was indicted in three separate
bills, each charging him with forging and altering a specific check.
He entered a plea of guilty, and was sentenced to a term of eighteen
to twenty-four months in the state's prison. He then filed a petition
in propriapersona, alleging that he first saw his court appointed attorney at the time his case was called for trial. This petition was
denied. He then filed another petition, this time attacking the validity of the indictment on the theory that the paragraphs had not
been numbered. The trial judge appointed his former counsel to
represent him; after the hearing, the trial judge ordered a re-trial
because defendant had not had the timely assistance of counsel at the
preliminary hearing before the magistrate. This had not been
averred in the defendant's petition, and he immediately appealed to
the Supreme Court from the order for a new-trial. The Supreme
Court denied the appeal, and defendant was put to trial a second
Id. at
1 "Id.
at

588, 146 S.E.2d at 680.

588, 146 S.E.2d at 681.
1Q5268 N.C. 330, 150 S.E.2d 509 (1966).
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time. His defense of "double jeopardy" was overruled, he was found
guilty, and this time he was sentenced to prison for not less than
three nor more than five years.
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the second trial
and second sentence were unconstitutional: "Had defendant secured
a new trial upon his first petition, he would have voluntarily placed
himself again in jeopardy and thereby would have waived the constitutional guaranty against double jeopardy." But here, continued the
Court, "defendant had a new trial forced upon him." In the second
petition, he sought only his release and alleged no grounds for a
new trial. "If not entitled to the relief sought, he wanted no other,
for he had no intention of risking a longer sentence in a new trial,"
the Court said. "Under the circumstances," the Court held, "Judge
Martin had no authority to vacate the 1965 sentence and to order a
new trial, and his order purporting to do so is void."'3 6
Right to Notice and Hearing
A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him,
to his day
and an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right
13 7
jurisprudence.
of
system
our
in
basic
in court-are
Housing Authority v. Thorpe'3 8 raises the question whether the
government, acting as a landlord, is subject to the constitutional
limitations which govern its activities in other areas of conduct.
In November, 1964, Mrs. Thorpe became a tenant in a low-rent
public housing project owned and managed by the Housing Authority of Durham. The lease provided for tenancy from month to
month, and gave both parties the option to terminate by written
notice at least fifteen days before the end of any monthly term. On
August 10, 1965, Mrs. Thorpe was elected president of the Parents
Club, a group of tenants in the project. The next day she received
written notice from the Authority to leave at the end of the month.
The notice did not give any reasons for the eviction, and the Housing Authority refused to meet with Mrs. Thorpe to give an explanation. She refused to vacate, and the Authority brought summary
ejection action. Mrs. Thorpe had two defenses: first, that she was
entitled to notice and a reason for the termination of the lease; and
"'

Id. at 334, 150 S.E.2d at 512.

in In re Oliver, 33 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
Justice
431,Black
148 S.E.2d 290 (1966).
""*Mr.
267 N.C.
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second, that the eviction was because of her exercise of first amendment rights and therefore unconstitutional. The trial court ruled
against her and appeal was taken.
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the eviction:
The defendant having gone into possession as tenant of the
plaintiff, and having held over without the right to do so after
the termination of her tenancy, the plaintiff was entitled to bring
summary ejectment proceedings ....

It is immaterial what may

have been the reason for the lessor's unwillingness to continue
the relationship of landlord and tenant after the expiration of the
term as provided in the lease.
Having continued to occupy the property... the defendant,
by reason of her continuing trespass, is liable to the plaintiff for
damages due to her wrongful
retention of its property and for
139
the costs of the action.
The United States Supreme Court agreed to review the case, but
vacated the decision and remanded for further proceedings when the
Department of Housing and Urban Development issued a circular,
reciting in part:
Since this is a federally assisted program .. .it is essential

that no tenant be given notice to vacate without being told by the
Local Authority . . .the reasons for the evictions as he may
40

wish.1

A second "notice and hearing" situation arose in the context of
a "contempt" proceeding. In It re Williams,141 The Reverend Williams was subpoened by both the state and the defense as a witness
in a criminal case (rape) wherein both the defendant and the complaining witnesses were members of his congregation and had discussed the situation with him. When he was called to the witness
stand, he refused to take the stand, and the jury was thereupon excused while the trial judge pursued the matter. The Reverend Williams explained, "Well, they came to me as their pastor. They
confided in me as their pastor, and I think I would be less than their
pastor to take the stand in defense of one of these persons.'A 42 After
a short colloquy, the trial judge held Williams in contempt, and
sentenced him to 10 days in jail.
11
' Id. at 433, 148 S.E.2d at 291-92.
1.

Thorpe v. Housing, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4366 (U.S. April 17, 1967).

1"1269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317 (1967).

' Id. at 70, 152 S.E.2d at 320.
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The following day Williams filed a motion to be released, in part
because he had not been afforded notice, and an opportunity to defend himself with the aid of counsel.1413 The motion was denied,
and the denial affirmed on appeal because:
Summary punishment for direct contempt committed in the
presence of the court does not contemplate a trial at which the
person charged with contempt is represented by counsel .... As
to the alleged duty of the court to appoint counsel for him, we
note that he is presently represented by three able attorneys, two
of whom appeared for him in the superior court on the day after
sentence.... There is no basis for the contention that to carry
out the sentence would deprive him of his liberty without due
process of law on the ground that he was denied a hearing or
denied representation by counsel of his choice.'"
A petition for a writ of certiorari is now pending in the Supreme Court of the United States.
Right to Speedy Trial
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
45
to a speedy and public trial."'
On January 3, 1964, Professor Klopfer of Duke University
participated in a sit-in demonstration at a segregated restaurant on
the outskirts of Chapel Hill. He was promptly indicted and tried
for "trespass." The jury was unable to agree on a verdict, and the
case was continued. In the 1965 term of court, the solicitor informed Klopfer that he would ask for a nolle prosequi with leave.
If granted, this would give the solicitor authority to call the case for
trial at any time in the foreseeable future. Klopfer filed opposition,
1
. In Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131, 136 (1965) a Virginia judge summarily found a lawyer guilty of contempt because of a motion made by that
lawyer in court. The Supreme Court reversed because: "It is settled that
due process and the Sixth Amendment guarantee a defendant charged with
contempt such as this 'an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to
his day in court-and to be represented by counsel.'" It re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257 (1947), concerned a contempt conviction imposed by a Michigan judge
upon a witness for "evasiveness." The Supreme Court reversed because:
"failure to afford the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to defend himself...
was a denial of due process .... A person's right to reasonable notice of a
charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense . . .are
basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and
to be
1 represented by counsel." Id. at 273.
.Inre Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 76, 152 S.E.2d 317, 323-24 (1967).
15 U.S. CONST.

amend. VI.
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and asked for an immediate trial. By that time the Supreme Court
had held in Harem v. Rock Hill4 ' that all pending "trespass cases"
had abated by reason of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The trial
judge granted the "nolle prosequi with leave," and appeal was taken
to the North Carolina Supreme Court, where the decision was affirmed.1" 7 The North Carolina Supreme Court held that:
Without question, a defendant has the right to a speedy trial,
if there is to be a trial. However, we do not understand the defendant has the right to compel the State to prosecute him if the
State's prosecutor, in his discretion and with the court's appproval, elects to take a nolle prosequi.'48
The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and
reversed. After pointing out that the North Carolina conclusion
"has been explicitly rejected by every other state court which has
considered the question," the Supreme Court held:
We, too, believe that the position taken by the court below
was erroneous ....
By indefinitely prolonging this oppression,
as well as the 'anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation,' the criminal procedure condoned in this case by the Supreme Court of North Carolina clearly denies the petitioner the
right to a speedy trial which we hold is guaranteed to him by
the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 49
At least one thing stands out in this brief survey of criminal
procedure cases; that the North Carolina Supreme Court does not
hesitate to set aside a guilty conviction-no matter how abundant
the evidence of guilt-where there has been a denial of constitutional rights.
This is true when the trial court fails to make complete findings
concerning the voluntariness of a confession,5 ° or when the trial
judge hears evidence on this score in the presence of a jury.' 51 This
is true when the trial judge departs from the "cold neutrality" of
his position, and makes adverse comments about the defendant
which cannot help but influence the jury.'52 This is true when the
.'.
379 U.S. 306 (1964).
2'7 State v. Klopfer, 266 N.C. 349, 145 S.E.2d 909
(1966).
1'8 Id. at 350, 145 S.E.2d at 910.
" Klopfer v. North Carolina, 87 S. Ct. 988 (1967).
1"0 State v. Conyers, 267 N.C. 618, 148 S.E.2d 569 (1966).
1"1 State v. Carter, 268 N.C. 648, 151 S.E.2d 602 (1966).
..
2 State v. Belk, 268 N.C. 20, 150 S.E.2d 481 (1966).
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state convicts without trial of all elements of the crime ;153 when the
state convicts on a charge which has not been made;14 when the
state convicts under a statute which is hopelessly vague ;155 and when
the state tries a man a second time over his objection.' 56
The lawyer might deplore the use of so-called "technicalities" to
reverse the conviction of persons whose guilt seem clear; but lawyers can only appreciate and applaud these decisions. It is not only
the individual who is on trial; it is the very system of justice that
sits on the dock.
PROPERTY RIGHTS

During the period under review the Supreme Court of North
Carolina found no constitutional issue of taking by eminent domain
save with respect to measure of value. 1 ' Taking under the police
power did arise in three cases. Contrasting results in two of these
three teach once again the limits of legislative power to alter the
law under American constitutional theory. In Johnson v. Blackwelder, 5 " a conflict between the widow and collateral relatives of a
deceased, the latter asserted property rights in the estate by virtue
of the statutes of descent and distribution as they read at the time
decendent had the legal competency to make a will but did not because allegedly satisfied with the method of distribution provided
by them. After mental incompetency overtook the intestate, the Assembly enacted the Intestate Succession Act, which became effective
two years before his death. The kind of reliance generated by these
facts is not productive of any constitutional protection; the intestate
"was charged with knowledge that these statutes were subject to
change by the General Assembly. ' " 9
On the other hand, action taken in pursuance of state grants may
create the type of reliance protected by the constitutional prohibition against impairment of the obligation of contract. Illustrative of
this is Oglesby v. Adams,'0 0 where the lessee of oyster beds under
1933 legislation empowering the Board of Conservation and Devel...
State v. Mason, 268 N.C. 423, 150 S.E.2d 753 (1966).
1
. McClure v. State, 267 N.C. 212, 148 S.E.2d 15 (1966).
...
v. Furio, 267 N.C. 353, 148 S.E.2d 275 (1966).
"5 State
State v. Case, 268 N.C. 330,
150 S.E.2d 509 (1966).
..Highway Comm'n v. Gasperson, 268 N.C. 453, 150 S.E.2d 860 (1966);
Highway Comm'n v. Phillips, 267 N.C. 369, 148 S.E.2d 282 (1966).
267 N.C. 209, 148 S.E.2d 30 (1966).
"'Id.at 211, 148 S.E.2d at 32.
150268 N.C. 272, 150 S.E.2d 383 (1966).
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opment to lease river bottoms for twenty years, at one dollar per
acre for the second decade of the leases, was successful in his challenge of an attempt by the Board to raise the rental fivefold in compliance with a statute of 1965. The Court treated as contractual the
relation between state and lessee, thus bringing the contract clause
limitations into operation and removing the case from the general
rule applied in Blackwelder. "The distinction," said the Court in
contrasting an earlier enunciation of the general rule, 8' "is that
here the plaintiff is relying not upon a statute but upon a contract
duly and legally executed by the State, and the State is not at liberty
to violate the rights conferred upon the plaintiff by a solemn agreement.' 0 2 Interpretation of the contract clause, whether of state or
federal constitution," 3 as applicable to any articulation of state legislative policy is an anachronism from an age that thought of nearly
every interrelationship as founded in contract. Yet the decision of
Marshall's in Fletcher v. Peck'" withstands the test of time and
circumstance, to continue to provide private interest with protection
against change in statute law governing land grants, tax exemptions,
corporate charters, and public utility franchises absent express reservation of legislative power to alter or amend.
For the period here reviewed, Clark's Greenville, Inc. v. West" 5
is the Court's major decision under the police power. Plaintiff's
emphasis was upon the motives prompting enactment of the Greenville Sunday closing ordinance. The motivation, it was contended,
was to destroy plaintiff's competitive advantage over merchants desiring to remain closed on Sunday. Accordingly, in plaintiff's view,
the preamble of the ordinance, stressing the desire of the City
Fathers to promote the public health, safety, morals and general
welfare, was a calculated misrepresentation. The Court gave plaintiff's argument short shrift:
The question presented . .. is whether the court may inquire
into the motives which prompted a municipal legislative body to
enact an ordinance valid on its face. The answer is NO.... Any
other rule would permit any displeased or disgruntled citizen to
question the validity of any legislative enactment merely by alleg..
1 Pinkham v. Mercer, 277 N.C. 72, 40 S.E.2d 690 (1946).
1"2 268 N.C. 272, 274, 150 S.E.2d 383, 386 (1966).
...
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 17 (law of the land); U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
1' 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
102268 N.C. 527, 151 S.E.2d 5 (1966).
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ing bad faith and conspiracy on the part of the body which passed
it. Orderly government could not survive such license.10 6
The opinion illustrates the inevitability of result under syllogistic
reasoning, once the major premise is set. Three times it is asserted
that the city council acted within its authority; if this be true, bad
motive cannot, of course, reverse the result. But in asserting the
validity of the ordinance, the Court begs the very question presented
to it for resolution. That question is whether a statute or ordinance
purposively enacted to prefer one merchant or one product over
another is consistent with due process conceptions. The answer depends upon basic constitutional predicates of decision. In economic
matters, such as involved in the case under discussion, the Supreme
Court of the United States will not look behind the veneer of legislative profession to determine the true purpose motivating the legislative enactment. "We cannot undertake a search for motive in
testing constitutionality."' 67 Yet, consistently with the double standard employed by it,"" the nation's High Court will pierce the veil
of legislative profession where personal and political rights are involved 69 and individual Justices, at least, will do so in other noneconomic contexts.Y17 Almost all state courts reject the double stanprofession to purpose where
dard, and a number will look beyond
7
economic interests are in litigation.1 '
Under current federal constitutional doctrine it is immaterial
that the United States Supreme Court refuses to go behind the
268 N.C. 527, 530-531, 151 S.E.2d 5, 7-9 (1966).
Daniel v. Family Security Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949).
188 McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court, Sup. CT.
REv. 34 (1962), is a perceptive study of the Court's double standard.
...
Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 28
1..

187

(1939).

1.0 E.g. Murphy, J., dissenting in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944); Douglas, J., concurring in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963).
17
Kresage Co. v. City of Detroit, 290 Mich. 185, 287 N.W. 427 (1939);
State v. Gleason, 128 Mont. 485, 277 P.2d 530 (1954); Saidel v. Village,
254 App. Div. 22, 4 N.Y.S.2d 814 (App. Div. 1938); State v. Cromwell, 72
N.D. 565, 9 N.W.2d 914 (1943); State ex rel. Richey v. Smith, 42 Wash.
237, 84 Pac. 851 (1906) (licensing of plumbers), overruled by Tacoma v.
Fox, 158 Wash. 325, 290 Pac. 1010 (1930) (earlier decision out of line
with later trend in other jurisdictions). That much legislation which professes to be in the public interest has in reality a different purpose is the
thesis of Hanft and Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation under Licensing
Statutes, 17 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1938); Note, Governmental Product Favoritism,
8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 264 (1941).
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legislative profession in cases of economic orientation because there
is in any event so little limitation upon permissible legislative objectives. Powell v. Pennsylvania7 early set the tone of Court tolerance
of product favoritism, followed by similar toleration of legislative
favoritism in the competition between older and newer methods of
distribution.1 73 In the second Carolene Products case174 the Court
denied that in Congressional proscription of interstate commerce in
filled milk there is prohibition "merely because it competes with
another such article which it resembles," but the Carolene Products
litigation nevertheless indicated great legislative leeway. With many
state courts, on the other hand, judicial inquiry into purpose is most
material, inasmuch as due process is conceived as forbidding legislative disadvantage of one business or businessman for the competitive gain of another absent substantial evidence of relationship
between the restrictive legislation and the public health, safety, or
welfare. 7 5 In the last 20 years the Supreme Court of North Carolina has first sustained and then invalidated the licensing of photographers, 170 held licensing of dry cleaners and tile contractors unconstitutional,177 and upheld licensing of realtors. 8
In the case of Clark's Greenville earlier decisions of the Court
had foreclosed attack on the municipal Sunday closing ordinance 79
unless plaintiff, by inducing judicial attention to the allegedly true
purpose of the local law, could overcome its presumed relatedness to
the state police power and thus bare it as an unjustified attempt of
City Council to play favorites between competing types of mer-1
U.S.v.
678Lee(1888).
. 127
Wilson
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); State Board v.
Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931).
171 Carolene Products Co. v.United States, 323 U.S. 18 (1944).
..Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 20 (1944);
People v.Brown, 407 IIl.
565, 95 N.E.2d 888 (1951); Brackman v.Kruse,
120 Mont. 249, 199 P.2d 971 (1948); State v.Wood, 207 Okla. 193, 248
P.2d 612 (1952) (licensing of watchmakers); Moore v. Sutton, 185 Va.
481, 39 S.E.2d 348 (1946) (licensing of photographers) ;John J. Jelke Co.
v.Emery, 193 Wis. 311, 214 N.W.369 (1927).
176 State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949),
overriding
State v.Lawrence, 213 N.C. 674, 197 S.E. 586 (1938).
""Roller v.Allen, 245 N.C.516, 96 S.E.2d 851 (1957); State v.Harris,
216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940).
...
State v.Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 114 S.E.2d 660 (1960).
",Similar ordinances had been sustained, ina series of cases culminating
inCharles Stores v.Tucker, 263 N.C. 710, 140 S.E.2d 370 (1965), on the
basis of their professed concern for the public interest in a requirement of

Sunday observance.
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chandisers. Judicial inquiry into legislative motive has its undeniable hazards, suggesting the wisdom of caution.18 Yet there is
great appeal in the view of the supreme court of Washington expressed 60 years ago: "We are not permitted to inquire into the
motive of the legislature, and yet, why should a court blindly declare
that the public health is involved, when all the rest of mankind know
full well that the control of the plumbing business by the board and
its licensees is the sole end in view?"",SEPARATION OF POWERS

Two decisions during the period under review concerned the
applicability of the state's Declaratory Judgment Act. In the first
the Court, finding that "no genuine justiciable controversy now
exists between the parties hereto," remanded with directions that the

action be dismissed :.82
Our Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act does not authorize the
adjudication of mere abstract or theoretical questions. Neither
was this act intended to require the Court to give advisory opinions when no genuine controversy presently exists between the
parties. Actions for declaratory judgment will lie for an adjudication of rights, status, or other legal relation only when there
is an actual existing controversy between the parties.1 8 3
In a case decided a few weeks later, the Court found present an
existing controversy between the parties where the trial court had
nonsuited the plaintiff. Accordingly, the cause was here remanded
"for a trial de novo and for an adjudication of the respective rights
84
of the parties."'
This familiar judicial behavior would scarcely deserve comment,
required as it supposedly is by the doctrine of separation of powers,
did it not provide contrasting background for Advisory Opinion In
Re Work Release Statute, which appears as an unpaginated Appendix to Volume 268 of the Reports. The North Carolina Constitution nowhere directs the state's highest court to render technically
8'The problem is considered from a somewhat different perspective by
Strong, Toward an Acceptable Function of Judicial Review?, 11 S.D.L.
Rlv. 1, 6-8 (1966).
.8State ex rel. Rickey v. Smith, 42 Wash. 237, 248, 84 Pac. 851 (1906),
cited note 171 supra.
...
Angell v. Raleigh, 267 N.C. 387, 148 S.E.2d 233 (1966).
:3 Id. at 391-92, 148 S.E.2d at 236.
...
Hubbard v. Josey, 267 N.C. 651, 148 S.E.2d 638 (1966).
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advisory opinions to governor or legislative assembly, as do the
constitutions of a handful of states. In the absence of constitutional sanction, the advisory opinion is an anomaly in the face of the
state constitution's express declaration in article I, sec. 8, that "The
legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other."' 8 5
Little but misleading information would be available on the North
Carolina advisory opinion were it not for the research of Professor
Preston Edsall, the results of which appeared in the pages of this
Review nearly twenty years ago.18 6 Publication of the Court's advisory opinions was for years as haphazard as the practice itself
was spasmodic; Professor Edsall in the course of his study turned
up several "lost" opinions, which were then published by the court
reporter. But the current advisory opinion indicates an accepted, if
constitutionally questionable, practice in this state which is now near18 7
ly one hundred years old.

In the pages of another law review, the writer offers a possible
solution for the paradox of a court freely giving advisory opinions s yet choking on analogous use of the declaratory judgment.' 89
That analysis emphasizes the fundamentalness of the distinction between ordinary judicial review-the historic judicial practice of deciding non-constitutional litigation through statutory or case interpretation followed by application of the controlling legal norm to
the facts of the particular litigation, and constitutional judicial
review-the power of the judiciary to enforce the written constitu..Even if point is made of the fact the constitutional provision reads
"ought to be" rather than "shall be," arguably leaving room for legislative
deviation, the advisory opinion is no less anomalous for the reason that it
has never enjoyed even statutory authorization in North Carolina, again
unlike some other jurisdictions.
...
Edsall, The Advisory Opinion in North Carolina,27 N.C.L. REv. 397
(1949). Professor Frankfurter, author of Advisory Opinions: 1 ENcyc.
Soc. Sci. 475 (1934), erred in stating that the North Carolina practice "has
become atrophied" and misjudged the consequences of Opinion of the Justices, 64 N.C. 785 (1870), in asserting that power to render advisory
opinions had there been "explicitly denied." Professor Edsall's analysis is
thorough and excellent, aside from which Note, 7 N.C.L. REv. 449 (1929),
seems to be the only accurate, although short; investigation of developments
following upon the 1870 opinion.
"'Counting from the 1870 opinion, cited note 186 supra.
...
Put to one side as pure rationalization is the explanation that the
Justices and not the Court render the advisory opinion. This is the practice
even in those states whose constitutions authorize advisory opinions.
8' Strong, Judicial Review: A Tri-Dimensional Concept of Administrative-Constitutional Law, 69 W. VA. L. REv. 249 (1967).
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tion. This distinction does not reconcile the North Carolina cases
on advisory opinion and declaratory judgment; if there is a rationale
to them, it lies in the concept that the advisory opinion is available
for resolution of serious governmental problems that cannot later
be so structured as to bring the issues within the framework of
"existing controversy." But the distinction offered does provide
basis for acceptable resolution of the North Carolina paradox
through its insistence upon clear differentiation between two distinctly different types of judicial review. If the judicial review
sought is of the ordinary type, requirement of the presence of an
"existing controversy" constitutes an adequate articulation of the
fact that the court, as one of the co-ordinate divisions of state government, should withhold its intervention until the legislative and
executive branches have fulfilled their proper roles in the governmental process. On the other hand, if the judicial review sought is
of the constitutionality of governmental action, either proposed or
taken, then there is in order a different criterion for judicial intervention consistent with the entirely distinct posture in which the
court places itself, vis-a-vis the other branches of government, in
the exercise of constitutional judicial review.
Justice Lake's dissent in Rabon v. Hospital,'0 wherein a bare
majority of the Court overruled the former common-law rule"9 ' of
charitable immunity for hospitals, puts in classic context the appropriate role of the judiciary in relation to the law-making function
of government. It was remarked a year ago, in reviewing constitutional decisions of that earlier period, that "American courts have
not, as a general principle, found inconsistency between the constitutional principle of separation of powers and their historic function
of fashioning common law."' 9 2 Avoidance of inconsistency has been
achieved by judicial indulgence in the fiction that courts declare,
rather than make, the law. But as Justice Lake's dissent discloses,
that indulgence presents problems when a court concludes that it is
time to overrule an earlier common-law decision. This can be done
properly, he reasons, only through "its determination that its former
decision was an erroneous statement of the law when the decision
10 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485 (1967).
19.Williams v. Hospital, 237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303 (1953), adhering to
"settled law."
192 Strong, Survey of North Carolina Case Law; Constitutional Law, 44
N.C. L. REv. 934, 947 (1966).
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was rendered and, therefore, the law never has been as stated in the
former opinion and the correction is retroactive." However, "to
change the existing law for the future because a different rule would
be a wiser policy for the State of North Carolina to follow in the
future is, in my opinion, a violation by this court of the Constitution of North Carolina and a usurpation of a power which has not
98
been granted to us by the people."'
By this reasoning, according to the Justice, the Court, in failing
to make the overruling decision fully retroactive, has exercised "the
essence of the legislative process." Otherwise stated, the majority
preference for effectiveness of the new rule from the date of the overruling is declared to constitute a violation of the state constitutional
requirement of separation of powers. This new wrinkle would jeopardize increasing resort to prospective overruling by American state
courts only recently freed from the threat that such resolution of the
difficult problem of timing might run afoul of Federal due process.' 94 In North Carolina it might produce complete judicial im-

potency to alter the common law; recent North Carolina cases cast
doubt upon the due process validity of retrospective overruling, at
least where property rights are involved. 95 The majority's rejection
of the declaratory theory of law requires a new rationalization to
square judicial formation of policy with the doctrine of fractionated
powers, but it is fortunate for law administration that Justice Lake's
views did not appeal to other members of the Court.'
Statutory interpretation is even more fertile than common-law
ruling as a source of litigious conflict over the respective domains
of legislature and judiciary. In theory the Court is to find the legislative meaning, not to rewrite the enactment to its own satisfaction.
Legal history is full of debate on the merits and demerits of "judicial
legislation." During the period reviewed the Supreme Court of this
1, 29, 152
485, 502
° 269
GreatN.C.
Northern
Ry. S.E.2d
v. Sunburst
Oil (1967).
& Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358
(1932).
...
See discussion in Strong, 44 N.C.L. REv. 934, 948 (1966). Federal
due process furnishes no obstacle. Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444
(1924).
...
Chief Justice Parker, also dissenting in opinion, approaches the problem largely on a policy level. The closest he comes to constitutional considerations are his statements that "the General Assembly is the ultimate
tribunal to determine public policy," and that "this prospective judicial ac-

tion is outright legislation by the court." 269 N.C. 1, 24-25, 1152 S.E.2d
485, 504 (1967).
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state was almost inevitably presented with issues turning on statutory interpretation. Of these cases, by far the most prominent was
D & W, Inc. v. Charlotte,1 7 the celebrated "brown bag case." The
Court's assertion that "It is the prerogative and function of the
legislative department of the government to make the law"' 98 does
not, of course, of itself absolve the judiciary of governmental trespass. However, there is nothing in the circumstances of this case to
justify questioning the Court's restrictive interpretation of the Turlington and ABC Acts as improper encroachment upon the province
of the General Assembly. The current travail in that deliberative
body stems from the complexity of the liquor problem, not from
any effort of the judiciary to "establish the public policy of this State
with reference to alcoholic beverages."' 9

CONTRACTS
Walter D. Navin, Jr.*
THE CONTRACT CONCEPT AT WORK

What is a contract? In one sense the question is unanswerable
because contracts do not exist the way a tree or a stone exists; it
is a construct of the lawyer's brain, and is used to classify activity
of human beings concerning very nearly everything humans consider
important. A contract is not an "is" but a lawyer's concept defining
a relationship between persons. As lawyers, we find the concept
useful because once we classify the particular relationship, then we
know how to deal with it, in terms of resolving the conflict every
lawsuit represents. We know how, because we have been trained in
the use of the concept and have reached approximate agreement as
to what it contains and what it does not. Put shortly, a good answer
to the question, what is a contract, is the further inquiry: For what
purpose do you wish to know? A consent judgment, for example, is
really a "contract" because by treating it as a contract the rules by
17 268 N.C. 577, 151 S.E.2d 241 (1966).
1911Id. at 591, 151 S.E.2d at 250-251.
.99 The words quoted from D. & W., Inc. v. Charlotte, ibid., are given a
new, but consistent, context.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
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which a "contract" is construed may be applied to the construction
of a consent judgment. This is some of the learning of Insurance
Co. v. Bottling Co.' A common reason for deciding whether a set
of facts falls within our created concept of contracts is whether or
not the "contract" statute of limitations applies. The Court faced
this in City of Reidsville v. Burton.' Lawyers with clients who refuse to accept their good legal advice will no doubt feel a twinge of
sympathy for an engineer working for the city of Reidsville in the
late '50s. In exchange for the city's taking into its borders a real
estate development, the city required the real estate developer to construct a bridge leading into the development across a drainage ditch,
according to specifications furnished by the engineer. The developer
built the bridge but it did not meet the specifications and the city
engineer refused to accept it, fearing, apparently, its early collapse.
The city council, however, accepted the bridge in exchange for the
developer's promise to rebuild if the bridge collapsed within the
following twelve years. In less than four years the bridge did collapse. When the city demanded its replacement from the developer,
and he refused, the city rebuilt it and billed the developer its cost.
But the city did not bring suit until more than three years after the
date of their demand. Is the city in this set of facts exercising a
governmental function in which case no statute of limitations may
be pleaded against the municipality, or is the city merely enforcing
a private right-a contract-in which case the statute does apply?
The Court decided it was the latter. A similar sort of judicial
process occurred in Parsons v. Gunter3 where the Court held a particular set of facts to fall within the contract concept rather than
the constructive trust concept and thus the contract statute of limitations barred the plaintiff.
The state 'owns' the bottom lands under the waters of the state
and by legislative enactment gave to the Board of Conservation and
Development the power to lease such lands for oyster beds. The
statutory enactment prescribed the term, the renewal and the rent.
Does a man asserting claims under such an agreement that is authorized by the legislative statute assert a right based on a statute or a
contract right? It makes a difference because after one Oglesby
1268 N.C. 503, 151 S.E.2d 14 (1966).
2269 N.C. 206, 152 S.E.2d 147 (1967).

- 266 N.C. 731, 147 S.E.2d 162 (1966).
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entered into such a lease at 10 dollars a year for 20 years, the
legislature amended the statute to raise the rent to 50 dollars a year.
No one has a vested right in a statute, but on the other hand, the
state cannot impair the obligation of contract. The North Carolina
Supreme Court called the fact situation existing a contract, and held
the legislature could not constitutionally change the rental in Oglesby
v. Adams.' The application of the contract clauses of our State
and Federal Constitutions is discussed in the Constitutional Law
Survey, above.
CONTRACT OR TORT
Two cases decided during the period surveyed, Veach v. Bacon
American Corp.5 and Hollenbeck v. Ramset Fasteners, Inc.,' are
examples of fact situations courts have had difficulty classifying as
tort or contract; both involve personal injuries resulting from defective manufactured equipment. Whether or not such "breach of warranty" cases properly belong within the contract concept, the tort,
or perhaps a new concept-products liability-has been perceptively
explored in this Review, once during the 1965 Survey by Professors
Dobbs and Byrd7 and again by Professor Clifford in his article
dealing with the sales portion of the Uniform Commercial Code
Symposium.' In the Veach case, which more directly raises the
problem of classification, certain oral statements by the selling agent
were urged as express warranties that had been breached, but the
written document contained that common clause expressly disclaiming any oral agreements by agents. The Court gave effect to the
clause. The argument that such express disclaimers are unconscionable is made more difficult in North Carolina by the failure of the
legislature to adopt section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code.'
A bank's liability for a payout over an unauthorized indorsement
has also been treated as both tort or contract insofar as the true
owner of the negotiable instrument is concerned. In Modern Homes
Constr. Co. v. Tryon Bank & Trust Co." the Court reversed prior

"268 N.C. 272, 150 S.E.2d 383 (1966).
266 N.C. 542, 146 S.E.2d 793 (1966).
-267 N.C. 401, 148 S.E.2d 287 (1966).
'Dobbs & Byrd, Torts, Survey of North Carolinta Case Law, 43 N.C.L.
REv. 906, 936 (1965).
' Clifford, The Uniform Code in North Carolina,A Symposium, Article
Two: Sales, 44 N.C.L. RFv. 539, 577 (1966).
'UmFORm Co
RCIAL CoDE § 2-302.
10266 N.C. 648, 147 S.E.2d 37 (1966).
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law that had held such liability was promissory in nature and joined
the mainstream of judicial authority by classifying such liability as
arising from a conversion of the true owner's property. This is the
position the Uniform Commercial Code takes" and one wonders
why the Code did not rate a citation in the opinion.
IMPLIED PROMISES

Ever since Slade's Case,13 which held that assumpsit would lie
to enforce a promise implied by law and not one based on actual
facts, lawyers have struggled to separate contract from quasi-contract. The quasi-contract recovery is viewed more conveniently today as a part of the concept of Restitution,' 4 but judges and lawyers
still speak of it as contract and discuss enforcement of such promises.
During the period surveyed several disputes were resolved under
rubrics arising from such a classification. Beacon Homes, Inc. v.
Holt3 involves a fact situation that has always given the judicial
process a great deal of trouble because both parties are essentially
innocent. Beacon Homes, Inc. contracted with the defendant's
mother to build a home on a lot the mother thought she owned but in
reality was owned by her daughter. The daughter had no knowledge
of the construction and thus could not be held liable on the contract
under any theory of estoppel. Does she have to pay for the home
constructed on her land? The trial judge did not give a clear answer
to that very question when it was posed to him by the jury trying
the lawsuit between the construction company and the landowner.
The jury then returned a verdict for the defendant, apparently on
the theory that the damage done to the defendant's lot equalled the
value of the permanent improvements. The Supreme Court reversed
and granted a new trial, offering a careful set of issues for the next
jury which clearly imply that if the owner prevents the builder from
removing the home from her lot, the builder will be entitled to the
amount the home increased the fair market value of the owner's lot.
If the owner is willing, the only choice the builder has is to remove
the structure." For a case involving repairs to a boat not owned
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-419 (1965).
,' The problem is fully delineated in a student note in 44 N.C.L. REv. 1073

(1966).
1'4

1

CoxE, 92b (1602).

RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION

4 (1937).

18266 N.C. 467, 146 S.E.2d 434 (1966).

"oBeacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 266 N.C. 467, 146 S.E.2d 434 (1966).
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by the repairer nor the one for whom the repairs were done, see
17
Sawyer v. Wright.
When the State Highway Commission orders a railroad to widen
its crossings under appropriate statutes, has the Commission been
so unjustly enriched by the new crossing that the law will imply a
promise to pay? The Court said "no.""' Services performed in discharge of a legal obligation confer no unjust benefit. Another bar
to the action was the state's immunity to a suit of this kind; there
was no "taldng" and no tort.
Once again the Supreme Court had to decide the classic case of
the daughter-in-law claiming from the estate of her husband's
mother the value of personal services rendered the mother by the
daughter-in-law. Sometimes the courts have implied such a promise
to pay, particularly where the relationship is not based on close family
ties. 9 In Brown v. Hatcher2 our Supreme Court found no express
promise to pay nor did it imply one. While the in-law relationship
does not give rise to the presumption the services were rendered
gratuitously, the Court applied the "one family relation" doctrine,
holding the services were a gift despite the lack of a blood relationship. On the facts the services were clearly given freely and the
mother's expressions of appreciation for the kindness could not,
without more, amount to an express promise. Even between those
not closely related there must be some evidence justifying the inference of a promise to pay.
CONTRACT FOR A SALE ON CREDIT-USURY

A contract for the loan of money at a rate of interest greater
than the law allows is usurious and certain penalties attach to it."'
Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Hannerl involved an action to recover on
a deficiency remaining after the foreclosure of a note and conditional sale contract. The defendant alleged that the original cost of
the chattel-an airplane-was 59,250 dollars; that he had paid a
5,000 dollar down payment; and that the dealer had agreed to
finance the sale. The defendant signed in blank a conditional sale
' 268 N.C. 163, 149 S.E.2d 873 (1966).
" Clinchfield R.R. v. State Highway Com'n, 268 N.C. 92, 150 S.E.2d

70 (1966).

" Grady v. Faison, 224 N.C. 567, 31 S.E.2d 760 (1944).
N.C. 57, 149 S.E.2d 586 (1966).
" N.C. Gn. STAT. § 24-2 (1965).
22268 N.C. 668, 151 S.E.2d 579 (1966).
20268
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contract and promissory note. The dealer filled in the blanks, making the sale price 69,500 dollars and adding to that a sales financing
charge of 19,365 dollars; he then sold it to his financing agency.
Allowing credit for the down payment, the indebtedness totaled
nearly 84,000 dollars. The defendant's answer that the transaction
was a loan and therefore usurious was stricken by the trial judge
and this result upheld on appeal. A bona fide credit sale on an installment basis can be no basis for usury. The dealer had discounted
the note and security document to Appliance Buyers Credit Corporation, which in turn had sold them to the Bank bringing the suit.
The bank is apparently a holder in due course of the note; the argument defendant made that because the note was attached to the
conditional sale contract the holder had notice of the defense has
not often found judicial favor.2 3 The opinion in the instant case,
however, did not turn on the holder-in-due-course question possibly
because at least as to the usurious interest, the defense may be
utilized even against the innocent purchaser."4 If Appliance Buyers
Credit Corp. had loaned defendant the money but had in form made
the transaction appear to be a sale of the airplane, the defense would
have been available, as it was in Ripple v. Mortgage and Acceptance
Corp. 5 Interestingly, in the Ripple case a conditional sale contract
was the form of the transaction, as it was in the instant fact situation.
In other words, had the buyer obtained the financing directly from
the lender there would have been usury but since the dealer, in effect,
secured the loan for the buyer there is no usury. The contract here
was not for the loan of money, but for the sale of an airplane on
credit and thus the usury rule does not apply. In either situation the
lender's money is to be repaid by the buyer-borrower, the lender receives compensation for his loan, and the dealer gets his sale price as
a lump sum. The opportunities for the unscrupulous are obvious.
Other state courts have pierced the useless symbolism of classifying
such a transaction as a sale on credit.2" Still other states have regulated this factual pattern carefully both as to the amount charged and
as to such "minor" matters as the practice of buyers signing blank
"tSee Certified Igotors, Inc. v. Nolan Loan Co., 122 A.2d 227 (D.C.
Munic. Ct. App. 1956) and cases therein cited.
"Federal Reserve Bank v. Jones, 205 N.C. 648, 172 S.E. 185 (1934);
Ward v. Sugg, 113 N.C. 489, 18 S.E. 717 (1893).
' 193 N.C. 422, 137 S.E. 156 (1927).
'6 The leading case is Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark.
601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952).
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promissory notes and conditional sales contracts.2 This is not to say
that one financing consumer goods should not have a just and fair
return for such endeavors. They should and it probably ought to
be more than 6% simple interest. Purposes of justice will be better
served, however, by recognizing the realities of the consumer credit
situation. It's a fair guess that until the State Supreme Court does
so, the legislature will be under no pressure to act.28
CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY

Once again the Supreme Court wrestled with the problem of
whether a person drinking intoxicating liquors in excessive quantities has the capacity to contract. Regular readers of these survey
articles will recall Professor Dameron's careful treatment of Moore
v. New York Life Ins. Co.,29 in last year's Insurance Law survey.
There the alleged incompetent changed the beneficiary of his life
insurance policy and also signed a cash surrender form at the same
time. The personal representative of the decedent incompetent ratified the change of beneficiary and disaffirmed the cash surrender
cancellation. Lawyers for the insurance company had argued, reasonably but not accurately as it turned out, that if man were incompetent for the one purpose he must have been incompetent for the
other.
In Chesson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co.8 ° the Supreme Court faced a
similar factual latticework. The decedent had been confined, off and
on during 1963, to two different hospitals for chronic alcoholism. In
March of 1964, Mr. Chesson, the insured, again entered the hospital.
lie was discharged on May 9, and on May 14, took the insurance
policy in question from a dresser drawer in his home and presented
it to the insurance company's home office. The policy, taken out by
Mr. Chesson several years earlier, was in the face amount of
5000.00 dollars and contained a double indemnity clause. Mr. Chesson had twice before borrowed against the policy. On the May 14th
7 See, e.g., The Ohio Retail Installment Sales Act, Chpt. 1317, Page's
Ohio3 Revised Code (1962 Replacement).
" The present North Carolina Consumer Finance Act does not reach
this problem at all. It is limited to direct loans of money (not retail installment sales of goods) not in excess of 600 dollars.

See N.C. GE.

STAT.

§ 53-164 to -191 (1965).
- 266 N.C. 440, 146 S.E.2d 492 (1966); Dameron, Isurance, Survey of
North Carolina Case Law, 44 N.C.L. REv. 1022, 1026 (1966).
30268 N.C. 98, 150 S.E.2d 40 (1966).
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visit, the remaining cash surrender value was only 25.40 dollars.
After some discussion of the consequences, the representative of the
insurance company gave Mr. Chesson a check for that amount and he
surrendered the policy. Mr. Chesson died on June 8, 1964, and
Mrs. Chesson as beneficiary of the policy and administratrix of his
estate brought action to rescind the cancellation of the policy. On
seriously conflicting evidence--psychiatrists who had treated Mr.
Chesson prior to his May 9 release testified that in their opinion he
understood what he was doing-the jury decided Mr. Chesson was
incompetent. On the basis of the testimony of the widow and others
concerning the decedent's behavior this finding is at least understandable. But since Mr. Chesson had never been adjudged insane
his contracts are only voidable, not void. This means, generally,
that the one asserting the incompetency must establish that fact to
the satisfaction of the jury and that was done here. The law also
requires the one dealing with such an incompetent to have had
notice of his state of mind, but the burden is on the one dealing
with the alleged mentally ill person to show that he did not have
notice.31
From the evidence in Chesson it was perhaps arguable a person
may have had notice of Mr. Chesson's need for the money but there
seems to be no fact revealed to indicate Mr. Chesson lacked ability to
contract when he appeared in the office of the insurance company.
The jury decided otherwise and the Supreme Court did not reverse.
This offers a classic example of two fundamental policies in conflict.
We must have certainty in our commercial transactions, yet we must
protect the incompetent from the consequences of his irrational acts.
If the legal paradox is difficult to resolve, ascertainment, analysis
and proof of facts for a lawyer trying such a case must be far worse.
1
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS, § 18c (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1964) sums up a rule of law for this area nicely:

(1) A person incurs only voidable contractual duties by entering into
a transaction if by reason of mental illness or defect (a) he is unable
to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of
the transaction, or (b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in
relation to the transaction and the other party has reason to know of
his condition. (2) Where the contract is made on fair terms and the
other party is without knowledge of the mental illness or defect, the
power of avoidance under subsection (1) terminates to the extent
that the contract has been so performed in whole or in part or the
circumstances have so changed that avoidance would be inequitable.
In such a case a court may grant relief on such equitable terms as the
situation requires.
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The psychiatrists defined Mr. Chesson's illness as a depression, depressive reaction. 2 Suppose instead of a depressive reaction, he is
in the mania phase of his illness (if it indeed is an illness and not a
perjorative label for unwelcome human behavior) and he buys property at slightly inflated prices in order to carry out certain moneymaking schemes. Can his representative later set aside the property
transaction? In Faberv. Sweet Style Mfg. Corp.,38 the highest New
York State court said that he could. In the Moore case in particular
the nature of the testimony as to the alleged incompetent's condition
was challenged; for example, Mr. Moore's minister was asked for his
opinion as to the rationality of the insured. The minister had some
difficulty replying because the evidence indicated that the insured
had been perfectly able to drive a car." Can a man drive a car and
yet not be able to enter into a contractual relationship? Medico-legal
questions are also raised by the second issue in Chesson. Mr. Chesson, standing in a hallway, suddenly jumped upward and backward,
hitting his head against a cement floor. His death was later ascribed
to a cerebral hemorrhage. The issue then became: under the circumstances was the cerebral hemorrhage an accident within the
meaning of a double indemnity clause? On this issue a jury verdict
for the plaintiff was reversed. The training of young lawyers today
seems to demand at least a nodding acquaintance with a wide range
of materials not traditionally classified as legal.
CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE

Two cases during the period surveyed illustrate the balance the
law must make between freedom to contract and the necessity of
open competition viewed as an economic good. The paradox is
created by promises not to enter a given field of endeavor. Our
basic economic tenent that open competition is a desirable policy is
undercut in the case of an express promise purchased as a result of
an otherwise perfectly acceptable exchange which limits the competi82268 N.C. at 101, 150 S.E.2d at 42 (1966). Professors take chiding
occasionally from some practicing lawyers and some judges to the effect that
we ought to teach "the law" and quit worrying about social science, medi-

cine, economics and the like. But is the problem posed by Chesson medical
or legal?

What is "incompetency?"

Why is a depressive unable to con-

tract? Even the psychiatrist for the plaintiff testified that Mr. Chesson was
not and never had been feeble-minded.
"'40 Misc. 2d 212, 242 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1963).
, Moore v. New York Life Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 440, 448-49, 146 S.E.2d
492, 500 (1966).
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tion. The rule frequently enunciated is that reasonable restraints
will not be stricken and that reasonableness must be measured in
terms of the geographic and time limitations imposed. Reasonableness is often tested in economic terms, although not verbalized as
such. In U-Haul Co. v. Jones,85 a service station operator became
agent for U-Haul in the business of renting automobile trailers.
The terms of the agreement included a promise by the agent to
account weekly, notice of termination provisions, a liquidated damages clause and a promise ("The dealer warrants, covenants and
agrees . . .") by the agent that upon termination he would not
undertake to rent trailers for any other competing firm within the
county for a period of "the then existing telephone directory listing,
plus a period of one year. . . ."" The agent breached the agreement
by not transmitting receipts promptly, U-Haul terminated, and the
agent immediately began to rent a competing brand trailer. U-Haul
then instituted action to obtain a temporary injunction against such
activity and also to recover the liquidated damages and the unpaid
receipts. The case presented no novel problem for the Supreme
Court but the method of measuring the length of time of the restraint intrigues the reader. This could be described as the case in
which the North Carolina Supreme Court took judicial notice of the
fact that you can let your fingers do your walking through the
yellow pages. In order to hold the restraint reasonable they took
judicial notice of the fact that telephone directories are annually
revised and then issued, and that an uninformed person, desiring to
rent a trailer would probably turn to the yellow pages index of the
telephone directory to ascertain where one could be obtained. Since
the time limitation could not exceed two years and the geographical
limitation was a single county the restraint was acceptable. The
injunctive relief was appropriate although a possible remedy at law
-the liquidated damages-was also available to the plaintiff.17 Is
the fundamental basis for the decision an implicit knowledge that
there are scores of trailer rental agents in the area so that the harm
to competition caused by the elimination from the market of this
one agent is de Ininimus?38
--269 N.C. 284, 152 S.E.2d 65 (1967).
"269 N.C. 284, 285, 152 S.E.2d 65, 66 (1967).
"Id. at 287, 152 S.E.2d at 67-68.
a Cf. Richardson v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790, 127 S.E.2d 113 (1962).
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In Engineering Associates, Inc. v. Pankou? a covenant not to
join a competing firm for a period of five years after termination
of an employee's present position was said to be unreasonable especially as to the geographical factor since there was no space limitation. The statements are dicta since the employee had never agreed
to the proviso and received nothing of value for it.
INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS

That process labelled "interpretation" by which a Court must
read meaning into a set of words to settle lawsuits continued during
the survey period. An outstanding example of the judicial process
of implication-creating a promise where no express promise existed-is Kayann Properties,Inc. v. Coxz. 4
Mrs. Cox owned outright a piece of property given to her by
Mr. Cox prior to their marriage; in anticipation of a possible divorce, she agreed to transfer to him a half interest as tenant in
common in exchange for the right to live in the home on the property the rest of her life. Certain other benefits not mentioned in the
deed were contained in a separation agreement. Mr. Cox was to
pay off the mortgage on the property and in the separation agreement the obligation of Mr. Cox to make monthly payments to
Mrs. Cox as well as to pay off the mortgage was made an express
lien on his half of the property. The transaction went through, and
Mr. Cox then conveyed his half by quarters to two purchasers, one
of whom wished to build a motel on the property but needed the
entire tract for its purposes. The other transferee was Mr. Cox's
lawyer who earlier had unsuccessfully attempted a quiet title action
against Mrs. Cox. The motel builder brought an action for partition
by sale. The whole purpose of the transaction was to provide Mrs.
Cox, ill of a disabling disease, with a suitable income and a place to
live for the rest of her life. Since a partition by sale might eliminate
or injure her interests, the Court properly held that Mr. Cox had
by implication made a promise never to partition and this was binding on his successor. While the successor claimed no notice of the
terms of the separation agreement, the implied promise was "revealed" in the terms of the deed of separation which gave Mrs. Cox
her life estate and which was in the chain of title.
268 N.C.
137,149
150S.E.2d
S.E.2d553
56 (1966).
(1966).
,o268
N.C. 14,
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In Taylor v. Gibbs41 a "sure rent" tobacco lease contained a
provision reducing the rent if the tobacco acreage allotment were
reduced more than five percent during the year. That year the "government" instituted poundage controls which had the same effect of
reducing the lesser's income. The lessee withheld a portion of his
rent and the lessor sued, winning a judgment on the pleadings in
the trial court. On appeal the Supreme Court said the reduction by
poundage control was totally unanticipated at the time of the making of the lease contract and held that the agreement, clear and
unambiguous in its terms, must be given effect. This is a hard case,
for by using the words they did the parties seemed to have in mind
a reduction in rent if a government action reduced the income of
the lessee. But if written documents adopted by the parties are to
have any significance at all, there must be a limit to what a judge
can do by way of interpretation and that limit is reached when the
words as viewed in their ordinary sense, have a generally agreed
meaning as these did here.
In Consolidated Vending Co., Inc. v. Turner' the maker of a
negotiable promissory note was denied the opportunity of proving by
parol evidence that his promise to pay was conditional on receipt by
the holder of "promotion money" from other sources which was to
have been credited on the note. The plaintiff had the food and
drink concessions at a number of "speedways" and the defendants
operated the "speedways." The promotion money turned out to be
money paid to a concessionaire by suppliers for the exclusive privilege of supplying the food and drink requirements.
A provision in a lease permitting the lessor to terminate, re-enter
and repossess the property if a receiver were appointed for the lessee
was held to extend to a sub-lessee where the lessee-sub-lessor had
had a receiver appointed for it. The Court in Carson v. Imperial
'400' Nat'l, Inc.43 said that it could not under the guise of construction rewrite the contract: the lessee was named specifically, and it
was the lessee who was in receivership.
The phrase appearing in the uninsured motorists' indorsement
to the ordinary automobile liability policy, covering injuries caused
by accidents arising "out of the ownership, maintenance or use" of
41268 N.C. 363, 150 S.E.2d 506 (1966).
,267 N.C. 576, 148 S.E.2d 531 (1966).
48267 N.C. 229, 147 S.E.2d 898 (1966).
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an uninsured automobile was interpreted as covering an uninsured
automobile up on blocks being repaired. The car slipped off the
blocks injuring the plaintiff who was a member of the family covered
by a family policy issued to his wife which bore the uninsured
motorists' indorsement. In reaching this result in Williams v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., the Court applied the ordinary rules of
contract interpretation and decided that maintenance meant repair
in its common, non-technical meaning so that the facts came within
the coverage.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS

The magic of those few words in the Statute of Frauds4 5
"signed by the party to be charged" has been illustrated again in
40
Burkhead v. Farlow.
The written option involved the purchase of
a tract of land and was signed by the seller; the buyer accepted orally
saying, in effect, "My acceptance of this title depends on the title examination of this property."'47 Justice Sharp in a perceptive opinion
pointed out that the oral acceptance was all that law requires. The
option giver was bound; the option acceptor was not. To the argument that the acceptance was conditional and thus no acceptance but
a rejection and counteroffer, Justice Sharp drew the well known
distinction between such acceptances as require the original offeror
to do something he otherwise would not be required to do, and those
acceptances which merely verbalize what the law would read into the
contract anyway. Here the acceptance fell within the latter concept.
Any contract to convey land implies an undertaking on the part of
the vendor to convey good and marketable title and the vendee had
a right to have his lawyer check his title; there was no requirement
that any particular person approve. The case also holds that since
the option did not require payment of the price until after the delivery of the deed, the plaintiff did not have to tender payment because the defendant had refused to execute the deed. Shades of
Pordage v. Cole48 and the rules of Serjeant Williams! On the
option aspect of the case, it should be compared with Carr v. The
Good Shepherd Home, Inc.49 where the oral acceptance was one
"269 N.C. 235, 152 S.E.2d 102 (1967).
' N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 22-2 (1953).

"266 N.C. 595, 146 S.E.2d 802 (1966).
,7Id. at 596, 146 S.E.2d at 803.
1 Wms. Saund. 319, 85 Eng. Rep. 449 (K.B. 1669).
,p269 N.C. 241, 152 S.E.2d 85 (1967).
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which did propose an agreement other than the one appearing in the
written option. In Ferguson v. Phillips" a tender of payment
seven hours late was no tender; time was of the essence in that
option. And in Young v. Sweet 5 an option to renew a lease the new
rental "subject to adjustment at the beginning of the option period"
was held unenforceable, the price term being too indefinite. On the
matter of tender, Evans v. TransportationIns. Co.52 can be said to
stand for the proposition that a legally sufficient tender, although
refused, does not have the effect of extinguishing the debt or obligation represented thereby.
DAMAGES

Several cases decided during the period surveyed had to consider
the problem of contract damages. Perhaps the most important is
Freeman v. Hardee'sFood Systems, Inc.,53 which expressly sets the
stage for a square holding in North Carolina that an employee
wrongfully discharged from a term contract can claim as an element
of damages the future losses he might suffer when the action is
brought before the end of the term. A student note reviews the
problem on an earlier page. 54 One important key to the Freeman
situation lies in a brief cross reference citation by Judge Bobbitt.
"In this connection," he writes, "it seems appropriate to call attention to the rule stated in Thomas v. Catawba College.. .5relating to
the measure of damages."5 6 That rule requires an employee in such
circumstances to mitigate his damages if he can by finding other
suitable work. The measure of damages thus is the amount of compensation promised less the amount the employee earns or by reasonable effort could earn during the contract period.
In City of Kinston v. Suddreth57 a provision in a contract permitting the city to retain a deposit as liquidated damages was held
to limit recovery for breach to that figure although the injured party
did show loss in excess thereof. The clause was contained in a con50268 N.C. 353, 150 S.E.2d 518 (1966).
51266 N.C. 623, 146 S.E.2d 669 (1966).

5'269 N.C. 271, 152 S.E.2d 82 (1967).
6'267 N.C. 56, 147 S.E.2d 590 (1966).
'Note, 45 N.C.L. REv. 223 (1966).

248 N.C. 609, 104 S.E.2d 660 (1958).
Freeman v. Hardees's Food Systems, Inc., 267 N.C. 56, 62, 147 S.E.2d
590, 594 (1966).
266 N.C. 618, 146 S.E.2d 660 (1966).
5
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tract for the purchase of property owned by the city and read as
follows:
That if the said party of the first part (the buyer at auction
sale who breached) shall fail to so purchase and to comply with
such bid and to comply with the terms of this contract, that then
the $4000.00 so deposited with the City shall be forfeited to the
City as liquidated damages, and the said party of the first part
shall have no further rights therein ....58
Does that say that if Kinston suffers damage in excess of 4000
dollars it cannot recover the excess from the contract breaker? The
Court said that it did, and the weight of authority seems in accord. 9
If there is a possibility that damages on breach will exceed the
amount of the deposit, contract drafters should beware the use of the
phrase "as liquidated damages." Without that language the plaintiff's position is much improved."0
Another damages case involved a contractor's warranty to repair, replace, or adjust his materials and workmanship in a home
he had built at no cost to the purchaser-owner. Here the owner's
measure of damages was the cost of repair or replacement and not
the difference in value between what the home properly completed
would have been worth and what it actually was worth in its defective state. Leggette v. Pittman. 1 The contractor argued that the
owner should recover the difference in the two values, not the cost of
repair, but the headnote attributes the argument to the owner.
82 the jurisdiction of the superior court
In Jenkins v. Winecoff
turned on whether a claim for recovery of a portion of a down payment made to a real estate broker was contractual when brought by
the seller. The Supreme Court held that the cause of action did
sound in contract and, as the amount was 200 dollars, the superior
court had no jurisdiction. G.S. § 7-121 and Article IV, Section 27
of the North Carolina Constitution give the justices of the peace
exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.
It is worth remembering that as between the parties the fact that
a negotiable instrument has been given has no particular significance
5
8Id.at 619, 146 S.E.2d at 661.
5 CoPmnX, CONTRACTS 1074 (1964).
60 See Royer v. Carter, 37 Cal. 2d 544, 233 P.2d 539 (1951)
(Vendor
given damages in excess of down payment retained where no reference made

to liquidated damages; seller had "option" to retain.)
81268 N.C. 292, 150 S.E.2d 420 (1966).
02267

N.C. 639, 148 S.E.2d 577 (1966).
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insofar as cutting off defenses is concerned. The court pointed this
out in Montague v. Womble 3 and allowed the defense of no consideration to be asserted. In Beaver v. Ledbetter" a clause in a deed
stating that the grantee assumes and agrees to pay a mortgage
against the property involved was held not to be evidence that the
grantee did in fact undertake such personal liability. It does not
raise any presumptions and evidence that the grantee expressly or
impliedly assented thereto or ratified it, is required.
The very common provision in construction contracts giving to
the architect the power to decide disputes arising among the contractors on the job and to withhold from one contractor's payment
damages for work the architect decides is faulty or injurious to
another contractor was judicially approved in Welborn Plumbing &
Heating Co. Inc. v. Board of Educ. 5 The dispute was settled according to the agreement of the parties by the architect, and the
court does not concern itself with whether the contract was a good
or a bad one, a wise or a foolish one, from the standpoint of the
defaulting contractor.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Kenneth L. Penegar*
SANCTIONING LAW

Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has recently proclaimed "there is no such thing as a 'science of penology,"'- and
while the Court is very reluctant to give very much elasticity to
the concept of a cruel and unusual punishment,2 it finds the occasion
more and more frequently to review and not infrequently reverse
the judgment of trial courts involving the illogic if not the undesir0"267 N.C. 360, 148 S.E.2d 255 (1966).
0269 N.C. 142, 152 S.E.2d 165 (1967).
*268 N.C. 85, 150 S.E.2d 65 (1966).
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
State v. Taborn, 268 N.C. 445, 447, 150 S.E.2d 779, 781 (1966).
"We have held in case after case that when the punishment does not
exceed the limits fixed by the statute, it cannot be considered cruel and unusual punishment in a constitutional sense." State v. Caldwell, 269 N.C. 521,
527, 153 S.E.2d 34, 38 (1967); State v. Davis, 267 N.C. 429, 148 S.E.2d
250 (1966); and State v. Bruce, 268 N.C. 174, 150 S.E.2d 216 (1966).
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ability of certain sentences. More often than not the logic applied
is that of statutes. Less frequently it is the fortuity of the number
of separate judgments entered below. Other times it is a rule of its
own making that the Court applies in appraising the sentence appealed from.
Illustrative of the first of these three categories are three cases
in which ten year terms of imprisonment were awarded for simple
larceny of chattels or money under the value of two hundred dollars.' Since G.S. § 14-72 makes such larceny only a misdemeanor,
the Court held each of these sentences excessive. The circumstances
surrounding a particular instance of larceny, such as breaking and
entering, may of course give rise to a separate charge and sentence,
as in State v. Ford,4 in which situation the sentencing judge apparently has two choices. He may enter one judgment on both
counts and sentence as severely as the greater offense warrants. Or,
he may enter two judgments, preserving the outer limits of sentences accordingly. In the Ford case the trial judge erroneously
entered a five to seven year sentence on the larceny count as well as
on the breaking and entering charge. In State v. Smith," the sentencing judge made the other choice, entering but one judgment for
both offenses-breaking and entering and larceny-and awarded an
indeterminate sentence of seven to nine years, a permissible sentence
for the burglary count. This judgment was upheld by the Court,
while that in Ford was not, even though in Ford the sentences were
to run concurrently.6
In view of the fact that in Ford the sentences were to run concurrently, it well may be wondered whether the decision marks any
departure from the long standing Hirabayashirule to the effect that
if one court is proper, error with respect to another need not be
considered.' Of course if the sentences are to run consecutively, and
'State v. Fowler, 266 N.C. 667, 147 S.E.2d 36 (1966); State v. Davis,
267 N.C. 126, 148 S.E.2d 250 (1966); and State v. Foster, 268 N.C. 480,
151 S.E.2d 62 (1966).
'266 N.C. 743, 147 S.E.2d 198 (1966).
266 N.C. 747, 147 S.E.2d 165 (1966).
'A similar decision is State v. Hart, 266 N.C. 671, 146 S.E.2d 816
(1966), wherein the Defendant pleaded guilty to six counts of passing
worthless checks, each a misdemeanor. Six months imprisonment on each
was awarded for a total of thirty-six months. The Court held that where
the charges are "consolidated for trial and judgment," the court could not
impose a sentence greater than for any one crime charged. In other words
two years would be the maximum for any one or all these charges.
'See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), discussed in
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there is error with respect to the judgment in one of two charges,
then of course our Court will set aside the erroneous judgment
and remand for new sentencing on that count."
Furthermore, the particular sanctioning outcome could be the
function of yet another fortuity not clearly related to the goals of
applying our criminal law sanctions. Under G.S. § 14-72 for larceny
to be a felony the state must allege and prove the value of the
property stolen to be in excess of two hundred dollars.' But G.S.
§ 14-72 does not apply to certain other kinds of larcenies such as
from the person or by breaking and entering, in which case the
value of the property stolen is not important. It. is a felonious
larceny in that event. But a remaining question-now the focus
of some confusion in the North Carolina Court-is whether the
indictment has to allege that the larceny was by breaking and entering in order to sustain a verdict and judgment of felonious larceny
or whether it will suffice if the evidence indicates these circumstances. The Fowler, Ford, Smith and Davis cases mentioned above

would suggest that such allegation is essential. In two other recent
cases the suggestion is the opposite.'0 But two members of the
Court now are of the view that in order to make out felonious
larceny, whether by breaking and entering or by stealing property
of greater than two hundred dollars in value, the jury must be specifically instructed to find these circumstances."
It may be possible to summarize this brief consideration of some
of the problems relating to sentences that hinge on technicalities of
statutory construction in the larceny area and on perceptions of
regularity in charging, proof, and judgments. Whether or not the
sentence of a person who has committed some kind of theft offense
may or may not be directly related to the social seriousness of the
total offense seems to depend in part upon whether the solicitor
draws the indictments with these constructions and perceptions in
mind, whether the judge submits precise instructions to the jury
Penegar, Criminal Law and Procedure, Survey of North Carolina Case Law,
44 N.C.L. REv. 970, 975 (1966).
'See State v. Thompson, 268 N.C. 447, 150 S.E.2d 781 (1966).
' This does not mean, however, in the view of a majority of our Court
that the jury must be specifically instructed to so find. State v. Brown, 267
N.C. 189, 147 S.E.2d 916 (1966).
"State v. Brown, 266 N.C. 55, 145 S.E.2d 297 (1965); and State v.

Stubbs,
266 N.C. 274, 145 S.E.2d 896 (1966).
1

" Justice Bobbitt, joined by Justice Sharp, dissenting in State v. Brown,
267 N.C. 189, 147 S.E.2d 916 (1966).
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with these factors in mind, and, finally, whether the judge enters
single or multiple judgments. In any case the policies that should
guide the respective decision-makers in choosing among these alternatives seem lacking or of such subjectivity as to not be capable
of easy articulation.
Another troublesome matter for the courts in fixing proper sentence has been the concept now embodied in what may be called the
Blackmon rule." Under this rule language appearing in particular
statutes which is insufficiently precise to limit the sentencing judge's
discretion, such as "fined or imprisoned in the discretion of the
court," will be limited by the provisions of G.S. § 14-2, which provides for a maximum term of ten years for any person convicted of
a felony "for which no specific punishment is prescribed by statute."
Thus, in a conviction under G.S. § 14-177, the "crime against nature" statute as amended by the 1965 General Assembly, a sentence
of eighteen to twenty years is excessive.13 Excessive also is a sentence of eighteen to twenty years for involuntary manslaughter
under G.S. § 14-18, as amended in 1933."4
Three other cases raise a similar problem concerning the limits
imposed upon the sentencing judge upon remand of the case when
the Supreme Court has found error in one or more of the judgments
6
previously entered. In State v. Smith15 and in State v. Rhinehart"
as well as in State v. Thompson, mentioned above, the Court held
that the petitioner was entitled to credit for time spent in custody on
the erroneous sentence to be applied to any new lawful sentence
imposed. No one should quarrel with the soundness of this rule even
though it probably encourages the sentencing judge to give the maximum sentence allowable.
A harder question in the same general area of the sentencing
judge's discretion is presented in State v. Pearce, 7 where the error
in the appellant's first trial was not related to the sentence but to
the admission of a confession. At the first trial the appellant was
given a twelve to fifteen year sentence for assault with intent to
commit rape. At the new trial the judge awarded a straight eight
" State v. Blackmon, 260 N.C. 352, 132 S.E.2d 880 (1963).
State
v. Adams,
Thompson,
150 S.E.2d
781 (1966).
State v.
266 268
N.C.N.C.
406, 447,
146 S.E.2d
505 (1966).
15267 N.C. 755, 148 S.E.2d 844 (1966).
16267 N.C. 470, 148 S.E.2d 651 (1966).
17268 N.C. 707, 151 S.E.2d 571 (1966).
'
14
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year term of imprisonment. Appellant, however, had served six and
one-half years under the first sentence. Taking the eight years together with the six and a half already served, it appeared to appellant that his sentence was being arbitrarily increased over the minimum of the first sentence."8 The Court in Pearce ruled: "If a sentence is set aside on a defendant's application, the former judgment
does not necessarily fix the maximum punishment which may be
imposed after a second conviction."' 19 Thus the Court reaffirmed its
position taken in State v.Slade2" and in State v. Weaver 2 ' to the
effect that the earlier sentence did not impose any ceiling unless the
time served plus the new sentence resulted in a sentence in excess of
the statutory maximum. Between the time of the decision in those
cases and the present one, however, the issue of the constitutionality
of this procedure was presented in a habeas corpus proceeding to a
federal district court. In the resulting decision in that case, Patton
v. North Carolina,22 Judge Craven ruled that a harsher sentence
upon retrial must rest upon a discernible reason if due process is not
to be violated, citing the inevitable intimidation not to proceed with
appellate or collateral review inherent in the practice of increasing
sentences.' The North Carolina Court in Pearce chose not to review the issue more fully than it had done in Weaver.24
Even more difficult than the issues raised in the above decisions
is the unspoken problem of determining what factors, what policies,
"8And this minimum has particular significance in terms of parole
eligibility.
'o State v. Pearce, 268 N.C. 707, 708, 151 S.E.2d 571, 572 (1966).
20264 N.C. 70, 140 S.E.2d 723 (1965).
21264 N.C. 681, 142 S.E.2d 633 (1965).

::256 F. Supp. 255 (W.D.N.C. 1966).

Za Sometimes the coercive effect of judicial attitudes with respect to prosecution of appellate rights is more obvious, as in the case of State v. Rhinehart, 267 N.C. 470, 148 S.E.2d 651 (1966), where an active sentence was
suspended on conditions, one of which was that appellant would not take an
appeal from another conviction. Our Court had no difficulty, albeit after a
federal habeas corpus proceeding, in holding that to be an unreasonable
condition, one violative of one's right to appeal. See also State v. Patton, 221
N.C. 117, 19 S.E.2d 142 (1942); and State v. Calcutt, 219 N.C. 545, 15
S.E.2d 9 (1941).
2 Itshould be added that the re-sentencing judge inPearce indicated in
the record that he was giving some consideration to the time already spent
on the first sentence; were itnot for that, the judge would have given a
fifteen year sentence. State v.Pearce, 268 N.C. 707, 708, 151 S.E.2d 571,
572 (1966). The Patton case is now on appeal to the Fourth Circuit. For a
survey of the indexes of frequency of harsher sentences being awarded on

retrial see Note, "Increased Sentence and Denial of Credit on Retrial Sustained under Traditional Waiver Theory," 1965 DUKE L.J. 395.
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and what expectations, based on what assumptions should dictate
the choice of, for instance, fifteen years for the assault with intent
to rape conviction in the Pearcecase or a two year sentence for the
larceny of fifteen cents worth of tomato paste as in the case of
State v. Wiggs. 5 A careful enunciation of statutory guidelines to
assist in the selection of an appropriate sentence, whether it is to be
active or supervised conditional liberty, and if it is to be incarceration, then how long, etc., is singularly lacking in most criminal codes
of the country. As the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice recently stated:
The penal codes of most jurisdictions are the products of piecemeal construction, as successive legislatures have fixed punishments for new crimes and adjusted penalties for existing offenses
through separate sentencing provisions for each offense.2 6
As a consequence of this piecemeal construction there is little in
the way of unifying theme, theory, or thought running through the
sentencing provisions in these codes which the sentencing judge must
consider in fashioning a particular "prescription" for the "ills" of
particular cases. Consider what help it would be merely to have some
legislative expression of various degrees of seriousness of such
broad groupings as felony and misdemeanor. Are there feloniesand personalities-which from society's point of view deserve the
possible application of an extended term of years, something, perhaps, beyond five years actually spent in prison? Is forgery, for example, on the same plane in such a view as a discrete instance of
sodomy between consenting adults? Is the theft of $250 without
violence on the same plane as the robbery of the same amount of
property? In each of the four cases put the court could impose a
ten year sentence.
An enlightened sentencing code . . . should provide for a more
selective use of imprisonment. It should ensure that long prison
terms are available for habitual, dangerous, and professional
criminals who present a substantial threat to the public safety and
that it is possible for the less serious offender to be released to
community supervision without being subjected to the potentially
"269 N.C. 507, 153 S.E.2d 84 (1967). Although the measure of the
sentence was not reviewed by the Court, a convenient basis for reversal on
this count was found in the absence of any proof of ownership of this
grocery store item in the person alleged in the warrant
"President's Commission on Law Enforcenent and Administration of
Justice, TAsK FopcE REp. THE Coxmns 1, 15 (1967).
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destructive effects of lengthy imprisonment. Moreover, it should
provide the courts and correctional authorities with sufficient
imprisonment which are appropriate
flexibility to fix lengths of
27
on the facts of each case.
Considerable flexibility already exists in much of the rather informal structure that we do have. Consider, for example, the court's
power to place a defendant on probation under certain conditions,
to suspend sentence for a time, or, in North Carolina anyway, to
"continue prayer for judgment" long enough to see how the defendant disposes himself. The purpose of all three expedients is thought
to be much the same-to allow the defendant opportunity to conform under supervision; but the invocation of the sentence is usually
for specific cause, that is violation of a specified condition. This
right to specificity in advance is not available, however, to one for
whom prayer for judgment has been continued, as illustrated in the
case of State v. Thompson.2" There the appellant had been given an
active sentence under several counts of forgery; but judgment had
been continued for several other related counts. Five years later the
state's solicitor gave notice of his intention to pray for immediate
judgment on the other counts, apparently because of reports of infractions of disciplinary rules in the prison. A further eight to ten year
sentence was imposed at the ensuing hearing, to begin at the expiration of the five year term. It was from this judgment that the appeal
in question was prosecuted. Although the point at issue in the appeal relates to whether the appellant was entitled to a bill of particulars as to the infractions,2 9 the case is instructive for the light it
sheds on informal developments toward elaborating the sentencing
' Ibid. The Commission cites with apparent approval, for example, the
categories of felonies and sentencing criteria developed in the Model Penal
Code and the Model Sentencing Act. Both models provide "an ordinary
term, which is generally shorter than authorized under present statutes, and
an extended term, which the court may impose when certain factors are
present.... Developing proper standards to guide the courts in determining
[But]
the length of prison sentences is only in the elementary stages ....
they are the most definite criteria . . . which have been formulated on the
basis of limited ability to predict behavior. These standards will be revised
should the behavioral sciences develop improved ways of identifying dangerous offenders." Id. at 17.
28267 N.C. 653, 148 S.E.2d 613 (1966).
s' If the sentence had been suspended, the Court conceded, he would have
been so entitled. Quaere why should the result turn on such a technical distinction if the man's liberty is vitally at stake? As it was, the appellant could
not call witnesses or otherwise prepare his "defense" at the hearing in which
he was awarded the eight to ten year sentence.
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process. It is difficult to determine, however, from the report of the
case whether the sentence appealed from was the product of a desire
to punish or control behavior in prison or the product of a desire to
find out more about the offender with respect to the crimes he
actually committed. Certainly the latter desire has a place in the
peno-correctional process, but the sharing of the competence to make
decisions about appropriate sentences with authorities other than the
court customarily rests on the expectation that in the intervening
time classification studies, personality appraisals, background reports
of work-habits, etc., will be forthcoming which will be useful to the
judge who finally imposes sentence. In the instant case apparently
only the bare facts of the alleged infractions, which were uncontradicted save by the testimony of the appellant himself, were presented
to the court, suggesting that the courts have been enlisted in some
sort of subtle disciplinary role in tandem with the prison staff.8"
If an appellate court is to make any intelligent appraisal of a
sentence or judgment, it is apparent that an adequate record of the
proceedings below must be made. In this respect the record in the
Thompson case just discussed seems adequate at least in revealing
what the trial court did consider before entering judgment. All too
often, however, in cases where a guilty plea is entered and the court
proceeds at once to pronounce sentence, no record at all is kept even
to indicate circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime
itself which might reflect severity or mitigation. And, not infrequently, it will be important in passing on an attack of the guilty
plea itself to know what happened below. This is illustrated by
State v. Jones,8 ' where on appeal it was suggested that appellant entered the guilty plea to charges of forgery with the expectation that
other charges would be dropped. But the Court felt it impossible to
consider matters not of record. It is not unlikely that a record will
have to be made eventually to consider the merits of appellant's
claim, in a collateral attack via a post-conviction hearing or habeas
corpus in the federal courts. The Court was apparently not unmindful of this prolongation of the review process when it lightly
" Loss of good time and unfavorable reports to the parole board have
been the more traditional modes of control in prison, plus of course loss of
privileges and, for the most serious of incidents, isolation. There was nothing
here to suggest that the prison rule infractions amounted to new crimes for
which charges and trial would be appropriate.
268 N.C. 160, 150 S.E.2d 52 (1966).
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admonished: "In view of recent rulings, it would seem to be advisable that the presiding Judge see that a record is made of the evidence adduced before him so that upon appeal the appellate court
may have the information that was available to the lower court.""2
SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS

Crime and Defenses
Homicide committed through the mere negligent operation of an
automobile is not a crime in most common law jurisdictions or in
North Carolina, although a few jurisdictions have enacted vehicular
homicide statutes to cover those cases where the actor's conduct does
not rise to the level of recklessness or wanton misconduct sufficient
to convict for manslaughter under the general rule.33 Although
some thoughtful observers have expressed difficulty in understanding and applying the concepts of recklessness and wanton misconduct as a kind of super negligence which will suffice for the mens
rea essential to a common law crime,3 4 the general rule just stated
is so well and long established that it is surprising to find a prosecution was begun in the case of State v. Reddish. 5 In that case the
defendant was overtaking the deceased on a divided highway of the
interstate variety. Deceased's car was apparently slowing in preparation for a right turn off the highway. Defendant's car was doing
no more than sixty miles per hour when his car struck the left rear
of the deceased's car. The only permissible inference seems to be
either that defendant was traveling too closely behind the other car
or failed to notice the other car's turn. It might present a case for
recovery of damages in a civil action, but it clearly called for a dismissal in a criminal forum under existing law. The Supreme Court
held that the motion to dismiss was improperly denied. "Civil negligence," the Court stated, "is not enough to establish criminal responsibility." 6 Perhaps equally surprising was the jury's verdict of
-2268 N.C. 160, 161, 150 S.E.2d 52, 54 (1966).
"See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. Rnv. § 14-218 (1958); Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 435.025 (1958).
"The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, Tent. Draft No. 4
(1955), comments to sec. 2.02 at page 128: "The apex of ambiguity is 'wilful,
wanton negligence,' which suggests a triple contraction--'negligence' implying inadvertence; 'wilful,' intention; and 'wanton,' recklessness." (quotating from

JERomE HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL

LAW 227-228

(1947).

"269 N.C. 246, 152 S.E.2d 89 (1967).
"State

v. Reddish, 269 N.C. 246, 249, 152 S.E.2d 89, 91 (1967).
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guilty of manslaughter as charged, although one is not completely
out of sympathy with what must be taken as an authoritative effort
(here on the part of the prosecutor) to "do something" about the
mounting death toll on the state's and nation's highways. As suggested above, however, the traditional concepts and categories may
not be sufficient to deal with the task. Arguably, the civil law
remedy may provide an adequate deterrent to infractions of rules of
the road, but the index of rising traffic mishaps resulting in millions
of dollars in damages to property and loss of life to thousands of
Americans annually does not seem to bear this out. It is certainly
open to question whether a motorist who speeds slightly on an open,
high-speed freeway, or follows a bit too closely is mindful then of
his obligation to pay damages if he injures the other fellow; and of
course there is the existence of liability insurance to further complicate the picture. Beyond this, however, the kind of homicide represented by the Reddish case is more than just a criminal law problem;
it represents a challenge to the total safety and transportation policy
of a commonwealth.
While the plea of not guilty (coupled with the motion to dismiss) was enough to raise the issue of insufficiency of the evidence
to make out all the elements of the offense of manslaughter in the
Reddish case, at least as far as the Supreme Court is concerned,
sometimes trial courts will confuse such general denials with affirmative defenses. In State v. Fowler,3 7 for example, defendant was
charged with first degree murder and he put on evidence purporting
to show that the killing was accidental. In his instructions to the
jury the trial judge said in effect that if the defendant would rebut
the presumption of malice arising from an intentional killing and
thus reduce the crime to manshaughter or "excuse it altogether on
the ground of self-defense, unavoidable accident .. . or other defense," then he must "establish to the satisfaction of the jury" such
excuse. Quoting extensively from Justice Sharp's opinion in State
8
v. Phillips,"
the Court held this was error in that it confused an
affirmative defense, in which the defendant carries a burden, with a
simple denial of an intentional killing. 9 One difficulty with this
'268 N.C. 430, 150 S.E.2d 731 (1966).
"264 N.C. 508, 142 S.E.2d 337 (1965).
The decision is also instructive for the point that in affirmative defenses
the defendant must only "satisfy" the jury as to the existence of the excuse
or justification or provocation and not prove "by the greater weight of the
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seemingly simple distinction between affirmative defenses and general denials is that in telling a jury that the defendant must prove
something or "satisfy" the jury as to the existence of something the
Judge may imply that the state has established its case, subject only
to be undone by something the defense may make out to be adequate
evidence. In other words, it may be preferable to avoid language
about shifting burdens in criminal trials, for the ultimate burden of
proof on the existence of every element of the offense charged rests
on the state in our system.40
Further complications in the area of self-defense are revealed
when the context shifts from a homicide case to one involving
assault and battery. In State v. Fletcher,4 1 where defendant was
prosecuted for an aggravated assault under G.S. § 14-32, evidence
was presented suggesting that defendant was himself resisting an
assault by his adversary. The trial court instructed, in part, that in
order to benefit by the principle of self-defense, defendant "must
show that he was free from blame." The Court on appeal concluded:
"In prosecutions for felonious assault and for assault with a deadly weapon, it is not incumbent on a defendant to satisfy the jury
he acted in self-defense. On the contrary, the burden of proof
rests on the State throughout the trial to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant unlawfully assaulted the alleged
'42
victim."
The distinction between this kind of case and one involving homicide, the Court explained, is that upon a showing of homicide with a
deadly weapon the presumption of malice, sufficient to make out
common law murder (second degree under conventional statutes),
arises. But for this presumption the rule would be the same for
both kinds of offenses, viz., the court would not in its instructions
use language about shifting burdens of proof. But in either case,
evidence" or "beyond a reasonable doubt." The Court here cited State v.
Prince, 223 N.C. 392, 26 S.E.2d 875 (1943); and State v. Matthews, 263
N.C. 95, 138 S.E.2d 819 (1964).
,0 Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
41268 N.C. 140, 150 S.E.2d 54 (1966).
,State v. Fletcher, 268 N.C. 140, 142, 150 S.E.2d 54, 56 (1966). The
case is also interesting in that it suggests, via the uncontested portions of the
instruction, that North Carolina clearly follows the so called retreat rule,
to the effect that before deadly force may be used even in resisting an unlawful assault the actor must withdraw to a place of safety, if such place
existed.
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if evidence is allowed which suggests the existence of necessity,
self-defense, or provocation, or other matter in excuse or partial reduction of the charge, it would seem simpler and less confusing to
the jury if they were told that the state's case must demonstrate
beyond doubt the existence of every element of the crime charged.
Then the court could go on to explain the significance of defense
evidence suggesting that defendant did not act with malice aforethought. The emphasis then is on the elements of the crime and not
on a subjective evaluation of the reasonableness of the defendant's
conduct, although that is not without importance in determining the
central question of the presence of all the elements of the offense.43
The crimes of kidnapping and rape are frequently committed
simultaneously, at least in the technical sense. But not every prosecution of the capital crime of forcible rape, even though it involves
taking the woman by force and transporting her some distance, also
presents the charge of kidnaping. Technically, too, both these crimes
involve some kind of assault; yet that offense is rarely separately
charged and to do so would present questions of double jeopardy.
If multiple defendants are involved, the state has yet another po"'Even in homicide cases the Court will not assiduously hold to its
affirmative defense doctrine, if the state's evidence suggests an excuse for
a deliberate killing-as by defense of habitation. State v. Miller, 267 N.C.
409, 148 S.E.2d 279 (1966), is illustrative. In this case a drunk was trying
to break into the defendant's house by tearing away the screen door. The
victim had been turned out of the house on a previous occasion. The defendant said "I told you not to tear my screen out," and fired one mortal shot
with his pistol. Our Court thoughtfully added: "A householder will not...
be excused if he employs excessive force in repelling the attack, whether it
be upon his person or upon his habitation." 267 N.C. 409, 411, 148 S.E.2d
279, 281 (1966). The trial court had instructed on self-defense, not on
the "substantive right" to defend one's habitation. This amounted to reversible error. The most relevant point here is that defendant had not put
on any evidence; nor does he have to in order to benefit by the principles
raised by the other evidence; nor need he even request special instructions.
If, as the Court said in State v. Fletcher, supra, "the burden of proof rests
on the State throughout the trial to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant unlawfully assaulted the alleged victim," why then is not the
state's burden to prove an unlawful homicide? Should not the strength and
quality of the state's evidence be pitted against that of the defendant regardless of what the charge is, regardless of what the mitigating or excusing
circumstances are alleged to be? The alternative, maintained in dictum in
the Fletcher case, is to pit the defendant against some abstract standard
even before the jury has passed on the presumed probity of the state's evidence. After all, "reasonable resistance to entry of habitation" or "selfdefense" or "provocation" are or may be as effective to negative the presence
of the operative mens rea as "the plea of accident," yet in our Court's view
the latter in effect rests on a higher plane than the others.
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tential charge to make, aiding and abetting others in the act of
forcible rape. The prosecution thought of all these possibilities in
State v. Overman,4 4 where convictions for rape by three brothers
with aiding and abetting one another in the commission of rape were
upheld. Upon a recommendation for life imprisonment, judgment
was entered accordingly. At the trial defendant's pleas of former
jeopardy were entered based on the theory that a former trial for
kidnapping the same girl was a bar. These pleas were rejected. The
earlier trial resulted in convictions of assault. Thus, the state has
another opportunity to charge defendants with a more serious
offense.4 5 Motions for separate trials also were denied. Whether or
not the requirements of former jeopardy were made out,46 the most
remarkable feature of the case is that successive trials were used.
Justice Lake points out that due process has not so far been interpreted to forbid the states to use multiple trials involving more than
"269 N.C. 453, 153 S.E.2d 44 (1967).
Compare State v. Turner, 268 N.C. 225, 150 S.E.2d 406 (1966), where
both offenses were charged but tried together against one defendant.

" In this respect Justice Lake's disposition of the argument is one of the
more interesting features of the case. He concedes that the argument that
assault (of which defendants had been formerly convicted growing out of
evidence identical to that in the rape trial) is essential to rape is an "ingenious" one but without merit, for "a simple assault is probably not, and
an assault on a female is certainly not, an essential element of the crime
of kidnapping, since the victim of a kidnapping need not be a female and
may be enticed away by fraud rather than... by violence or threat.. .. "
State v. Overman, 269 N.C. 453, 465, 153 S.E.2d 44, 55 (1967). Somehow
this is not satisfying. First, this case did involve a forcible abduction,
albeit after getting into the car of the victim's escort by a ruse. Second,
why did the Court fudge with the expression "probably not" an essential
element of kidnapping? Third, the argument was addressed to the later
prosecution of rape, which does involve an assault, and not the crime of
kidnapping, of which the defendants had been impliedly acquitted. See State.

v. Case, 268 N.C. 330, 150 S.E.2d 509 (1966), for an unusual instance of
where double jeopardy does clearly attach, namely where successful petitioner in a habeas corpus declined but was forced to go through a new trial.
And see State v. Vaughan, 268 N.C. 105, 150 S.E.2d 31 (1966); after a

judgment as of nonsuit the plea of former jeopardy will lie. But the order
of a mistrial because of illness of prosecuting attorney in a non-capital case
will not support the plea. State v. Battle, 267 N.C. 513, 148 S.E.2d 599

(1966). Nor will the declaration of a mistrial because of the illness of a
juror.
State v. Pfeifer, 266 N.C. 790, 147 S.E.2d 190 (1966).
7
The failure to grant separate trials, too, seems regrettable as a general
matter where some defendants seem more criminally involved in a series

of events than others, as was the case here. See in this respect also State
v. Battle, 267 N.C. 513, 148 S.E.2d 599 (1966), where the Court declined

to reverse the trial judge's denial of a motion for separate trials for persons
accused of conspiracy, the motion being in the trial court's "sound discretion."
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one offense or several counts of the same offense.
But this principle does require that fundamental fairness be preserved in such a
procedure. It is difficult to give concreteness to such a term where
the cases have not gone so far as to find fundamental unfairness in
almost identical circumstances. Yet the procedure does suggest that
the state wished to minimize the risks of an adverse or "luke warm"
jury in one trial by saving one principal charge for another. Frankly it is difficult to see, from the report of the case at least, why the
state should have suffered from any lack of confidence in this case.
Identification of the culprits was no problem; and in addition to the
evidence of the female victim as to the circumstances surrounding
the abduction there was the testimony of the girl's escort. Admittedly the jury in the rape case did take quite a few hours to reach its
verdict, but the Court's speculation that this could have stemmed
from deliberations about recommendations as to the sentence seems a
plausible explanation. Under the circumstances it may be wondered
what legitimate policy determined the decision to employ separate
trials. If there was none, then the unfairness resulting in putting
the defendants before successive juries with all the anguish that
entails seems fairly obvious and unnecessary.
A case which sheds some light on the contours of the crime of
assault with a deadly weapon deserves passing mention in this section. In State v. Wiggs,4 9 defendant was charged, among other
crimes, with assault with a deadly weapon, "to wit, a gallon glass
jar by threatening to hit [the officer] with the said jar. . . ." The
Court held that such a description failed to allege that the instrument used was a deadly weapon, for the ordinary nature of the
object did not by itself import its deadly or dangerous character.
The Court said that unless the object used is commonly accepted as
a dangerous weapon, then the indictment must sufficiently relate the
circumstances making the ordinary object deadly.5" A simple assault,
,' Cited in this connection were Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464
(1958); Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
'*269 N.C. 507, 153 S.E.2d 84 (1967).
The principal reliance here was on State v. Porter, 101 N.C. 713, 7
S.E. 902 (1888); and State v. Randolph, 228 N.C. 228, 45 S.E.2d 132
(1947) ; but the Court conceded some difficulty in distinguishing "borderline
cases," such as State v. Phillips, 104 N.C. 786, 10 S.E. 463 (1889), holding
that a club, without further elaboration, could be taken to mean a deadly
weapon. The distinction at least seems to have semantics on its side, for the
word "club" itself suggests utility in fighting, whereas a glass jar, except
perhaps as a missile, lacks something of that special utility. See OXFORD
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in any event, was made out, and the verdict would be so treated;
accordingly the Court remanded the case for appropriate sentencing
in this respect.
Two cases involving substantive crimes that are not themselves
part of the body of prescriptions directly protective of public order
but that support these prescriptions indirectly by reinforcing the
integrity of the trial process are worthy of inclusion in this survey
if for no other reason than their relative rarity. One is State v.
King"' in which defendant was alleged to have procured another
to commit perjury. Specifically, defendant was alleged to have
suborned one Rainey Harris to testify at an earlier trial for illegal
possession of three gallons of whiskey that the whiskey belonged to
him, Harris, which testimony, it is now asserted, was known to be
untrue by defendant King. The issue presented was whether Harris'
testimony plus that of several officers who repeated what Harris told
them as to King's asking him to testify falsely would suffice for a
conviction of subornation of prejury. In holding that defendant's
motion for judgment as of nonsuit should have been granted, the
Court reiterated its rules that proof of such a crime must be made
out by two witnesses who testify as to the former oath's falsity or
one such witness plus "corroborating circumstances" of the false
oath. In other words, all the state produced here was one witness to
testify as to which oath was false and several who repeated this
witness' testimony but nothing else independent of such statements
to corroborate the single witness' account. 52
The other case is In re Williams,' which presents the troublesome matter of when a trial judge should punish for contempt of court. The facts in Williams involved "the contumacious
and unlawful refusal, in the presence of the court, by one duly subpoenaed, to be sworn as a witness," which the court said "is direct
contempt and may be punished summarily."54 The issue was whether
UNIVERSAL DicTIoNARY 328 (3d ed. rev. 1955), where the first usage
given of the term "club" is as follows: "A heavy staff for use as a weapon,
thin at one end for the hand, and thicker at the other...
61267 N.C. 631, 148 S.E.2d 647 (1966).
82 The decision is basically in accord with State v. Sailor, 240 N.C. 113,
81 S.E.2d 191 (1954), and seems to support the sound policy of discouraging
bilateral swearing contests among the often disgruntled participants of trials.
'269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317 (1966).
' Thus spoke the Court, citing G.S. § 5-5. lit re Williams, 269 N.C. 68,
75, 152 S.E.2d 317, 323 (1966).

1967]

SURVEY OF NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW

925

there is fundamental conflict between this principle and the one protecting a clergyman's good faith refusal to answer questions relating to his association and conversations with a communicant. G.S.
§ 8-53.1 recognizes a qualified privilege in this respect. Reverend
Williams, however, seems not to have reached the point of declining
particular questions on the strength of his communicant's objection.
Rather he claimed a privilege not to have to take the witness' oath
and say anything about his associations with the defendant in a
pending trial. This kind of professional arrogance, however well
intended, seems out of place among the balanced policies of effective
administration of criminal justice and the free exercise of religion.
Accordingly the resulting decision upholding the ten day contempt
sentence would appear well grounded. This is not to say, however,
that any sterner measures should be employed to force compliance
where matters of conscience are concerned. It might be of considerable public service if organized groups of such professionals would
undertake to establish appropriate guidelines for the proper conduct
of members in the context of civic enterprises like criminal trials.
This would not end the need for a considered judgment by judicial
authorities but it might assist in appraising the claim of consciencerelated-to-a-professional-endeavor invoked by individual members of
the cloth.5"
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE*

Jurisdictionand Venue
"In the absence of an accusation the court acquires no jurisdiction whatever, and if it assumes jurisdiction a trial and conviction
are a nullity," the Court said in McClure v. State.5 In that case the
petitioner was illegally imprisoned after he pleaded guilty to a charge
of assault with intent to commit rape and the indictment charged
" Concededly this would be no easy matter when one considers the fact
that many branches of the country's principal faith do not recognize orga-

nized, not to say centralized, responsibility or authority in doctrinal matters.
But surely some concensus about the nature and scope of the professional
relationships vis-a-vis believers could be empirically described. For a differ-

ent view of the whole matter see Professor Daniel Pollit's "Constitutional
Law" elsewhere in this Survey. And see generally Reese, Confidential Com-

inunications to the Clergy, 24 OHiro ST. L.J. 55 (1963).
* This section is conceptually extended into other parts of the Survey,
principally the section on Constitutional Law, where confessions and right
to counsel
are treated.
0267 N.C.
212, 215, 148 S.E.2d 15, 18 (1966).
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only that he had carnal knowledge of a virtuous girl under the age
of sixteen. Lack of jurisdiction may arise, too, where over-lapping
state and local law coverage is confused. Two examples are present
in the recent decisions of the Court. In one, State v. Wiggs,5 7 the
defendant was charged, among other things, with disorderly conduct
"by cursing and swearing in a loud and boisterous manner in a
public place." During the trial the prosecution introduced a section
of the Raleigh City Code proscribing such conduct. Since defendant was not charged with a violation of a municipal ordinance, his
motion for judgment as of nonsuit should have been granted. G.S.
§ 160-172 requires the specific pleading of particular local laws if
they are to govern the charge alleged. In State v. Furio,5 8 while
the city ordinance was specifically pleaded in the warrants charging
the display of obscene pictures on an outdoor movie screen, the
offense was not unequivocally alleged to have been committed in the
city of High Point. A municipality has no inherent power to prohibit acts beyond its corporate limits; hence the warrant, in the
Court's view failed to charge an offense.59
In criminal cases which generate local notoriety the defense can
move for a change of venue. Sometimes the trial judge without
making findings with respect to the adverse publicity and prospects
for a fair trial in the county where the trial is laid will order a
special venire to be drawn from another county. In effect the trial
judge is conceding the assertion of a high degree of adverse publicity
but chooses a remedy different from that requested. As illustrated
by the decision in State v. Childs,'° our Court feels this is a reasonable substitute and will decline to hold that an abuse of discretion
has occurred. On the face of it there may seem little to choose between in these alternatives; but there may be occasion for extrajudicial influences to permeate the minds even of these non-residents
depending upon the intensity of feeling in the county of trial and
the duration of the trial. Concededly, however, the special venire is
probably better from the defense point of view than an outright
"269 N.C. 507, 153 S.E.2d 84 (1967).
267 N.C. 353, 148 S.E.2d 275 (1966).
Quaere if a city, assuming the validity of the ordinance in other
respects, should not have some kind of contiguous zone jurisdiction to cope
with problems just beyond its boundaries which intrude within them as by
the powered transmission of offensive matter. The Court went on to decide
in any event that the ordinance in question was void for vagueness.
269 N.C. 307, 152 S.E.2d 453 (1967).
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denial of the motion. Where the judge elects to rule on the motion
to remove, he of course should do so only after carefully examining
the affidavits and other exhibits (such as local news clippings) proffered by the defense. Likewise any counter evidence of the state
must be considered. It is at best an unenviable position the judge is
in when he has, as did the judge in State v. Porth,1 a number of
affidavits from one side asserting the opinion that the defendant
could not get a fair trial and a like number of affidavits from the
other side asserting he could receive a fair trial. It is a highly
speculative matter approached in such a way. At worst it seems an
impossible choice to make, although the judge has criteria of relevant detail and vividness of cited instances of bias to assist him. In
Porth the judge found that the defendant could receive a fair and
impartial trial in Forsyth County and accordingly denied the motion. The Supreme Court had no difficulty in upholding this ruling,
emphasizing that the judge had considered all the evidence, had held
an adequate hearing, and had made the necessary finding. The
additional consideration, that the defense had failed to exhaust its
peremptory challenges on the voir dire, does not seem terribly relevant. After all, as the Supreme Court pointed out in Irvin v.
Dowd, 2 whether a prospective juror can say he is not biased is not
dispositive, for bias is an attitude not always consciously held nor
easily admitted. The focus in such an inquiry should perhaps be
more on the quantity, quality, and repetitiveness of the adverse publicity in the community rather than on the subjectivities of potential
participants drawn from the community alleged to have been saturated by the news media.'
Jury Composition and Unfair Tribunal
It is by now familiar constitutional doctrine and practice that
grand or petit juries from which members of the defendant's race
have been systematically excluded cannot discharge their functions
validly in a constitutional sense. Juries from which certain classes
have been excluded present harder questions." Where statute allows
61269 N.C. 329, 153 S.E.2d 10 (1967).
02366 U.S. 717 (1961).
6 Cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
6 See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), upholding New York's
"blue ribbon" juries. But see Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217
(1946); and Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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certain professions or categories of persons, such as mothers of
children under twelve and physicians or ministers, voluntarily to exempt themselves, the question of a proper composition is yet more
complex. And this is the problem raised in State v. Knight,65 where
in a prosecution for a capital offense the defense complained of this
permissive withdrawal of hundreds of doctors, dentists, druggists,
pilots, ministers, postal clerks and nurses. The challenge raises, in
terms of the developed concepts anyway, two questions. One, since
the service of such persons is permitted officially, how does the doctrine of systematic exclusion apply? Secondly, what point of view
would be brought to the deliberations of the jury by members of
such groups if they were not allowed to withdraw or even if they
were excluded for some reason not amounting to discrimination
against the class?" Of course not every particular jury itself can
or must reflect the myriad class and personality identifications possible in social groupings, but the "American tradition of trial by
jury ... necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a
cross-section of the community."" One factor lacking in the defendant's arguments in support of his challenges in Knight was the
empirical proof of how many of the various groups permitted to
beg off jury duty had actually done so in how many cases over how
many years. In other words, it might have been possible to show a
practice of wholesale withdrawal from jury duty by such groups,
whether or not they were affirmatively excluded by official action.
The public policy is one of making it easy not to serve, it might have
been argued. And a pattern of jury composition over the years
which leaves out virtually all the medical profession, by itself, could
hardly be said to present a cross-section of the community from
which the jury lists must be drawn. Beyond this, however, there is
the difficult question of showing what "view point" the excluded
or withdrawn group would add to the jury mix. Professional membership does not necessarily mean unanimity on social issues of im05269 N.C. 100, 152 S.E.2d 179 (1967).
Most of the categories listed in G.S. §§ 9-19; 90-45; 90-150; and 127-84
are presumably thought to involve callings essential to the rendering of critical services to society. Quaere if all pilots, all nurses, or very many postal
clerks are needed all the time to keep society functioning? Why couldn't the
judge decide in individual cases whether a particular professional's services
were likely to be required on the days in question? The statutes are probably in need of updating.
7
"'
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (emphasis
added).
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portance. But juries which are made up primarily of those persons
who either do not have a statutory category to invoke or the economic prestige to get excused otherwise may tend to be made up of
the poorly educated and persons whose cultural or class identifications may be if not more pronounced than others perhaps at least
less subject to self-scrutiny and accomodation with larger community norms. 8 This, it seems, is the fundamental problem presented in the resourceful arguments of the defense in State v.
Knight.
A related problem was presented in the previously mentioned
case of State v. Childs.'9 Is a fair jury one that excludes any person
who says he does not believe in capital punishment? In this case the
trial judge granted several of the state's challenges for cause which
were based on the venireman's expression of lack of sympathy for
the death penalty. These rulings were upheld on appeal, the Court
citing cases and authorities from several jurisdictions in accord. Of
course the defense may use its peremptory challenges for some
jurors, but after these are exhausted the defendant in capital cases
will then face a jury which in sum is the only kind that could impose
the death penalty in view of the unanimity rule. Whether or not
such a jury is more inclined to punishment generally and therefore
presents a more formidable array to the defense than a different
composition is a question which should receive some empirical research in order better to appraise the policy issues at stake.
Not only must the triers of fact in our system of trials be drawn
from a representative cross-section of the community in order that
the defendant may receive a fair trial, but the jury must also be
free from coercive, not to say persuasive influences where they emanate from other participants in the process. For example, the judge
should not convey directly or otherwise his perspectives or beliefs as
to guilt or innocence of the accused or as to the quality or validity
of his defense. This policy is embodied in G.S. § 1-180 which forbids an expression by the judge of an opinion. This statute was applied in State v. Douglas,70 where the trial judge had in effect ridiculed the defense by characterizing it in terms which over-stated the

" See BERELSON AND STEINER, HUMAN BEHAVIOR: AN INVENTORY OF
SCIENTIFIC FINDINGs, 482-490 (1964).
e9269 N.C. 307, 152 S.E.2d 453 (1966).
10 268 N.C. 267, 150 S.E.2d 412 (1966).
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defense. Here, the accused had pleaded not guilty to larceny from a
store and offered no evidence. In instructing the jury the court said:
The Defendant says and contends in the first place that he wasn't
even ...there . . . , he didn't take any suit of clothes ....
that [the store owner] never lost a suit of clothes. . . . He

doesn't even sell suits of clothes. 71

The Court had no difficulty concluding:
When the judge charged that defendant contended Lipinsky
'doesn't even sell suits of clothes', the jurors, recognizing the
absurdity of such a contention, likely understood that the judge
considered the rest of defendant's contentions to be on a par
with that one.7 2

Likewise the jury may be coerced or have its independence compromised by insistent judicial pressure to have a verdict reached, as by
telling a deadlocked jury: "Jurors, if they cannot render a verdict,
are entirely useless"
Seemingly, remarks of the judge during trial
which put defense counsel in a bad light could have a prejudicial
effect in the minds of the jury, although the court must of course
control the conduct of counsel in its presence. In State v. Davis4
the trial judge during the examination of the defendant as a witness
by his attorney told the lawyer: "Let him do the talking. You just
hush up; he can talk."' 75 This was held not to be prejudicial to the
defendant's case before the jury, although the Court characterized
the trial judge's choice of words as not "felicitous."7 ,
Guilty Pleas
There are few more vexing problems in the area of criminal procedure today than those centering around the appraisal, often long
after the event, of the entry and acceptance of a plea of guilty. The
social importance of the guilty plea in the contemporary context can

'1268
N.C. 267, 270, 150 S.E.2d 412, 415 (1966).
7

*1d. at 271, 150 S.E.2d at 416. And see State v. Belk, 268 N.C. 320,
150 S.E.2d 481 (1966), for a yet more blatant judicial indiscretion, viz., a
description of defendants in terms of being "three black cats in a white
Buick."
' State v. McKissick, 268 N.C. 411, 412, 150 S.E.2d 767, 768 (1966).
*' 266 N.C. 633, 146 S.E.2d 646 (1966).
' 266 N.C. 633, 634, 146 S.E.2d 646, 647 (1966).
" And see State v. Sullivan, 268 N.C. 571, 151 S.E.2d 41 (1966), where
the Court declined to limit a judge's informal remarks (in this case about
how criminals from Maryland were making a "picking place" out of North
Carolina) at sentencing.
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hardly be minimized when it is considered that somewhere in the
range of from eighty to ninety percent of criminal convictions in
7
the United States are based upon it.Y
Nor can the technical implications of the plea, from the point of view of the accused, be taken
lightly."' Accordingly it would be a poor system that did not provide persons so convicted of some appraisal of the question whether
his plea of guilty was intelligently and voluntarily entered. Provided
the record is adequate this question may be examined on direct appeal. 9 To avoid subsequent swearing contests in habeas corpus or
other collateral proceedings, the trial judge should conduct a searching inquiry fully recorded and sufficient to satisfy himself that the
accused has not been induced to enter the plea for reasons of expected leniency or because of over-reaching on the part of prosecutors, police, or even his own counsel.80 In such an inquiry, however, the judge may discover that a plea has been "copped" or other
"arrangement" has been established between prosecution and defense which will present something of a dilemma for the judge in
finding that the plea was voluntarily made, and not the product of
a promise of leniency. If the "arrangement" is honored, under
existing precedents, then there should be no difficulty in having the
conviction upheld on direct or collateral review.8"
Search and Seizure
A search warrant which does not specify the contraband or stolen
goods to be searched for in a particular place, though it may be
proper in other respects, is void as authorizing a general or exploratory search, violative of Article I, Sec. 15 of the North Carolina
" See NRWMAN, CoNvxcTioN: TE DETERMiNAToN OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966).

' A plea of guilty of course obviates the necessity of proof by the State,
so that an exception based on variance will be unavailing. State v. Dye, 268

N.C. 362, 150 S.E.2d 507 (1966).

And an appeal from such a conviction

presents only the record for any errors patent on its face and the sentence

to see if it conforms to limits of statute. State v. Darnell, 266 N.C. 640, 146
S.E.2d 800 (1966). One such error may be that the facts charged in the
warrant or indictment does not charge an offense. State v. Hodge, 267 N.C.

238, 147 S.E.2d 881 (1966).
" State v. Caldwell, 269 N.C. 521, 153 S.E.2d 34 (1967) ; State v. Baugh,
268 N.C. 294, 150 S.E.2d 437 (1966).
So See, e.g., People v. Heirens, 4 Ill. 2d 131, 122 N.E.2d 231 (1954).
8 See United States ex rel. McGarth v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir.

1963); Martin v. United States, 256 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1958); Note, 112
U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1964). But see Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571
(5th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 356 U.S. 26 (1957).
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Constitution (and of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).82 Evidence so seized must be excluded if offered at trial in
line with the exclusionary rule made applicable to the states through
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Furthermore, a search warrant may be insufficient in other respects, such as
the way in which is was procured or issued. In State v. Upchurch,4
it was held that the warrant was improperly issued when the assistant clerk testified that she just "witnessed" the officers' signatures
when requested to do so and did not, in other words, examine the
affiant under oath as required by G.S. § 15-27.15
When evidence has been seized in violation of statutory or constitutional rights and is to be excluded at trial, a procedural question arises as to when the propriety of the search and/or seizure is
to be tested. Of course the inquiry should be out of the hearing of
the jury; but does the defense have to wait until the evidence is
proffered before the inquiry is made? In State v. Myers s the
defendant made a motion to suppress after arraignment and before
the plea, which motion was denied as being premature. On appeal
the Court said it would be proper to make the inquiry on the motion
at the outset of the trial but declined to rule that this was mandatory. Although Federal Rule 12 does not in terms require the conduct of such a preliminary inquiry, the practice in the federal courts
seems to be of ruling on the motion at the earliest opportunity.
This practice seems wise since interruptions of the trial are minimized and the defense is to a certain extent relieved of any possible
prejudice by references however slight before the jury to evidence
that must be separately tested.
Where officers conduct a search without a warrant, the issue
whether the individual consented to the search, absent a prior arrest,
will arise. Several cases from the Court during the period being
surveyed presented such a question. In State v. Belk, s7 the defen82 State v. Myers, 266 N.C. 581, 146 S.E.2d 674 (1966).
'Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The North Carolina Court in
Myers also cited the new statute enacted after Mapp to comply with that
decision. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27.1. The case has an interesting factual
twist in that the seizure was made in Virginia.
8'267 N.C. 417, 148 S.E.2d 259 (1966).
8 See also the recent decision of the North Carolina Court invalidating
the statute authorizing police desk officers to perform this essentially judicial
function. State v. Matthews, 270 N.C. 35, 153 S.E.2d 791 (1967).
88266 N.C. 581, 146 S.E.2d 674 (1966).
87268 N.C. 320, 150 S.E.2d 481 (1966).
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dants in a car were reasonably suspected of having committed robbery, and they were stopped by a policeman and permission to search
the car was requested. The driver of the car, one of the three defendants, said "he would get the key and let [the officers] look in the
trunk." Nothing was found there, but the officers had spotted a
brown bag under the driver's feet inside the car. The bag was
seized; it contained property of the robbery victim. The Court held
that the consent was a general one, to search the whole car.88 In
another case the Court found unconvincing the argument that the
accused's permission to search his house without a warrant for
stolen goods was vitiated by the intimidation inherent in seven officers surrounding his house and approaching both doors in the night
time.8 9
To be distinguished from the problem of consent to a search in
the absence of a warrant and by one competent to give consent is
the situation where a valid warrant has been issued, but the one
whose house was searched is absent at the time. The fact that admittance to the premises is given by another member of the household is no ground for objection to admission of the evidence
seizedY0 The warrant, properly issued and drawn, bestows the
needed authority regardless of the presence or absence of the owner
or occupant or that person's consent.
A final reference should be made to the passing of a not so venerable rule of constitutional search and seizure-the so-called "mere
evidence" rule.9 ' The North Carolina Court may have been presaging this demise when it said recently in State v. Bullard:92 "It must
be remembered that the object of search warrants is to obtain evidence. . . ."" Today this is more nearly correct after the recent
Supreme Court decision in Hayden v. Maryland;4 but it was formerly the rule, albeit often more honored in the breach, that only
contraband, fruits of crime, or "instrumentalities" of crimes could
8 Cf. State v. Temple, 269 N.C. 57, 152 S.E.2d 206 (1967).
8'State v. Williams, 267 N.C. 424, 148 S.E.2d 209 (1966). And see
State v. Williams, 269 N.C. 376, 152 S.E.2d 478 (1967), where there was apparently no timely motion to suppress.
90 State v. Heckstall, 268 N.C. 208 (1966).
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), rev'd by Hayden v.
U.S. (May 29, 1967).
Maryland, °'267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966).
90267 N.C. 599, 601, 148 S.E.2d 565, 567 (1966).
(May 29, 1967).
U.S. " Hayden v. Maryland, -
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be seized even under an otherwise valid search warrant." The most
interesting feature of the case, at least from a professional viewpoint, is not that it was overturned, for it had been difficult to give
a concrete rationale in policy for it,98 but how the public reacted to
the Court's decision. Some newspapers have taken this decision as
an indication of a retrenchment on the part of the Court in favor of
7
greater powers of police at the expense of individual rightsY Of
course, the Court deserves support in its efforts to help the nation
realize its spoken ideals by seeing its decisions in the full social context out of which they arise, and out of the hard practicalities, too,
of trying to serve overriding goals of both public order and individual human dignity. But it would probably be a mistake to generalize from a decision like that in Hayden to an assertion that the
Court is in retreat from its role of leadership in protecting and advancing basic human rights under our Constitution.

EVIDENCE
Henry Brandis, Jr.*
RIGHTS TO CROSS-EXAMINATION
In a criminal case1 a prosecution witness, after giving significant
testimony, was withdrawn by the solicitor on the understanding
that he would later be recalled. In fact, the witness was never recalled, and, therefore, was never cross-examined. The Court held,
in effect, that failure of defendant's counsel to request recall, when
the witness remained in the courtroom, was a waiver of the right
to cross-examine.
"5See in addition to Gouled, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); and Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946).
The rule was frequently criticized. See, e.g., People v. Thayer, 47 Cal. Rptr.
780, 408 P.2d 108 (1965) ; and Note, Limitations on Seizure of 'Evidentiary'
Objects: A Rile in Search of a Reason, 20 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 319 (1953).
. But the Court's opinion in Hayden distinguished written documents as
not necessarily covered, pointing to possible compulsory self-incrimination
problems. This point emphasizes that a man's papers, to which he is more
likely to contribute something of his essential personality, should be more
highly protected than say an article of clothing.
07 See, e.g., Durham Morning Herald, June 1, 1967, editorial page.
* Graham Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
State v. Gattison, 266 N.C. 669, 146 S.E.2d 825 (1966).
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In a civil case2 objection was sustained to a hypothetical question
because it contained assumptions not then supported by the evidence,
but, in the absence of the jury, the expert's answer was recorded.
After supporting testimony had been supplied, counsel requested
that the expert's answer be read to the jury. The request was denied. The Court held that the denial was proper since, the witness
having meanwhile left the courtroom, cross-examination would not
have been possible.
Both decisions were per curiam and both seem correct. There
must be an opportunity for cross-examination, but, when that is
provided, the right may be waived-and the waiver may be by conduct as well as by express declaration.
TAKING EVIDENCE TO JURY

Room

3

In State v. Spears a police officer had talked with three defendants together and they signed a statement which the prosecution
introduced in evidence. The jury, after beginning its deliberation,
requested that it be allowed to take this statement to the jury room.
Counsel for one defendant objected; counsel for another said he
had put on no evidence and thought granting the request might be
prejudicial; and counsel for the third indicated no objection. The
judge refused the request. All three defendants were convicted, but
only the third appealed, assigning this ruling as error. The Court,
without discussion, sustained the trial judge on the authority of a
prior case. 4
This reflects North Carolina's general rule that juries may not
take evidence to the jury room.5 The cited case recognizes that, by
consent, the jury may do so, though neither that case nor any North
Carolina case found by this writer presented the precise question
involved in Spears. Here, assuming that the solicitor consented, 6
the objections made by other defendants were sufficient to justify,
and probably to require, the judge's ruling.7 However, even had
2Bryant v. Russell, 266 N.C. 629, 146 S.E.2d 813 (1966).
'268 N.C. 303, 150 S.E.2d 499 (1966).
'State v. Caldwell, 181 N.C. 519, 106 S.E. 139 (1921).
'2 MCINTOSHi, NORTH CAROLINA AND PROCEDURE § 1545 (2d ed. 1956).
'The

opinion is silent as to the solicitor's attitude, but, since he intro-

duced the evidence, it seems doubtful that he objected.
'In this respect, however, the case presents one more example of the
problems of fairness presented when several defendants are tried together.
,
Compare the discussion of "Confession of a Codefendant," infra, page
dealing with the notion that the jury may be told, with reference to evidence
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there been no codefendants, the consent rule probably means only
that the consenting party may not assign the matter as error.8 It
does not necessarily follow that, even if all parties consent, the
judge must allow the jury to take the evidence.'
REFRESHING RECOLLECTION

Harvel's, Inc. v. Eggleston3 ° involved a dispute over the extent
to which defendant had authorized plaintiff to furnish a house for
defendant's daughter at defendant's expense. The daughter, a witness for plaintiff, testified without objection that defendant authorized her to buy a pool table after he had given Lucy (allegedly his
intended bride) a Corvette (more titillatingly identified as a "Stingray"). Objection was made and overruled to questions asked defendant on cross-examination suggesting that Lucy expressed her
desire for a Corvette when she saw one in front of plaintiff's store
while accompanying defendant on one of his visits there. The
Court said:
Defendant had denied many of the conversations which Mr.
Harvel [plaintiff's key witness] testified he had had with him,
and he was indefinite as to the number of times he went to plaintiff's store. The questions with reference to the Corvette were an
attempt by plaintiff's counsel to refresh defendant's recollection
as to one of the visits he had made to plaintiff's store. The court
was careful to instruct the jury that this evidence related "only
to the circumstances under which the defendant is alleged to have
contacted and dealt with Mr. Harvel with relation to the matters set forth in the complaint." The evidence was competent
for that purpose."1
It is perhaps plausibly arguable that the purchase of the Corvette was relevant to the issues because of its tendency to prove a
motive for defendant's generosity to his daughter and that the
it hears in the courtroom, "You may consider this in passing upon A's
guilt, but not in passing upon B's guilt." Would it be any more unrealistic
to give a comparable instruction with reference to evidence taken to the
jury room?
'See Angier v. Howard, 94 N.C. 27 (1886).
0 Cf. the matter of comparison of handwriting samples by the jury, which
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-40 (1963) seems to authorize. The Court has indicated that the judge is not required to permit this in the jury room. Gooding
v. Pope, 194 N.C. 403, 140 S.E.2d 21 (1927). See also In re Will of
68 S.E.2d 301 (1951).
Gatling, 234 N.C. 561,
10268 N.C. 388, 150 S.E.2d 786 (1966).
-'268 N.C. 388, 394, 150 S.E.2d 786, 791 (1966).
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daughter's testimony as to this should have been admitted even had
objection been made. Conceivably, then, the cross-examination of
defendant regarding Lucy's desire to own a Corvette could be regarded as corroborating the daughter's testimony, though it would
hardly have been necessary for that purpose, since actual purchase
of the Corvette seems not to have been disputed. 12 However, as the
above quotation indicates, this was not the basis of the Court's
ruling. Indeed, if the questions were relevant to the issues, reliance
upon refreshing recollection hardly seems necessary.
This writer accepts the proposition that, even on direct examination, things usable to refresh the recollection of a witness should
not be confined to writings prepared by or under the supervision of
the witness.'3 However, a writing used to refresh recollection is
not made admissible in evidence simply because so used,' 4 though
it may qualify for admission as a prior inconsistent statement or,
under North Carolina's broad practice, as corroborative.' 5 Here
there is no prior statement of the witness involved. Rather we have
questions seemingly treated by the Court as irrelevant to the issues,
which may be prejudicial.'" Conceding the right of a cross-examiner to incorporate in his questions matters which may aid a witness
(however unwillingly) to recall the occasion of a relevant conversation, it is perhaps still permissible to doubt that all such questions
should be allowed in the presence of the jury. At the least, the trial
judge should be careful to prevent abuse, lest, whenever a party
witness denies, or says he doesn't recall, a conversation, the next
"2Cf. Pearce v. Barham, 267 N.C. 707, 149 S.E.2d 22 (1966). In a
personal injury action it was held that, though for impeachment purposes
plaintiff could properly be cross-examined regarding her relations with the
car driver, defendant could not introduce evidence showing illicit relations
between them. Plaintiff had used evidence showing that she was forced
into the car by the driver. Defendant's attorney argued that his evidence
tended to prove that she was not a captive. The Court said there was no
allegation or issue that plaintiff was anything but a passenger.
" STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 32 (2d ed. 1963) (hereafter cited as STANSBURY.)
"Ibid.
1 STANSBURY §§ 46, 51.
Even calling counsel may ask an evasive witness
about prior contradictory statements to "refresh the memory." STANSBuRY
§ 40. (The quotation marks are in the text cited.)
" In view of the daughter's testimony, given without objection, it seems

doubtful that the questions involved sufficient prejudice to justify reversal,
even had they been held incompetent. Again, however, this was not the
ground of decision. Since that is true, appraisal of the decision as a precedent must be attempted on the assumption that the "refreshing" process
might introduce matters not reflected in prior testimony.
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question ostensibly attempts to identify the conversation by reference to something at once irrelevant and prejudicial." Otherwise
there is no safeguard as to "refreshing" questions of this nature
comparable to inadmissibility of a writing (other than a statement
of the witness) used to refresh recollection."'
It may also be doubted whether the quoted instruction in any
way deals with refreshing recollection. To this writer, the instruction means that the jury may consider the evidence in appraising the
credibility of the plaintiff's version of the basic facts. To the extent
that its use as circumstantial corroboration is permitted, the evidence, in at least a loose sense, is made relevant to the issues. Since
the Court seems to approve the instruction, despite its failure to
jibe with the Court's reasoning, a further uncertainty is introduced.
What did the instruction mean to the Court?
IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES

In State v. Wilson"9 defendant was convicted of incestuous relations with his daughter, aged fourteen. The daughter's testimony,
if believed, justified the conviction. The Court held that it was
error to exclude testimony from a defense witness to the effect that
the daughter had expressed a desire to get her father out of the
way because he was too strict with her. The Court said that this
tended to show bias and a motive to get rid of defendant, and that
the defense had a right thus to challenge the credibility of the prosecuting witness.
This, of course, makes good sense. The prejudice arising from
exclusion was certainly not overcome by the fact that defendant, as
his own witness, was allowed to testify to similar statements by the
daughter. If it be assumed that on cross-examination the daughter
11 Even relevant evidence should be excluded when its probative force is
relatively weak and there is great likelihood that it will appeal to the passions and prejudices of the jury. Pearce v. Barham, 267 N.C. 707, 149
S.E.2d 22 (1966).
16 See also, decided during the period covered by this Survey, State v.
Walker, 269 N.C. 135, 152 S.E.2d 133 (1967), holding that, while a witness may refresh his recollection from a memorandum prepared by him, only
his oral testimony is substantive evidence, and that, when the memorandum
is in conflict with such testimony, it may not be read to the jury as corroborative. As is usually the case, the question there arose on direct rather
than cross-examination. In general, cross-examination allows more leeway
for exploratory questions than is permissible on direct-but, still again, this
is not the ground upon which the Court's decision in Eggleston is rested.
10269 N.C. 297, 152 S.E.2d 223 (1967).
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was asked about the statements, the use of such testimony is sanctioned by prior North Carolina authority, even though the daughter
denied making them.2 ° The opinion does not indicate whether there
was such cross-examination; and if no such foundation was laid,
prior cases would require exclusion.2 1
It would not be too unhappy an outcome if Wilson resulted in
The rule is
dropping or modifying the foundation requirement.'
based upon fairness to the impeached witness, and our Court has
pointed out that, if the witness is still in the courtroom, he may be
recalled for the purpose of laying the foundation omitted on the
original cross-examination.- It might equally be said that the witness may be recalled by his sponsoring counsel to explain or deny
if he can. Fairness does not necessarily require that he be given
such an opportunity in advance of the impeaching testimony.
(Further, recall of the witness for foundation cross-examination
would ordinarily be in the discretion of the judge, whereas recall for
rebuttal would ordinarily be a matter of right.) This writer would
bar the impeaching testimony only where no foundation had been
laid on cross-examination and the witness is neither in court nor
readily available.
When the impeaching matter is "collateral" and does not tend to
show bias or prejudice, cross-examination is the only method by
which it may be shown, and the cross-examiner is bound by the
answers of the witness. This rule was reiterated in Pearce v. Barham,24 where plaintiff, as a witness, was cross-examined regarding
§ 48.
In re Craver, 169 N.C. 561, 86 S.E. 587 (1915); State v. Dickerson,
98 N.C. 708, 3 S.E. 687 (1887) (a case where the testimony was of very
similar import to that in the principal case); Edwards v. Sullivan, 30 N.C.
302 (1848). In State v. Wilson the only case cited by the Court for its
position is State v. Armstrong, 232 N.C. 727, 62 S.E.2d 50 (1950). In that
case the impeaching testimony was as to the mental capacity of the witness
and, as to that, no foundation problem arises.
2 There is respectable authority elsewhere to the effect that no foundation need be laid as to a prior statement showing bias. See, for example,
Kidd v. People, 97 Colo. 480, 51 P.2d 1020 (1935). Though the opinion
in that case concedes that it is applying a minority rule, it is also followed
in some other jurisdictions. See WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 953 (3rd ed. 1940),
where the wisdom of the majority rule is questioned and where it is emphasized that no foundation is required for evidence of conduct showing bias,
as distinguished from utterances of the witness.
Edwards v.
2" State v. Dickerson, 98 N.C. 708, 3 S.E. 687 (1887);
Sullivan, 30 N.C. 302 (1848).
'267 N.C. 707, 149 S.E.2d 22 (1966).
20 STANSBURY

21
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illicit relations with defendant's intestate. It was held to be error
thereafter to permit other witnesses to contradict her answers. But
when the cross-examination brings answers from the witness which
tend to impeach him, he is entitled to explain them. This rule was
clearly and correctly applied in State v. Calloway,25 where defendant
admitted that he had been convicted in nine prior cases of purse
snatching (one of the offenses for which he was being tried), but
was not allowed to testify that each time he obtained a new trial
with the result that he was acquitted or the prosecution was abandoned.
In Cline v. Atwood 26 plaintiff offered in evidence the pre-trial
adverse examination of defendant Scott. The Court said:
When this . .. was introduced in evidence, the plaintiff made

him his witness and represented that he was worthy of belief....
A party does not make his adversary his witness by taking his
adverse examination, unless he offers the adverse examination,
or part of it, in evidence at the trial ....

Furthermore, when a

plaintiff makes a party in the litigation his own witness, he is
not allowed to impeach him by attacking his credibility, but retains the right to contradict him by the testimony of other witnesses whose testimony may be inconsistent with his. 27

Actually, if the adversary testifies at the trial in his own behalf,
the party introducing the adverse examination may thereupon impeach the deponent in the same manner as he could impeach any
other witness.2" And if the 1967 General Assembly enacts the proposed new rules of civil procedure recommended by the General
Statues Commission, a party calling his adversary as a witness or,
indeed, any unwilling or hostile witness, may impeach him in the
same manner as if he had been called by the adversary.2 9 The proposals also include a provision that the deposition of an adverse
party may be used at the trial "for any purpose, whether or not
deponent testifies at the trial or hearing."3'
This does not specifically spell out the impeachment rules when,
for example, plaintiff's attorney introduces defendant's deposition as
-- 268 N.C. 359, 150 S.E.2d 517 (1966).
"267 N.C. 182, 147 S.E.2d 885 (1966).
'267 N.C. 182, 186, 147 S.E.2d 885, 888 (1966).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-568.25(b) (Supp. 1965).
" 13 THE NORTH CAROLINA BA No. 3, at 76, Rule 43(b) (1966). Cf.
N.C.soGEN.
STAT. § 8-50(b) (Supp. 1965).
13 THE
NORTH CAROLINA BAR No. 3, at 56, Rule 26(d) (1) (1966).
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a part of plaintiff's case.3 1 However, since, under the present practice, this is the equivalent of plaintiff calling defendant as plaintiff's
witness, it seems necessarily to follow that plaintiff's attorney could
impeach defendant regardless of whether or not defendant subsequently takes the stand in his own behalf (though any form of
impeachment requiring a foundation to be laid would seem to be
barred unless such foundation was laid when the deposition was
taken or defendant is a witness at the trial).
Another North Carolina rule will be modified if the proposals
are adopted. The present rule is exemplified by Moore v. Moore,32
holding that the party calling a witness (not his adversary) may
not contradict or impeach him by proving his prior inconsistent
statements. Under the proposals, if the witness' pre-trial deposition
has been taken, the calling party may introduce the deposition "as
substantive evidence of such facts stated in the deposition as are in
conflict with or inconsistent with the testimony of deponent as a
witness."' 3
EVIDENCE, ONCE EXCLUDED, SUBSEQUENTLY
READ TO JURY
4
In 1961, in State v. Payton,"
a rape case, a prosecuting witness
(a girl aged nine) seemed unable to testify before the jury. The
judge excused the jury, conducted the examination, recalled the jury
and had the reporter read the testimony. The Court, in reversing,
said: "Thus the story of the witness went to the jury as hearsay.
The defendant was entitled to have the jury hear the story from
the witness herself and to observe her demeanor at the time she told
it. This was a fundamental right."3'
In State v. Wilson, 6 an incest case, the solicitor objected to
questions propounded to a defense witness on direct examination.
The objections were sustained, but questions and answers were recorded in the absence of the jury. Subsequently the judge decided
"1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-568.25(b) (Supp. 1965) would be repealed. See

13 THaE NORTH CAROLINA BAR No. 3, at 129 (1966).

268 N.C. 110, 150 S.E.2d 75 (1966).
13 TuE NORTHn CAROLINA BAR No. 3, at 56, Rule 26(d) (2) (ii) (1966).
Under Rule 26(d) (2) (i) the calling party's adversary may also introduce
the deposition as substantive evidence, as well as to contradict or impeach
the deponent.
" 255 N.C. 420, 121 S.E.2d 608 (1961).
81 Id. at 420, 121 S.E.2d at 608.
"269 N.C. 297, 152 S.E.2d 223 (1967).
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the evidence was admissible and had the reporter read it to the jury.
Defendant's attorney objected to the judge's refusal to allow the
witness to give his answers before the jury. On appeal the Attorney
General conceded that if the testimony was admissible,37 defendant
was entitled to a new trial under State v. Payton. It is obvious that
here, by contrast with Payton, defendant's attorney is not urging
hearsay or any other ground for exclusion, since he offered the evidence. The sole ground for reversal is depriving the jury of demeanor evidence. The Court obviously agreed with the Attorney
General that this is enough. The two cases together mean that
defendant is entitled to have the jury observe witnesses, whether
they are for or against him.
The per curiam opinion in Wilson was filed on January 20, 1967.
On February 3 the Court filed the opinion in State v. Porth.3"
There defendant was convicted of murder. At the trial a prosecution medical expert, who had performed an autopsy, testified that in
his opinion death resulted from brain concussion and shock. On
cross-examination he was asked, in effect, whether the bruises, etc.
he observed could have been produced by a fall down a flight of
stairs. The jury was not permitted to hear his answer, which was
"It would have been compatible." Subsequently the trial judge, believing that this should have been admitted, repeated the question to
the jury and permitted the reporter to read the answer.
The opinion disposes of the matter in a single sentence to the
effect that the alleged error was cured by the judge's instruction
that the evidence was competent and by the fact that it was admitted and fully considered by the jury. No mention was made of
demeanor evidence. It is true that the testimony in Wilson was
more extensive and possibly more significant than the single answer
at stake in Porth; and the testimony in Payton was still more extensive and was vital to the State's case. It may be that the demeanor of this expert, taken in conjunction with the character of
the evidence, was less important than the demeanor of the witnesses
in the other cases. But if either of these is a potential ground of
distinction (and, on principle, this is debatable), neither (nor any
other ground) is specified in the Porth opinion. Indeed, there is
no indication that the Court was aware that any distinction was in
"' As to its admissibility, see note 19 supra and accompanying text.
8269 N.C. 329, 153 S.E.2d 10 (1967).
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order. Since the reasoning in the earlier opinions is patently sound,
the Porth ruling, pending further enlightenment from the Court, is
entitled to little weight as a precedent.3 9
AUTHENTICATION-WAIVER BY FAILURE TO OBJECT

In Mathis v. Siskin40 plaintiff, without objection, testified that
he received a telephone call from defendant Schulman, who stated
that he was cancelling the contract in litigation. On cross-examination plaintiff said that he did not know Schulman's voice well enough
to identify it positively and that all he knew was that it was someone who called himself Schulman. Motion to strike the direct testimony as to the conversation was denied. The Court, finding no
error, held, in effect, that defendant's attorney should have sought
permission to examine plaintiff as to the caller's identity before
plaintiff testified as to the content of the conversation; that the answers on cross-examination did not require striking the direct; and
41
that such answers would go only to weight and credibility. This
accords with the general proposition that an objection must be made
at the earliest opportunity; and, while the trial judge may, in his
discretion, grant the motion to strike, he is not required to do so.'
OPINION EVIDENCE

Insurability.-In a life insurance litigation4 3 the critical issue
was whether the insured, concededly insurable when he applied for
the policy, remained so at the time of its delivery. The trial judge
allowed an officer of the defendant company to testify that if the
company had known insured had had a convulsion or epileptic attack
it would not have delivered the policy; but the judge excluded the
testimony of the same witness that if insured had such an attack
that he would not have been insurable. The Court sustained this
exclusion: (1) as involving an inadmissible opinion on the very
question to be decided by the jury; and (2) because the testimony
" Neither Payton, Wilson, nor Porth presented a situation where the
method of putting the evidence before the jury shut off the right of crossexamination. Compare Bryant v. Russell, 266 N.C. 629, 146 S.E.2d 813
(1966).
"0268 N.C. 119, 150 S.E.2d 24 (1966).
" It was also pointed out that, in the deposition of another defendant,
admitted in evidence, there was some corroboration for the statements attributed to Schulman in the telephone conversation.
See STANSBURY § 27.
'8 Terrell v. Life Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 259, 152 S.E.2d 196 (1967).
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admitted had substantially the same meaning and hence the exclu44
sion could not have been harmful error.
Whether Vehicle Stopped or Barely Moving.-In Farrow v.
Baughain,4 a wrongful death case, the Court affirmed an involuntary nonsuit. A plaintiff's witness (a police officer with four years
experience), who did not see the crash but examined the scene shortly after it occurred, testified as to what he observed. He was not
allowed to say that, based upon his observations, he "determined"
that intestate's car was stopped or barely moving at the time of
impact. The Court said that the jury was as well qualified as the
witness to draw an inference as to speed from the physical facts
described, quoting from an earlier case.4
The per curiam opinion states that, under the allegations of the
complaint, defendant had the right of way unless intestate's car was
already in the intersection when defendant's car approached. Assuredly, if the physical facts described would permit an inference
that intestate's car was stopped or barely moving, this is relevant
on the question of whether it first entered the intersection, though
its persuasiveness might well depend upon where, within the intersection, the impact occurred. In this case the latter factor, from
the standpoint of the Court, was speculative, because the officer
witness had used a blackboard diagram and the record on appeal
contained nothing to show what he meant when he referred to
"here" or "there. 47 Entry of the nonsuit by the trial judge indicates that he believed the physical evidence would not permit the
inference that intestate's car was stopped or barely moving, or believed that the inference, if permitted, would not justify a finding
of negligence. Failure of the record to make plain the nature of the
physical evidence meant that neither hypothesis could successfully
"Compare the rule as to mental competence. Hammond v. Bullard, 267
N.C. 570, 148 S.E.2d 523 (1966).

See

STANSBURY

§ 127.

"266 N.C. 739, 147 S.E.2d 167 (1966).
'Shaw v. Sylvester, 253 N.C. 176, 116 S.E.2d 351 (1960). This case

did not actually involve speed testimony, but cited a still earlier case which
did-Tyndall v. Harvey C. Hines Co., 226 N.C. 620, 39 S.E.2d 828 (1946).
" Though not involved in the opinion in Farrow, a problem lurks here as
to whether one who did not see the crash may, based upon his post-crash
observations, identify the point of impact, or whether that, too, involves an
inference which the jury must draw without the help of the opinion of the
witness. See Dixon v. Edwards, 265 N.C. 470, 144 S.E.2d 408 (1965),
briefly discussed in Brandis, Evidence, North Carolina Case Law, 44 N.C.
L. REv. 1005, 1009 (1966).
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be challenged on appeal; and it is, therefore, difficult to quarrel
with the result of the case.
However, the ruling out of the opinion is in no way made to
depend upon the state of the rest of the record, and the case helps
to prepetuate a highly questionable rule. In an earlier case4 s a verdict for plaintiff was reversed because a highway patrolman, based
upon his examination of the scene, the results of which he described,
was permitted to opine that defendant's vehicle was going fifty to
sixty miles per hour. It was not suggested that the scene he described would not permit the jury to draw such an inference4 The
Court has also held in a criminal prosecution for reckless driving
that such testimony is without probative value. 0
In the case upon which Farrow relied,51 the critical question
was whether defendant's intestate (one of two occupants) was driving the other car when plaintiff's intestate was killed in a collision.
(There was sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of the
driver and of proximate cause.) No eye witness was available. A
sergeant of the Traffic Division of the Provost Marshal's section
of the Marine Corps testified to his observations at the scene.
Though he had investigated more than four hundred accidents and
had other special qualifications, he was not allowed to testify, based
upon a hypothetical question, that in his opinion defendant's intestate was thrown out the left door. The case was then nonsuited
and the Court affirmed. In both courts the reasons for exclusion
,3 Tyndall v. Harvey C. Hines Co., 226 N.C. 620, 39 S.E.2d 828 (1946).
The Court, in holding that the error was prejudicial, said: "The witness was a State employee whose duty it was to make a disinterested and
impartial investigation of the accident. In so doing he was a representative
of the State. His testimony should, and no doubt did, carry great weight
with the jury." 226 N.C. at 623, 39 S.E.2d at 830 (1946). In other words,
the more it is officially incumbent upon the witness to form an impartial
opinion, the more necessary it becomes to insure that the jury will not hear
that opinion.
"State v. Roberson, 240 N.C. 745, 83 S.E.2d 798 (1954). So far as
the patrolman's testimony is concerned, his opinion as to speed did not harm
defendant, since it accorded with defendant's own testimony. It would
hardly have justified conviction. The driver of the truck hit by defendant,
who admitted he did not see defendant's car before the impact, testified,
based upon the impact and "the way his tires drug on the road," that defendant was going around 65 miles per hour. The Court said that this, also,
was without probative value and that defendant's motion for nonsuit would
have been granted. Compare State v. Fentress, 230 N.C. 248, 52 S.E.2d
599 (1949), where a witness was allowed to testify to the speed of a car
from its sound as it went by out of his sight.
" Shaw v. Sylvester, 253 N.C. 176, 116 S.E.2d 351 (1960).
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seemed to be a compound of: (1) the idea that the jury is as qualified as the witness to draw inferences from the physical facts; and
(2) the idea that the physical facts, as a matter of law, left the
locus of exit too speculative to permit either jury or witness to draw
an inference.
This writer believes that a new look at the rule of exclusion is
long overdue. In his opinion (obviously of no probative weight)
it is wholly unrealistic to assert that an officer experienced in investigating motor vehicle crashes is no better qualified than the average
juryman to draw inferences or form opinions as to speed or point
of impact, even if it be assumed that the jury not only hears the
witness described the scene, but also sees photographs or diagrams or
both. Shutting the mouth of the witness makes sense only when
the witness is, in fact, no more expert than the jury.5 2
Cause and effect.-In Apel v. Queen City Coach Co.53 there was
an issue as to whether injuries received by plaintiff in a motor
vehicle collision caused fecal incontinence. Experts for plaintiff
testified on direct that they could or might have caused it, and on
cross-examination one testified more positively that they did so. As
to the latter, the Court said that defendant's attorney could not complain, because the testimony was induced by a prodding cross-examination. However, a more troublesome question was presented
"' When an expert witness is not allowed to express an opinion which,

if believed, would show negligence, and the issue is then withdrawn from

the jury, this is tantamount to saying that reasonable men cannot draw an
inference which, in fact, has been drawn by an expert. Perhaps, considering all the evidence, this was a valid approach in Shaw v. Sylvester, 253
N.C. 176, 116 S.E.2d 351 (1960) where the question was the side of the
car from which an occupant was catapulted. There is, however, some
danger here that admissibility and sufficiency will be confused. (Compare
State v. Becker, 241 N.C. 321, 85 S.E.2d 327 (1955), where a witness who
said she first saw a car when it was about 15 feet away from her, testified
that it was traveling 55 miles per hour. In the light of all the evidence, the
Court held, in effect, that this was so improbable as to be without probative
weight and that, disregarding this testimony, the State should have been
nonsuited. It may be asked, nevertheless, whether the finding that no credence could be given the speed estimate gives complete credence to the
distance estimate made by the same witness.) There might be extreme
cases involving speed or point of impact where the expert is so clearly off
base as to justify exclusion of his opinion, but in most cases this would
hardly be true. Further, this involves a decision as to whether things observed or assumed furnish a predicate for an inference or an opinion-not
a question as to the relative capacities of the witness and the jury. In the
cases, exclusion is ordinarily rested upon the latter.

:'267 N.C. 25, 147 S.E.2d 566 (1966).
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by defendant's contention that the direct testimony was inadmissible
and that, even if admissible, was insufficient to permit the jury to
consider the incontinence as an element of damages. In holding that
the trial judge was required to admit this testimony and let it be
considered by the jury, the Court said:
The Court has had, and still has, difficulty in applying the
rules to the facts of particular cases. Ordinarily, the hypothetical
questions should not be so framed as to permit the witness to
answer the ultimate issue to be determined by the jury and thus
invade its province. This case is a good illustration of the difficulty. The plaintiff's experts were permitted to answer the
lengthy hypothetical question as to whether the plaintiff's particular difficulty could or might have resulted from the 1962 accident. The witnesses, with some qualifications and explanations,
answered, "yes," that the accident could or might have triggered
the harmful results. On the other hand, the defendants' medical
expert, in answer to the same question, stated, "no," the harmful result might not and could not have come from the accident.
The rule overbalances the advantage in favor of the defendants. 54
This decision is notable for three things: (1) It omits any discussion of whether the admissibility of medical opinion as to causation depends upon whether it reflects a reasonable scientific probability of cause and effect.55 (2) It frankly admits, in general, that
the Court has had difficulty in applying the "jury province" rules,
and this, mayhap, indicates that consideration will be given to improving the rules. (3) It more specifically recognized the inherent
-1267 N.C. 25, 30, 147 S.E.2d 566, 569-70 (1966). As the quotation
indicates, a hypothetical question was involved. See STANsEuRY § 136, pointing out that an expert testifying entirely from his own knowledge may
testify positively as to cause and effect.
" See Lockwood v. McCaskill, 262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964),
commented on in 43 N.C.L. Rxv. 979 (1965). There the Court, though
allowing medical expert testimony that accident injuries "may have" produced amnesia, nevertheless indicated that such testimony must indicate a
reasonable scientific probability. The vice of this is readily apparent in the
light of the rule that causation testimony stronger than "could" or "might"
is inadmissible. This can prevent the expert from stating a probability,
scientific or otherwise. Therefore, under the Lockwood aberration, literally applied, the only opinion admissible under the "jury province" rule may
be excludible for failure to state a probability. (In Apel, the decision was
that the opinion evidence was sufficient, as well as admissible. Hence the
distinction between sufficiency and admissibility was not squarely presented;
but this writer still finds encouragement in the absence of discussion of
probability in relation to admissibility, particularly since Lockwood is one
of a number of cases listed in the Apel opinion as a preface for the statement that the Court has had difficulty in applying the rules.)
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unfairness in allowing one expert to state a flat negative while confining the opposing expert to the merely possible positive-which
should indicate that the Court, having explicitly identified a patent
injustice, will proceed to rectify it.
The imbalance is worse than that caused by allowing "did not"
while barring "did," because "could not" is even more negative than
"did not." Theoretically, balance might be achieved by confining
the expert for the negative to stating that A "possibly did not"
cause B. The absurdity of this is apparent. It is strange that the
Court has not perceived that the "could" or "might" formula on the
positive side is equally absurd. The qualified expert who has a clear,
positive opinion that A caused B should be allowed to say so.
"Could" and "might" would then be available for their only proper
use-reflecting that the witness, in his own mind, is less than positive about the causal relation. The lack of certainty, however, should
ordinarily affect only sufficiency, and not admissibility.
It is devoutly to be hoped that Apel foreshadows scrapping of
the "could" or "might" mumbo jumbo. In the interest of preventing the jury from abdicating in favor of the expert (though, of
course, only the expert for the affirmative), this ritual prevents the
jury from hearing opinion testimony in accurate form. It is indeed
anomalous to qualify an expert, make him swear to tell the truth,
and required him to express an opinion, but, at the same time, force
him to cast that opinion in a form which fails to reflect what he
actually believes to be true.
Another recent case5 highlights the niceties of the rules of the
opinion game as played in this baliwick. In a criminal prosecution,
the trial judge sustained an objection to a question as to whether
conduct of the defendant (of which conduct there was evidence)
could have caused the abortion to which the prosecuting witness testified. The judge then permitted a question as to the effect of such
conduct (not specifically described as that of defendant) on a pregnant woman. The answer was, in effect, that it would ultimately be
"very apt" to result in an abortion. The Court held that such generalized testimony is admissible.57 This raises an interesting possi" State v. Brooks, 267 N.C. 427, 148 S.E.2d 263 (1966).

" The Court cited as authority State v. Shaft, 166 N.C. 407, 81 S.E.

932 (1914) and State v. Furley, 245 N.C. 219, 95 S.E.2d 448 (1956). In
the former, as explained by the latter, an expert was allowed to testify that
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bility. In an appropriate situation, might an expert, barred from
opining that in the specific case A caused B, nevertheless be permitted to testify, as a generality, that A invariably causes B ?
Patients Statement as Predicatefor Medical Opinion.-In Todd
v. Watts,5 9 a motor vehicle collision case, on the damage issue,
plaintiff claimed that persistent headaches and backaches resulted
from her injuries. An orthopedic surgeon, who treated plaintiff,
was permitted to testify over objection: (1) to a diagnosis which
included a reference to the accident with resultant injuries; (2) that,
in his opinion, plaintiff would have some minimal permanent disability-i.e., continuing lumbo-sacral strain and persistent headaches
-as a result of the accident; and (3) that an injury or blow received in the accident could have aggravated a congenital condition
he found in plaintiff. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and
the majority of the Court awarded a new trial, solely on the ground
of error in admitting this testimony. Chief Justice Parker dissented.
As pointed out in the dissent, prior to reaching the critical testimony the witness testified to the history given him by plaintiff, including statements by her that she had been in the accident, that she
had been thrown forward, that she had struck the windshield, that
she wrenched and contused her knees and her low back, and that
she was dazed for a few minutes. There was no objection to admission of all this, though the judge, at the request of defendant's
attorney, confined its use to corroboration of plaintiff's testimony. 0
"Aloes in an excessive dose I should think would have an indirect tendency
to produce an abortion."
8 The cases cited in notes 56 and 57 supra do not involve so sweeping
an assertion. Compare State v. Temple, 269 N.C. 57, 152 S.E.2d 206 (1966),
where the question called for an opinion as to the "probable or likely
source of acid phosphatase . . . in the area of the mouth of the womb of a
female." The answer was that it "indicates the presence of male seminal
fluid." The Court approved admission of this testimony on the ground that
the expert witness, having superior knowledge, could be helpful to the jury,
citing, inter alia, STANSBURY §§ 134, 135. How nice it would be if this
eminently sensible reasoning could be applied to all causal relation testimony,
whether generalized or specific.
269 N.C. 417, 152 S.E.2d 448 (1967).
Under North Carolina's rule allowing great leeway for "corroboration," this seems allowable. See STANSBURY § 50. Statements regarding
present bodily condition of the declarant, as an exception to the hearsay
rule, are admissible as substantive evidence, whether made to a physician
or to a layman. STANSBURY § 161. Some courts have extended this to
history statements made to a treating physician. See, for example, Meaney
v. United States, 112 F.2d 538, 130 A.L.R. 973 (2d Cir. 1940). This,
however, would not necessarily extend to statements as to the specific occur-
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The majority opinion says that the witness was erroneously allowed to express an opinion grounded on matters beyond his personal knowledge, without having those matters properly assumed in
a hypothetical question. The dissent relies on the decision in an
earlier case 6 ' to the effect that a treating physician's opinion is not
rendered incompetent because based wholly or in part upon statements of the patient; and that even if the physician may not testify
to the statements as substantive evidence, he may give them to show
the basis of his opinion. In the view of the Chief Justice, the majority holding "defies the usual processes of medical thought."'6
It would be possible to distinguish the case on which the dissent
relies. It was a Workmen's Compensation case in which plaintiff
claimed disability resulting from a fall while at work. As described
in the opinion, the medical witness did not opine as to what resulted
from the fall. He testified that the patient gave him a history of a
fractured rib and punctured lung at a particular time, and of various
symptoms thereafter developing. On these he predicated a percentage estimate of disability. In Todd, as interpreted by the majority,
the witness related the headaches and backaches directly to the collision, as distinguished from the initial injuries suffered. Hence,
it is possible to say that in the earlier case the Court was dealing
with the patient's declarations as to past symptoms and in Todd
with the external cause of those symptoms. There is some language
in the majority opinion susceptible of the interpretation that such
a distinction was in mind, but the matter remains conjectural since
63
there is no discussion or even citation of the earlier case.
Even if the majority had such a distinction in mind, it seems
overly technical in the setting of Todd. Considering all the testimony of the witness, recited in both opinions, it seems highly improbable that the jury failed to comprehend that the opinion testimony as to cause implicitly assumed that plaintiff was involved in
the collision (not in dispute), that she banged her head and knees
rence producing the injury, as distinguished from the nature of the injury,
wayCo.,
affects
in noCoal
when Penland
the former
26, 97 S.E.2d 432 (1957).
246 the
N.C.treatment.
v. Bird
269 N.C. 417, 423, 152 S.E.2d 448, 452 (1967). The same thought
is expressed in 3 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 688 (3rd ed. 1940).
" Two other earlier cases cited in the majority opinion are adequate to
support the general propositions for which they are cited, but, in this
writer's opinion, neither has significant relevance to the specific question
involved in Todd.
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and wrenched her back (probably not contradicted), and that she
thereafter had headaches and backaches. (The congenital condition
found by the witness was within his personal knowledge, and involved no assumptions.) There was factual basis for all of these in
the testimony of plaintiff herself."4 If any error was involved, it
hardly seems prejudicial enough, standing alone, to justify a new
trial, at which the questions will explicitly state the assumptions
clearly implicit in the testimony at the first trial.
Further, it is most unfortunate that the majority simply ignored
the earlier case upon which the dissent relied. It is sound to allow a
doctor to testify to an opinion predicated upon the history of symptoms related to him by the patient and, in the process, to recite the
patient's statements as to such symptoms.a5 Must we now assume
that, for practical purposes, this case is overruled?66
RELEVANCE

Financial Worth of Civil Defendant.-When defendant denied
the contract (to furnish a residence at defendant's expense) upon
which plaintiff sued, the Court found no error in allowing plaintiff's
agent to testify that defendant told him that defendant had income
of 32,500 dollars per month and exhibited a bankbook showing
monthly deposits." Recognizing that, except upon an issue as to punitive damages, evidence of defendant's worth is ordinarily irrelevant
but prejudicial, the Court believed that under the circumstances of
" The case does not involve the well accepted rule, which the Court has
recently been required to reiterate several times, that a hypothetical question may not assume facts not supported by the evidence. Hubbard v.
Quality Oil Co., 268 N.C. 489, 151 S.E.2d 71 (1966); Petree v. Duke
Power Co., 268 N.C. 419, 150 S.E.2d 749 (1966); Bryant v. Russell, 266
N.C. 629, 146 S.E.2d 813 (1966).
" See the authorities cited in the Chief Justice's quotation from Penland
v. Bird Coal Co., 246 N.C. 26, 97 S.E.2d 432 (1957).
" In Bryant v. Russell, 266 N.C. 629, 146 S.E.2d 813 (1966) a witness
was asked: "Now, Doctor, based on your examination of this patient can
you give me your medical opinion as to the injuries she sustained?" A
unanimous Court sustained exclusion, stating that the question called neither
for a statement as to the patient's condition at the time of his examination
nor for his opinion as to what might have caused it, but for an opinion as
the injuries the patient sustained in a collision occurring three months
before the examination. Obviously there is a much stronger basis for excluding this than for ruling out the testimony in Todd. Cf. State v. Temple,
269 N.C. 57, 152 S.E.2d 206 (1967), finding no reversible error when,
though an expert gave an opinion based in part on information not acquired
by personal examination, there was a mass of competent evidence to prove
the fact involved.
" Harvel's, Inc. v. Eggleston, 268 N.C. 388, 150 S.E.2d 786 (1966).
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this case the evidence was not offered to prove defendant's actual
worth or income, but rather to show that, as part of the negotiations
leading up to the contract, defendant intended to induce plaintiff to
extend credit."'
Prior Crimes.-In a prosecution for murder of his wife (not
by poisoning), defendant contended that she died from a fall, that
he took the body and placed it elsewhere because he feared he would
not be believed about the fall, since his wife had formerly been
hospitalized by arsenic poisoning. Defendant's son, testifying for
him, referred to coming home from Alaska to his sister's funeral.
On cross-examination, over objection, the solicitor asked if the son
did not know for a fact that his sister died from arsenic poisoning.
He replied that he did not. The Court .said:
Absent a showing that the death of witness Porth's sister
was caused by arsenic poisoning which was intended, not for her,
but for her mother, the inquiry into the cause of the sister's
death would appear to be improper as introducing evidence of a
separate and independent crime. The rule, and the exceptions
with respect to such evidence are fully discussed in State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E.2d 364. The question may be debatable whether the evidence of the sister's death by poisoning
is governed by the general rule and should be excluded, or by
the exceptions, and should be admitted. But assuming the question was improper, nevertheless, the answer was exculpatory and
rendered the inquiry harmless.6 9
Such an unqualified assertion that an exculpatory answer eliminates prejudice is not altogether realistic and might well open the
way to trial by insinuation.7"
HEARsAY-ADMISSIONS OF A PARTY OPPONENT

The Court held that it was proper to exclude evidence offered
by defendant of what took place at a conference between defendant,
" The Court pointed out, also, that other evidence of defendant's worth
was admitted without objection and that defendant testified that his income
was less than 20,000 dollars per year.
"State v. Porth, 269 N.C. 329, 339, 153 S.E.2d 10, 18 (1967). Cf.
State v. Smoak, 213 N.C. 79, 195 S.E. 72 (1938), involving evidence of
prior poisonings in a prosecution for murder by poisoning.
"'The opinion points out that there was not even a showing that, at
the time of the daughter's death, she was a member of defendant's household. There is no indication as to whether there was any ground for
belief that the daughter in fact died of arsenic poisoning. Compare State
v. Phillips, 240 N.C. 516, 82 S.E.2d 762 (1954).
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defendant's attorney, and plaintiff's husband, absent any showing
that the husband was authorized to act as plaintiff's agent."
CONFESSION OF A CODEFENDANT

In two cases"2 the Court reiterated the rule that a criminal defendant may not prevent introduction of the confession of a codefendant, even when it implicates him, though the trial judge must
instruct the jury that it may be considered only on the guilt of the
confessor. However, in one of them,78 the Court found ground for
a new trial in the fact that an officer, testifying to the appealing
defendant's oral confession, was allowed to say that he read to
appealing defendant that part of the codefendant's written confession identifying the appealing defendant as a participant in the
crime. The Court said that the prejudicial effect of this was accentuated by the fact that the written confession was before the jury.
It is none too clear whether the Court regarded as error the
admission of the testimony or only failure to confine its use. It is
probably the former, since the officer's testimony was directed solely
against the appealing defendant. In either event, it is most difficult to see how the officer's testimony is any more prejudicial than
the written confession itself, whatever instructions are given. And
it is clear that the Court has qualms about the justice of allowing
joint trial where the confession of defendant A, though inadmissible
against defendant B, in fact implicates him. The last paragraph of
the opinion states: "When all circumstances are considered, we
are of the opinion and so decide that Lynch should be awarded a
new trial at which his guilt or innocence will be determined by
evidence against him and not by evidence incompetent as to him but
devastating in its impact upon this case."' 4
This recognition is all to the good. The Court pointed out that
it was not called upon to decide whether a defendant may demand
separate trial as of right when the prosecution, in case of a joint
trial, will use a codefendant's confession of this type; but, in the
"1Long v. Honeycutt, 268 N.C. 33, 149 S.E.2d 579 (1966). See also
Mathis v. Siskin, 268 N.C. 119, 150 S.E.2d 24 (1966), to the effect that,
while extra-judicial declarations of an agent may not be used to prove his
authority, he may testify that he was authorized to act.
" State v. Taborn, 268 N.C. 445, 150 S.E.2d 779 (1966); State v.
Lynch, 266 N.C. 584, 146 S.E.2d 677 (1966).
State v. Lynch, 266 N.C. 584, 146 S.E.2d 677 (1966).
" 266 N.C. 584, 588, 146 S.E.2d 677, 681 (1966).
73
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light of the above quotation, there can hardly be doubt as to what
the answer should be. Nevertheless, the North Carolina rule has
been that, even in this situation, separate trial is not a right, but is
within the discretion of the trial court judge.r5 In one case, in which
separate indictments were consolidated for trial over the protest of
the defendants, the Court apparently recognized a right to separate
trial,7" and this case has recently been cited in a joint indictment
case in which the Court, while still recognizing the rule of discretion, also recognized that limiting the use of such confession evidence is not too satisfactory. 77 At the very least, this seems to
suggest that a judge should exercise his discretion in favor of separate trial.
The major plausible objection to separate trial is that it increases
the time required of the court and witnesses and also increases the
expense. It seems most doubtful that this outweighs the objective
of fair trial. And surely, when the crime is the same, the matter
should not depend upon whether indictments are joint or separate.
If fair trial is the objective, this is irrelevant. Certainly the above
quotation provides an adequate basis for recognizing a right to
separate trial or, at the least, for a decision that a trial judge refusing separate trial has abused his discretion."'
" State v. Hines, 266 N.C. 1, 145 S.E.2d 363 (1965); State v. Egerton,
264 N.C. 328, 141 S.E.2d 515 (1965); State v. Stroud, 254 N.C. 584, 119
S.E.2d 907 (1961). Cf. Case v. State of N.C., 315 F.2d 743 (4th Cir. 1963).
, State v. Bonner, 222 N.C. 344, 23 S.E.2d 45 (1942).
, State v. Battle, 267 N.C. 513, 148 S.E.2d 599 (1966).
The federal courts have been struggling with the same problem. In
1966 FED. R. Civ. P. 14 was amended by adding: "In ruling on a motion
by a defendant for severance the court may order the attorney for the government to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements or
confessions made by the defendants which the government intends to introduce in evidence at the trial." This does not deprive the judge of discretion, but it indicates the importance of the problem. In Barton v. United
States, 263 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1959), failure to grant severance because of
possible prejudice from the confession of a codefendant was held to be
abuse of discretion. See also Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 17 (5th Cir.
1955). In some cases of joint trial the judge has edited the confession or
has excluded it completely. See Note, Joint and Single Trials inder Rules 8
and 14 of the Federal Rides of Criminal Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 553, 564

(1965). Cf. People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265 (1965) for

on illuminating opinion by Chief Justice Traynor.
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INSURANCE
Donald F. Clifford, Jr.*
LIABILITY OF AGENT OR BROKER FOR FAILURE TO PROCURE
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION INSURANCE

Two cases during the past year involved the nature of the responsibility of an agent or broker who has undertaken to procure
workman's compensation coverage and his liability for failure to do
so. In Wiles v. Mullinax,1 the court described the agent's responsibility as twofold: (1) he must exercise reasonable care to procure
insurance, and (2) if he is unable, in the exercise of reasonable care,
to procure such insurance, he must give timely notice of his failure
so that the customer may take the steps necessary to protect himself.
Thus, even assuming that an agent has used reasonable diligence to
procure coverage and is therefore not liable for his failure to procure it per se, still a cause of action is stated when it is alleged that
the agent has failed to give timely notice to the customer of his
inability to procure the requested coverage. Where either of these
responsibilities is not fulfilled, the customer "at his election, may sue
for breach of contract or for negligent default in the performance
of a duty imposed by contract." 2
The second case, Crawford v. Gen'l Ins. & Realty Co.3 seems at
first blush to hold that the customer does not have a remedy, but a
careful reading shows that it is consistent with Mullinax when its
facts are clearly understood. In Crawford, the plaintiff was the
administrator of a deceased employee of the employer who had
sought the insurance. The court held that he had no standing to sue
inasmuch as he had no right to compensation under the Workman's
Compensation Act and therefore could not have had an interest in
an insurance policy had one been issued. The only misunderstanding
that might arise from the opinion is that the employer who had
sought the insurance was an additional party plaintiff and the court
held that a demurrer should be sustained as to him also. In this
* Assistant

Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
1267
N.C. 392, 148 S.E.2d 229 (1966).
2
Id. at 395, 148 S.E.2d at 232.
8266 N.C. 615, 146 S.E.2d 651 (1966).
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respect, the case seems to be at odds with Mullinax. However, as
the court noted, the employer's complaint did not ask for recovery
in his own right; it asked merely that the administrator recover in
accord with the prayer in his complaint. Moreover, the record
showed that the employee's claim had not yet been allowed by the
Industrial Commission and therefore the extent of the employer's
liability-and hence the extent of his damages for the agent's failure
to procure insurance-had not yet been ascertained. Thus, even if
he had asked for damages in his own right, he would have been
unable to show more than nominal damages in addition to the
amount of premiums he had paid. In Mullinax, by way of contrast,
an award had already been allowed by the Industrial Commission,
and damages could therefore be ascertained.
PERMISSION OF INSURED

Shearin v. Globe Indemnity Co.' presents a troublesome question regarding the application of the permissive user provision of an
omnibus clause in a garage liability clause. The facts showed that
Speight, a prospective purchaser of an automobile, tried out a car
on or about April 18, 1958 and told the dealer "he would like to
have the car." He and the dealer agreed on a price of $495.00 cash.
Speight made a deposit of $40.00, promised that "he would have his
money in a few days," and, after inquiring "if it was all right for
him to drive the car," drove the car away. The following Saturday-,
Speight paid the dealer $20.00 more and said he expected to get the
rest "in a day or two." The following Saturday, Speight came in
and paid $20.00 more to the dealer's brother and did not say anything. When the dealer learned of this, he told his brother "Well,
George, we have got to get that thing straight; he has got to pay for
the automobile or we have got to bring it in." Four or five days
later, the dealer saw Speight at his home and told him that "it had
to be straightened out" and that "you will have to bring the car
around or you will have to pay for it." Speight assured the dealer
he could straighten it out the following Saturday. On Saturday,
Speight did not appear, and the dealer and his brother planned to
get the car on Monday, May 12, although the record does not show
that they so informed Speight. On May 12, Speight was involved
in a wreck, as a result of which he died and plaintiff was injured.
' 267 N.C. 505, 148 S.E.2d 560 (1966).
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Thereafter, plaintiff brought an action against the estate of Speight
which was defended by the dealer's insurer under a non-waiver
agreement. The instant case was brought against the dealer's insurer
to recover on the garage liability policy of the dealer. Judgment of
involuntary nonsuit was given after the close of plaintiff's evidence.
On appeal, the Court held that the evidence was sufficient to permit a jury to find that the car was owned by the dealer at the time
of the accident 5 but that, as a matter of law, "Speight had no permission to use the car after the Saturday on which he was obligated
either to pay therefor or to surrender possession thereof to Auto
Exchange, Inc."6 The latter question seems debatable at best, in
which case the nonsuit should not have been granted.
The evidence would seem to indicate beyond any doubt that
Speight had permission to drive the car at least until Saturday, May
10, and the dealer himself testified that he did not plan to pick up the
car until Monday, May 12-an intent which, so far as the record
shows, he never communicated to Speight. The dealer had not told
Speight not to use the car. When he left the car with Speight, did he
then really expect that Speight would not use it? If the dealer's
conduct did not constitute actual permission, certainly it would seem
enough to warrant submission of the question under the test of implied permission which would have to be read into the policy by
virtue of G.S. § 20-279.21(b) (2), a factor which the Court apparently did not consider. The Court could have found a cogent
argument for this result in the criticism given an earlier permissive
user case which it cited in the opinion in the instant case.7
The court noted that it was required to consider the evidence "in light
of the fact that 'prior to 1961 a purchaser of a motor vehicle acquired title
notwithstanding the failure of his vendor to deliver vendor's certificate of
title or vendee's failure to apply for a new certificate."' Id. at 510, 148 S.E.2d
at 563, quoting Credit Co. v. Norwood, 257 N.C. 87, 90, 125 S.E. 369, 371
(1962). It should also be noted that the question of whether title to the
car had passed to Speight had to be answered under pre-Uniform Commercial Code law. The court referred generally to Wilson v. Finance Co.,
239 N.C. 349, 79 S.E.2d 908 (1954). Since the pre-Code law is not applicable, this question will not be considered further. However, the scholar
may wish to consult VoLD, SAiES, 160-169 (2d ed. 1959) for an exposition
of the doctrine.
°Shearin v. Globe Indemnity Co., 267 N.C. 505, 512, 148 S.E.2d 560,
565 (1966).
S41 N.C.L. Rnv. 232 (1963) criticising Hawley v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of
North America, 257 N.C. 381, 126 S.E.2d 161 (1962).
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"AUTOMOBILE BUSINESS"
8
cases reaffirmed the decision of

a case decided a year
Two recent
ago' that the prospective purchaser who is test driving a car owned
by a car dealer is not within the automobile business exclusion of
the purchaser's own liability policy. In each of these cases, there was
also in existence a garage liability policy issued to the car dealer
who owned the car. The question of coverage of the garage policies
as to the car was apparently not contested, and the Court held, without citation, that such use was within the coverage of a garage
liability policy. In a third case involving somewhat different facts,
the Court did question whether a garage liability policy covered a
prospective purchaser. There, coverage was for automobiles used
"for the purposes of an automobile sales agency ...

and all opera-

tions necessary or incidental thereto."' 1 With respect to the involved
fact situation discussed above,'" the Court stated simply: "Nor does
it show that Speight's operation thereof on May 12, 1958, was
necessary or incidental to the operation of the automobile sales
agency of Auto Exchange, Inc.' ' 12 When one considers, as the
Court did, that Auto Exchange, Inc. owned the car at the time of
the accident, the conclusion does not seem consistent with the facts
of the case and is arguably inconsistent with the two cases just discussed. It is submitted that the holding of the case rests on the
question of permissive user and should not be relied on for the
question of the use of the automobile as an operation incidental to
the purpose of an automobile sales agency.
The fourth case' in this series involved an accident which occurred when an employee of a service station was returning the
owner's car to the owner after repairs had been made on it. Again,
the contest was between the insurer which had issued a garage
liability policy and the insurer which had issued an ordinary owner's
liability policy. This time, however, the Court held that the use of
'Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shelby Mut Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 341, 152 S.E.2d

436 (1967); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 269
N.C. 354, 152 S.E.2d 445 (1967).
'Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 430,
146 S.E.2d 410 (1966).
10
Shearin v. Globe Indemnity Co., 267 N.C. 505, 509, 148 S.E.2d 560,
563 (1966).
See text accompanying note 4 supra.
12267 N.C. 505, 512, 148 S.E.2d 560, 565 (1966).
1
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. McAbee, 268 N.C. 326, 150 S.E.2d 496
(1966).
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the car was within the coverage of the garage policy and that it was
also within the contemplation of the "automobile business" exclusionary clause of the owner's policy. The court cited with approval
the following quotation from a Virginia case:
Obviously, if the operation of the car by Perdue was a use in the
automobile business . . . within the meaning of the insuring
clause ... it was a use in such automobile business within the
14
meaning of the exclusion clause of United's policy.
The logic of that assertion, of course, would require a different result in the two cases previously discussed which held that a use
could be within the meaning of "automobile business" in the coverage of a garage policy while without the meaning of "automobile
business" in an owner's policy. The seeming discrepancy, however,
is cleared up, at least by implication, by the Court in distinguishing
an earlier prospective purchaser case' 5 on the grounds that the insured (for purposes of the owner's exclusionary clause) was not the
one engaged in the automobile business and therefore the exclusion
did not apply. In the instant case, by way of contrast, the insured
was an employee of the service station and was therefore the one
engaged in the automobile business and therefore within the exclusion of the owner's policy and within the coverage of the garage
policy. It should also be noted that the Court rejected a federal
court decision arising out of North Carolina which had held to the
contrary on this question.'
CONFLICT BETWEEN

"No

LIABILITY"

CLAUSE AND

"EXCESS INSURANCE" CLAUSE IN Two POLICIES
OTHERWISE COVERING THE INSURED EVENT
Two cases in the past year involved the interesting question of
the effect of clauses in two otherwise applicable policies purporting to
limit or avoid liability in the event of other insurance. Fortunately,
both cases presented identical questions involving identical conflicting policies. Both cases involved a contest between a garage liability
insurer and an ordinary owner liability insurer. The policy provisions of the former provided insurance for:
21 Id. at 328, 150 S.E.2d at 498.
" Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 430,
146 S.E.2d 410 (1966).
" Goforth v. Allstate Ins. Co., 220 F. Supp. 616 (W.D.N.C. 1963), aff'd
per curian, 327 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1964).
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any other person, but only if no other valid and collectible automobile liability insurance, either primary or excess is available
to such person....
The owner's policy, by way of contrast, provided that
...the insurance with respect to a temporary substitute automobile or non-owned automobile shall be excess insurance over
any other valid and collectible insurance.
The trial court in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co."
held that both policies afforded primary coverage for the insured and
prorated the recovery between them, while the trial court in Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.18 held that
primary coverage was afforded only by the owner's liability policy.
It also held that the "no liability" provision of the garage policy was
in conflict with G.S. § 20-279.21, but that the approval of the Commissioner of Insurance eliminated the conflict and thus validated the
endorsement and further that the "no liability" clause conflicted with
the "excess insurance" clause. The Supreme Court held that the
"excess insurance" policy afforded primary coverage, thus agreeing
with the second trial court on this point, but held that the "no
liability" clause was not in conflict with G.S. § 20-279.21 and that
the "no liability" clause did not conflict with the "excess insurance"
clause.
The Court's result comports with what has been said to be the
greatest number of cases' 9 involving the question. In so holding,
the Court rejected the reasoning of the decision in Oregon Auto.
Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,20 in which the
Court held that one could not rationally choose between the "other
insurance" provisions of two conflicting policies and that the two
insurers must be required to prorate the loss-thus effectively cancelling out the "other insurance" provisions of both policies. The
Court cited the following sentence from the Oregon Auto. Ins. Co.
opinion: "It is plain that if the provisions of both policies were
given full effect, neither insurer would be liable" and went on to
say that "we, likewise, reject such a result in the present case." The
basis for the decision, however, is not because the two clauses can17269 N.C. 341, 152 S.E.2d 436 (1967).
18269 N.C. 354, 152 S.E.2d 445 (1967).
1
.Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1163 (1956).
20 195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952).
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not be rationally distinguished, but because they can. One might
speculate that should a case come up in which the "other insurance"

clause in two otherwise applicable policies cannot be rationally distinguished, the Court would cancel them both out and prorate the
loss. Indeed, it is strongly arguable that such a result would be
required under the provisions of the compulsory liability insurance
law. However, that question was not posed in these cases, and the
Court held that the "no liability" clause of the garage policy did not
conflict with G.S. § 20-279.21 inasmuch as the injured parties on
the facts of these cases would still have the benefit of liability insurance to the full extent contemplated by statute.
UNINSURED MOTORIST CLAUSE

Plaintiff mechanic was insured under a family automobile and
comprehensive liability policy issued by the defendant insurance company to plaintiff's spouse. On the fateful day, plaintiff had gone to
repair the car of one Singletary who had no insurance. While
plaintiff was working underneath Singletary's car, which was raised
on blocks, Singletary negligently caused the car to fall off the blocks
thereby causing plaintiff serious injury. In this action 1 by plaintiff
against the company which had issued the policy to his wife, the
court held that the injury was within the "ownership, maintenance
or use" clause of the uninsured motorist indorsement. Noting that
this question was one of first impression in this jurisdiction, the
Court discussed cases from several other jurisdictions, 2 2 quoted the
dictionary definition of "maintenance," 23 and held: "Giving the
word its common, daily, non technical meaning, the facts alleged
'
come within the coverage of the policy."24
One question apparently not considered by the Court is the effect
that would be given to an "automobile business" exclusion clause
such as the one discussed above on these facts. Although the Court
in the instant case quoted liberally from the provisions of the
1Williams

v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 235, 152 S.E.2d 102

(1966).
2'Morris v. Surety Co., 322 Pa. 91, 185 AtI. 201 (1936); Fire Insurance
Co. v. Insurance Co., 275 N.Y.S. 47, aff'd, 267 N.Y. 576, 196 N.E. 587
(1935).
2 "Webster's New International Unabridged Dictionary defines 'maintenance' as 'The labor of keeping something (as buildings or equipment) in
a state of repair or efficiency: care, upkeep.'" 269 N.C. 235, 240, 152 S.E.2d
102, 107 (1966).
21 Ibid.

962

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.45

policy in question, no mention was made of such a clause. On the
basis of the Court's holding in Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.," and the Court's explanation of that holding
in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. McAbee,2 8 one might argue that
plaintiff's activity would have been within the purview of such an
"automobile business" exclusion because the plaintiff insured was
the one engaged in the automobile business. Perhaps the answer
would be found in the policy underlying the compulsory law which
is to be construed in favor of coverage for the injured public.
In Rice v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,T the Court, in a per curiam
opinion, reached a much more questionable result in construing an
uninsured motorist indorsement. There, the plaintiff was insured by
the defendant company whose policy contained a standard uninsured
motorist indorsement. Plaintiff was injured in an accident caused by
another motorist whose insurer became insolvent after the accident.
Relying on Hardin v. Insurance Company,28 the Court held that the
subsequent insolvency of the other motorist's insurer did not make
his vehicle an uninsured automobile. The Court appears to have
ignored the following dicta from a case decided after Hardin and
before the instant case: "It is noted that G.S. § 20-279.21(b) (3)
was amended by Chapter 156, Session Laws of 1965, so as to prelude the result reached by this Court in Hardin....
The case is
extensively noted at 45 N.C.L. REV. 551 (1967).
ACCIDENTAL MEANS

Two cases during the covered period reaffirmed the distinction
drawn in numerous cases between death caused by "accident" and
one caused by "accidental means." The policy in the first case provided for double indemnity if the insured "sustained bodily injury
resulting in death within ninety days thereafter through external,
violent and accidental means, death being the direct result thereof
and independent of all other causes. . . ."30 The insured, who while
under the influence of alcohol was awaiting the arrival of a relative
266 N.C. 430, 146 S.E.2d 410 (1966).
268 N.C. 326, 150 S.E.2d 496 (1966).
-'1267 N.C. 421, 148 S.E.2d 223 (1966).
'261 N.C. 67, 134 S.E.2d 142 (1964).
"0Buck v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 265 N.C. 285, 290, 144 S.E.2d 34,
37-38 (1965).
o Chesson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 268 N.C. 98, 99, 150 S.E.2d 40, 41
(1966).
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who was to return him to the State hospital, "suddenly threw his
arms and hands across his chest and jumped straight backwards,
striking his head on the cement floor.' 3 1 He died thereafter, and the
cause of his death was found to be a cerebral hemorrhage. The
Court held that there was no evidence to show that the cause, as distinguished from the result, was accidental, and that regardless of
whether the hemorrhage caused the fall (as plaintiff alleged) or
the fall caused the hemorrhage, the causation of the fall was not
shown to be accidental.
In the second case, the insured's accident policy provided coverage "against loss resulting directly and independently of all other
causes from bodily injuries sustained during the term of this policy,
and effected solely through accidental means."3 2 The insured, a fireman, was apparently overcome by heavy smoke while fighting a fire
as a result of which he later died. While noting "strong equities for
the plaintiff in this case"' ' (the policy was a group policy furnishing
coverage for firemen in the exercise of their duties), the Court held
that "in the instant case the insured was voluntarily performing an
intentional act and there is no evidence of any unusual mishap, slip
or mischance occurring in the doing of the act. To the contrary, it
appeared that the result was unusual and unexpected and unfore' 84
seen.
There is little that can be said about cases like these. Clauses of
the variety construed here have been said to be "the subject of more
American litigation than any other provision in insurance contracts,""5 and Mr. Justice Cardozo once noted in a strong dissenting
opinion that "the attempted distinction between accidental results
and accidental means will plunge this branch of the law into a Serbonian Bog."8 0 One can make a rational argument for either side
in almost all of such cases. For example, one could argue with
some cogency that the action of the insured in the first case here considered was not intentional in view of the fact that he was both
under the influence of alcohol and mentally incompetent at the time
31 1d. at 104, 150 S.E.2d at 45.
2
" Henderson v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 268 N.C. 129, 131,
150 S.E.2d 17, 19 (1966).
8"Id. at 133, 150 S.E.2d at 20.
,Ibid.
PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANcE LAW 243 (1957) [hereinafter
cited as PATTERSON].
" Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 499 (1934).
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of the event. 7 And, in the case of the fireman, one could argue
quite rationally that the means of his death were accidental inasmuch as though he intended to breathe, it was an accident that he inhaled the smoke that caused his death. The real issue raised in the
cases is whether the Court should remain in a "Serbonian bog." The
Court noted in one of these cases that there is a division of authority
on the distinction it relied on,38 but showed no interest in departing
from its established view. While it is perhaps still true that most
courts support the distinction, it has been noted that "a majority
of these cases were decided many years ago"3 9 and that the distinction "has been rejected by most of the recent cases, beginning with
the dissent of Judge Cardozo in 1934.'40 Perhaps it is time for
North Carolina to get out of the bog.

REAL PROPERTY
William B. Aycock*
Most of the cases in this section fall into two main categories:
(1) Conveyancing; (2) Landlord and Tenant. Also included is a
case establishing the right of the state to acquire title by adverse
possession, and a case concerned with taxation of an estate held by
the entirety. Another case dealing with a contingent class gift is the
subject of a Note published in a previous issue of this Review** and
is not discussed in this Survey.
ADVERSE POSSESSION

In 1913 the Court held that the City of Raleigh acquired title
to a strip of land by adverse possession.' In 1964 the Court in
"'See

VANCE,

INSURANCE 947 (3d ed. Anderson 1951) [hereinafter cited

as VANCE]. Cf. Accident Ins. Co. v. Crandal, 120 U.S. 527 (1887).
''While there is a division of authority elsewhere (see 29A Am. Jur.,
Insurance § 116 and Comment Note, 166 A.L.R. 469), this Court has consistently drawn a distinction between the terms 'accidental death' and 'death
by external accidental means."' Langley v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 261 N.C.
459, 461, 135 S.E.2d 38, 40 (1964).
0VANCE 950.
PATTERSON 243.
* Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
** Note, 45 N.C.L. REv. 264 (1966).
1 City of Raleigh v. Durfey, 163 N.C. 154, 79 S.E. 434
(1913).
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dictum2 indicated that the State Highway Commission could aquire
a right of way by prescription. In 1966 the Court, apparently for
the first time, was faced with the question of the right of the state
or its agencies to acquire title by adverse possession. In Willicns
v. State Bd. of Educ.a the Court answered in the affirmative notwithstanding the fact that the statutes on adverse possession explicitly refer only to "person" or "persons." The Court concluded
that the General Assembly intended that G.S. § 1-39 and G.S. § 1-40
should apply to any legal entity4 including the State of North Carolina and its agencies. Thus under G.S. § 1-38 the state or its
agencies may acquire title by seven years adverse possession under
color of title or under G.S.§ 1-40 in twenty years by adverse possession not under color of title.
In order to acquire title by adverse possession against the state
longer periods are required. G.S. § 1-35 provides that in order to
acquire title by adverse possession against the State of North Carolina there must be a period of twenty-one years under color of title
and a period of thirty years not under color of title.
CONVEYANCING

A. Right of First Refusal
In Duff-Norton Co. v. Hall5 the Court was concerned with
whether or not an "Option Agreement" violated the rule against
perpetuities. Plaintiffs leased a twenty-six acre tract of land for a
period of twenty years with an option to renew for four periods of
five years. A few months later plaintiffs secured an "Option Agreement" from the sellers on a thirteen acre tract adjacent to the
leased land. This "Option Agreement" gave the plaintiffs a "preemptive" right to buy the thirteen acre tract for the same price for
which the owners would be willing to sell to any other person.,
2
Browning v. State Highway Comm'n, 263 N.C. 130, 139 S.E.2d 227
(1964).
3266 N.C. 761, 147 S.E.2d 381 (1966).
'The unorganized public is probably excluded inasmuch as there is no
grantee capable of holding title. See 3 Am. JUR. 2d Adverse Possession §
139 (1962).
- 268 N.C. 275, 150 S.E.2d 425 (1966).
'A first refusal or first opportunity to buy contract will fail unless it
either fixes the price or provides a way in which the price can be determined.
However, the offer of a third person is usually deemed to provide a sufficient
standard. NoTE, 7 N.C.L. Ruv. 474 (1929).
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Subsequently, the thirteen acres of land were sold without giving
the plaintiffs an opportunity to purchase.
In a suit for specific performance of the "Option Agreement"
on the thirteen acre tract, the defendants invoked the rule against
perpetuities on the ground that the "option" of the plaintiffs could
extend for a period of forty years.7 The Court held that this "Option Agreement" did not violate the rule against perpetuities because
it did not restrain free alienation.' It gave the plaintiffs a preferred
right to buy at the market price whenever the owners desired to
sell. In substance, this "Option Agreement" was a right of first
refusal and not an option. An option contract in which one offers to
sell within a limited time and the optionee has a right to accept or
reject such offer within such time is subject to the rule against
perpetuities. 9
B. Statute of Frauds

In Montague v. Womble0 the parties had oral conversations
concerning the purchase and sale of a house. The defendant gave
plaintiffs a check for 5,000 dollars in anticipation of what would be
a credit on the purchase price of the house. On the check was
written "Down Payment on house." The check was returned for
insufficient funds. Although plaintiffs sold the house to another
party, they sued on the check. The jury returned a verdict of 5,000
dollars after a peremptory instruction from the court:
I also instruct you that all the evidence tends to show that the
defendant gave to the plaintiffs a check for $5,000.00, which
check has not been paid and that it was given to the plaintiffs
by the defendant as down payment for a house and that the
plaintiffs were ready and willing to convey the property had the
defendant paid the remainder of the purchase price."
Apparently the "Option Agreement" was to continue in effect during
the period of the plaintiff's lease and renewals thereof.
"The primary purpose of the rule against perpetuities "is to restrit the
permissible creation of future interests and prevent undue restraint upon or
suspension of the right of alienation." Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C. 101,
103, 52 S.E.2d 229, 230 (1949).
' Christopher, Options to Purchase Real Property in North Carolina, 44
N.C.L. REv. 63, 77 (1965). Options to purchase kased land by the lessee

generally have been treated as socially desirable exceptions to the rule
against perpetuities. 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 771 (1962).
N.C. 360, 148 S.E.2d 255 (1966).
IId. at 362, 148 S.E.2d at 256.

10267
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The Court held that the contract was void under the Statute of
Frauds; therefore, there was no consideration for the check and for
this reason the trial court should have sustained the defendant's
plea in bar.
C. Real Estate Brokers
General Statutes of Frauds requiring contracts for the sale of
real property to be in writing do not apply to agreements between
owners of property and real estate brokers. Thus in the absence of
specific statutory requirements 2 that such contracts be in writing,
3
oral agreements are valid. This is the law in North Carolina.1
In Jenkins v. Winecoff4 a real estate broker collected 500 dollars
"earnest money" from a purchaser who agreed to pay 4500 dollars
for the property. The purchaser defaulted. The real estate broker
retained 200 dollars and paid the vendor 300 dollars. The vendor
sued the broker for 200 dollars, alleging that pursuant to the oral
contract between them that the broker's compensation would be all
he could get for the property in excess of 4300 dollars. The Court
held that the superior court did not have jurisdiction in a suit on
contract for 200 dollars and left unanswered the question of the
rights of a vendor and broker in respect to "earfiest money" paid by
a purchaser who defaulted on the contract of sale. The Court, however, did refer to an annotation in the American Law Reports 5
without comment. This annotation suggests that the weight of authority upholds the right of the vendor to the whole of the forfeited
"earnest money" in the absence of a specific agreement as to its disposition.
D. Option to Purchase
In Burkhead v. Farlow'1 the defendants signed the following
document which had been prepared by the plaintiff:
"Option of Purchase"
We do here-by option to John A. Burkhead, a certain parcel or
tract of land, lying & being in Back Creek Township, Randolph
County and described as follows: App. 52 acres of land with
"2Some states have such statutes. 12 Am. Ju. 2d Brokers 41 (1964).
" Carver v. Britt, 241 N.C. 538, 85 S.E.2d 888 (1955).
267 N.C. 639, 148 S.E.2d 577 (1966).
15
Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 495 (1950).
18266 N.C. 595, 146 S.E.2d 802 (1966).
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500 ft. more or less fronting the Spero Rd. The purchase
15,000.00, payable upon delivery of deed and acceptance of Title.
Option expires Oct. 15, 1961.
His-Lester M. Farlow
Her-Dorothy Farlow
The plaintiff orally accepted this written offer subject to a title
check. Before the title check was completed, and prior to the expiration date specified in the "Option of Purchase," the defendants
notified the plaintiff that they had decided not to sell.
Plaintiff sued for specific performance and suffered a nonsuit in
the trial court. On appeal, the Court, in effect, considered two questions: (1) Does an oral acceptance of a written offer to sell bind the
seller? (2) Is an acceptance conditional if it is made subject to a
title check?
The Statute of Frauds in North Carolina, as in most jurisdictions, provides that contracts to convey land must be in writing and
"signed by the party to be charged therewith."' 1 This provision,
according to the weight of authority,"8 including the view of the
North Carolina Court, means that one who signs a written offer to
sell is bound by an oral acceptance even though the purchaser is not
bound. Thus the oral acceptance by the plaintiff was sufficient to
bind the defendant unless the acceptance was conditional. The Court
held that the title check contemplated by the plaintiff was the usual
one any prudent purchaser would make to determine whether the
vendor could convey the marketable title implied in every contract
to convey real property; hence, it was not conditional. The Court
noted that the outcome might be different in those situations in
which the vendor is required to furnish title satisfactory to the
purchaser or his attorney.' 9 Here a conditional acceptance may result because it is possible for a title to meet the legal standard of
marketability and yet be unsatisfactory to a purchaser.
LANDLORD AND TENANT

Three cases involved summary ejectment proceedings instituted
by the landlord against a tenant. In Morris v. Austraw2 ° the land27 N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 22-2 (1965).

Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 972 (1953).
10 Richardson v. Greensboro Warehouse & Storage Co., 223 N.C. 344,
26 S.E.2d 897, 149 A.L.R. 201 (1943). This case was discussed by the
Court.
20269 N.C. 218, 152 S.E.2d 155 (1967).

1967]

SURVEY OF NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW

969

lord asserted a forfeiture of the lease because the tenant had violated a provision in the lease in that he had been convicted of a
federal offense 2 ' in connection with the operation of the tenant's
business on the leased premises. The landlord relied on the following provisions in the lease:
Paragraph 1 (a) Tenant shall not use or permit the use of any
portion of said premises for any unlawful purpose or purposes.
Paragraph 16 (b) In case landlord should bring suit for the
possession of the premises, for the recovery of any sum due hereunder, or because of the breach of any covenant herein, or for
any other relief against Tenant, declaratory or otherwise, or
should Tenant bring any action for any relief against Landlord,
declaratory or otherwise, arising out of this lease, and Landlord
should prevail in any such suit, Tenant shall pay Landlord a reasonable attorney's fee which shall be deemed to have accrued on
the commencement of such action and shall be enforceable
whether or not such action is prosecuted to judgment.2
The courts do not look with favor on forfeitures. In the absence
of a specific statute providing for a forfeiture, 23 a breach of a condition in a lease will not result in a forfeiture unless the lease either
provides for termination because of the breach, or a right of reentry is reserved. The Court concluded that the foregoing paragraph in the lease did not meet any of these requirements. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and it was ordered
that the proceeding be dismissed as in case of nonsuit.
In Carsonv. Imperial '400' Nat'l Inc. 24 the forfeiture provisions
in the lease were explicit. Paragraph 12 provided:
Lessor reserves the right to terminate this Lease, and to re-enter
and repossess the whole of the property without further notice
or demand:
(1) Upon any general assignment for the benefit of creditors
of Imperial; or if a receiver shall be appointed for Imperial.2 5
2176 Stat. 784 (1962), 74 Stat. 403 (1960), 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 333 (1964).
22 Morris v. Austraw, 269 N.C. 218, 222, 152 S.E. 155, 159 (1967).
Dees v. Apple, 207 N.C. 763, 178 S.E. 557 (1935). N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 42-3 (1966) provides for an implied forfeiture in leases for nonpayment
of rent. Summary ejectment is provided for in Article 3, Chapter 42 of the
General Statutes of North Carolina.
24267 N.C. 229, 147 S.E.2d 898 (1966).
Id. at 230, 147 S.E.2d at 899.
2"
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A receiver had been appointed for Imperial, lessee. The defense, in
the summary ejectment proceedings, was that Imperial had subleased
the premises and that the parties intended for Paragraph twelve of
the lease to apply only if the lessee had the immediate right of
possession when the receiver was appointed. The Court rejected this
defense:
If the appellants (lessee) position is sound, we would have the
strange situation of the leasehold estate being valid for the next
34 years, invalid for the remaining 17 years of the term because
of a present violation of the lessor's right to terminate the lease.
such a strange situation
Certainly the parties never contemplated
26
when they executed the lease.

The judgment of the trial court terminating the lease was affirmed.
In Housing Authority v. Thorpe27 the Court upheld the right
of the lessor to terminate the lease by giving notice of termination
to the lessee in accordance with provisions expressed in the lease.
The lessee's request for a hearing on the reasons for the termination was not granted by the lessor. On this point the Court held
that it is not material what may have been the reason for the lessor's
unwillingness to continue the relationship of landlord and tenant
after the expiration of the term as provided in the lease. Whether
or not the Court's traditional view of a lease termination, as expressed in this case, will prevail, when, as here, a public housing
authority is lessor, will depend on the resolution of the constitutional issues which have been argued recently before the Supreme
Court of the United States. These constitutional issues are discussed elsewhere in this Survey.2"
Two additional cases involved the construction of a provision in
a lease. In Taylor v. Gibbs29 the lessee agreed to pay 2100 dollars
for certain tobacco allotments "providing the tobacco acreage is not
reduced over 5 per cent." The acreage was not reduced. But due to
acreage-poundage control regulations which neither party had anticipated, lessee could not sell all the tobacco produced. Lessee asserted
a right to reduce the rent in that the acreage-poundage control is
comparable to a reduction of the tobacco acreage. The Court rejected the contention of the lessee on the ground that the law cannot
233,431,
147 148
S.E.2d
at 901.
28 Id. at
N.C.
S.E.2d
290 (1966).
27267
8
' Supra 883.
"268 N.C. 363, 150 S.E.2d 506 (1966).
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bind the lessor to an unforeseen and unexpected eventuality not
within the contemplation of either party.
In Young v. Sweet" a renewal provision in a lease was held
void for uncertainty because the rental for the renewal period was
subject to adjustment at the beginning of the renewal period.
TENANCY

By THE

ENTIRETY

A tenancy by the entirety is created when real property is conveyed by deed or devised to two persons who are at the time husband and wife. Each spouse is considered as the owner of the entire
estate because of the common law fiction of the unity of husband
and wife. As between the husband and wife there is but one owner
-that third person recognized by the law, the husband and wife.3
In Duplin County v. Jones32 the Court had before it the question
of whether land owned as tenants by the entirety, listed for taxation by the husband in his name as owner, was subject to a lien for
taxes assessed on personal property, listed by the husband in his
own name, some of which was owned by him, and some by his wife,
but none of the personal property was owned jointly. In concluding
that the land owned by the entirety was not subject to a tax lien
under these circumstances, the Court adhered to the common law
rule that a tenancy by the entirety is not subject to the separate obli33
gations of either the husband or wife.
The Court found it unnecessary to determine the liability of the
husband's rights to rents and profits from such jointly held land to
taxes owned by him on his separate property.
30266 N.C. 623, 146 S.E.2d 669 (1966).
31 See Lee, Tenancy By the Entirety in North Carolina,41 N.C.L. Rlv. 67
(1962).
'3267 N.C. 68, 147 S.E.2d 603 (1966).
3 General Air Conditioning Co. v. Douglas, 241 N.C. 170, 84 S.E.2d
828 (1964). (A laborer's and materialmen's lien upon land held as tenants
by the entirety cannot arise in favor of one who constructs improvements

thereon pursuant to a contract with the husband alone).
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TORTS
Philip Thorpe*
IMMUNITIES

By far the most significant decision of the past year relating to
immunities from liability in tort was Rabon v. Rowan Memorial
Hospital.' The decision apparently abolished charitable immunity as
a defense available to hospitals in this state.2 In Rabon plaintiff
was a paying patient at defendant hospital. He alleged injuries resulting from the negligent administration of drugs by an employee
nurse. Plaintiff did not allege a lack of care by defendant in the
selection of hiring of the nurse. 3 After a hearing, the trial judge
granted a demurrer to the complaint on the theory that plaintiff, as
a paying patient, fell within the North Carolina charitable immunity
rule.4 In an opinion by Justice Sharp, dissented from by Chief
Justice Parker and Justices Lake and Pless, the Supreme Court
overruled two earlier decisions,' and held that plaintiff was entitled
to a trial on the merits. This discussion had the effect of making the
charitable immunity defense inapplicable to paying patients in hospitals. The decision was made prospectively only, so that the immunity defense applies to cases arising before Rabon.6
The majority opinion, after an extensive review of the history
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.

,269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485 (1967).
For reasons which will become evident, the word "apparently" is utilized
to signify some doubts about the Rabon decision, and not as a means of
equivocating about the unequivocal-a usage beloved by all attorneys and
law professors.
'Had plaintiff made such allegations, the case would have fallen within
the exception to the charitable immunity recognized in Hale v. Glenn, 167
N.C. 594, 83 S.E. 807 (1914); and in Barden v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry.,
152 N.C. 318, 67 S.E. 971 (1910).
'Williams v. Randolph Hospital, 237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303 (1953);
noted 32 N.C.L. R!v. 129 (1953). Notes in 37 N.C.L. REv. 209 (1959) and
in 30 N.C.L. REv. 67 (1951) also develop North Carolina law on the charitable immunity prior to Rabon.
'Williams v. Randolph Hospital, supra note 4; Williams v. Hospital
Association, 234 N.C. 536, 67 S.E.2d 662 (1951).
a In Quick v. High Point Memorial Hospital, 269 N.C. 450, 152 S.E.2d
527 (1967) plaintiff was permitted to proceed to trial, because he was not
within the scope of the charitable immunity, despite the fact the action arose
prior to the Rabon decision.
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of the charitable immunity, justifications advanced in its support,
and criticisms of it, and after an equally extensive and careful review of the current state of authority, concluded that the charitable
immunity should be abolished. The opinion then proceeded to cast
doubt upon the extent of the Court's ruling by apparently limiting
its decision to hospitals.7 Finally the majority opinion suggests that
defendant was not a charity at all, thus completing the confusion
as to the prebise limits of its decision." Despite these last minute
limitations by the majority, it seems safe to submit that Rabon
represents a retreat from the prior immunity granted charities in
this state. Because it overrules the Williams9 cases, the Court has
undoubtedly abolished the immunity as to hospitals where a paying
patient is injured. Since only the Williams cases were overruled expressly, it appears that the immunity has not yet been abolished as to
other charities." ° What is unclear is the extent to which Rabon is
limited: to paying patients only, or to all beneficiaries of the char-

ity?"
Although the above conclusions and comments make the Rabon
decision appear illogical, there is much merit in the approach taken
by the Court. In the first place, what with Medicare, privately obtained hospitalization insurance, employment obtained group hospitalization and state welfare aid, the incidence of truly gratuitous
services by hospitals must be small. Secondly, liability insurance can
be obtained at reasonable cost. Thirdly, prior application of the

immunity to hospitals has been particularly unjust and illogical it269 N.C. 1, 21, 152 S.E.2d 485, 498. The apparent limitation may well
be the result of Justice Lake's dissent, in which he suggests that the immunity
might well offer substantial protection to small charities. He argues that
abolition of the immunity, if it is to be abolished, should be done by the
General Assembly, after full hearings on the matter. This writer has received an informal report that rehearing of Rabon has been requested on
this ground.
'This aspect of the majority opinion was prompted by certain findings of
fact, made by the trial judge, as to the financing of defendant's enterprise.
Included were findings that every effort was made to collect from patients,
to operate at a profit, and that in fact the enterprise was profitable.
' See note 4 supra and accompanying text
"Although the great majority of North Carolina charitable immunity
cases have involved hospitals, a few cases have involved other charities.
Herndon v. Massey, 217 N.C. 610, 8 S.E.2d 914 (1940) (Y.W.C.A.).
Turnage v. New Bern Consistory, 215 N.C. 798, 3 S.E.2d 8 (1939) (Masonic
Lodge engaged in fund raising for charitable works).
" As to so-called "third persons" the immunity did not present a bar to
suit before Rabon. See, e.g., Quick v. High Point Memorial Hospital, 269
N.C. 450, 152 S.E.2d 527 (1967).
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self. Fourthly, as to charities other than hospitals, compulsory
automobile liability insurance offers protection to the public in
probably the major area of accidental injuries resulting from their
activities. Thus limiting abolition of the immunity to hospitals is
justified, at least for the present. Finally, the Court's statement to
the effect that defendant was not really a charity indicates a willingness to examine individual cases to determine whether reasons for
continued immunization of the particular charity are apparent.
Where they are not present, Rabon appears to promise a withdrawal
of the immunity. Thus, despite the constitutional and jurisprudential
misgivings of the dissenters,' the majority opinion's decision to
move slowly and carefully seems merited. Certainly at the time the
charitable immunity was developed, it was a sound position. There
still may be charities which need protection from tort liability. A
rule of total liability might be as unworkable as the total immunity
rule. Thus, despite the confusion which remains, Rabon v. Rowan
Memorial Hospital represents a highly sensible step by the Supreme
Court in this area.
" An article could be written about both types of misgivings raised by
the dissents in Rabon. Particularly with respect to the doctrine of stare
decisis Justice Lake's dissent raises some interesting arguments. Although
much of his position is untenable when viewed from modem theories of
jurisprudence, his suggestion that certain judicially created legal rules should
only be overruled by the legislature is a significant point. Certainly the
judiciary is not as well equipped as the legislature to permit all relevant
data and interested parties to be heard concerning the advisability of a
change in policy. At least in part, the idea of judicial self-restraint rests
upon this fact. Like many another advocate, however, justice Lake chose
to ignore this truly perplexing question; instead resting his argument upon
a doubtful issue of constitutional power. It is clearly within the power of
the judiciary to overrule judicially created rules, as history has indicated.
What is not at all clear is the extent to which this power should be exercised.
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TRIAL PRACTICE
Herbert R. Baer*
PROCESS
In Thomas v. Frosty Morn Meats, Inc.' suit was brought in
North Carolina against a North Carolina corporation on a judgment
which had been obtained in New York. The certified copy of the
New York judgment showed that service had been made in the
New York action by serving the defendant in North Carolina. Defendant moved for a nonsuit in the action on the judgment on the
ground that New York had no jurisdiction of the defendant, that
no valid service of process had been made on it, and that the defendant had not appeared in the New York proceeding. The trial court
granted the motion.
On appeal the Court reversed and sent the case back for a new
hearing. The Court cited the InternationalShoe' case and its progeny and stated that the fact the North Carolina corporate defendant
was not served with process in New York did not of itself establish
a want of jurisdiction in that state. Jurisdiction is to be presumed
until the contrary is shown. The trial court was instructed to consider the law of New York as interpreted by New York decisions
in passing upon the question of whether or not New York had jurisdiction. The burden of establishing lack of jurisdiction was on the
defendant and the defendant, on rehearing below, is to be given an
opportunity to show, if it can, that under the law of New York
there was no legal service of process.
In Russell v. Bea Staple Mfg. Co. 3 the original summons commanded the sheriff "to summon Clayton Eddinger, Kearns Warehouse, 518 Hamilton Street, High Point, North Carolina, local agent
for Bea Staple Manufacturing Company, Incorporated, defendant(s)
above named." It was so served. No appearance was entered and default judgment was taken against the corporate defendant, April 9,
* Alumni Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
1266 N.C. 523, 146 S.E.2d 397 (1966).
'International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See for
general discussion, 44 N.C.L. REv. 449 (1966).
*266 N.C. 531, 146 S.E.2d 459 (1966).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

1965. On April 21, 1965, the defendant corporation entered a special
appearance and moved that the judgment be set aside because of lack
of service on it. The trial court denied the motion.
On appeal the Court held that the only service made was on
Clayton Eddinger, individually, and that no valid service had been
made on the corporate defendant. The judgment was declared a
nullity and should have been vacated on the corporation's motion.
The reference in the original summons to Eddinger as local agent
for the corporation was merely "descriptio personae" and did not
result in bringing in the corporate defendant.
In Webb v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. 4 the Court restated the
well established rule that a sheriff has 20 days from the date of a
summons, or the date of an alias summons, or the date of the
endorsement extending the time for service on the original summons, in which to make service and that service after said 20 day
period is a nullity. In the same case the Court also declared that
although the issuance of an alias summons which does not refer to
the original process may operate as the institution of a new suit, it
cannot toll the operation of the statute of limitations unless it shows
its relation to the original summons.
SUBPOENA DucEs TECUM

The use of the subpoena duces tecum as compared to obtaining
an order giving leave to inspect documents under G.S. § 8-89, or
an order for the production of books and documents under G.S.
§ 8-90, is fully discussed in Vaughn v. Broadfoot.5 The Court
declared that the relevancy and materiality of the documents described in the subpoena duces tecum as well as its adequacy from
the standpoint of definiteness in describing the documents subpoenaed may properly be raised by a motion to quash, vacate, or modify
the subpoena. The court also called attention to the fact that no
affidavit is necessary for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
and that G.S. § 8-89 and G.S. § 8-90 do not supercede the subpoena
duces tecum.
552, 151 S.E.2d 19 (1966).
'268 N.C.
8267 N.C. 691, 149 S.E.2d 37 (1966).

See in this connection Rule
45(c) of the proposed North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure wherein
provision is made for the allowance of counsel fees and expenses if the
subpoena is quashed or modified or for the advance of the reasonable cost
of complying with the subpoena.
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VENUE

In Doss v. Nowel 6 the action was brought in Mecklenburg
County. The proper venue was either the county of the residence
of the plaintiff or that of the defendant under G.S. § 1-82. Neither
of the parties were resident in Mecklenburg. Defendant in due time
moved to have the case transferred to Catawba County which he
said was his residence. Upon taking proof the trial court found
that defendant was not resident in Catawba County and denied
defendant's motion.
On appeal the Court sustained the trial court's finding of fact
regarding defendant's non-residence in Catawba County. In upholding the denial of defendant's motion, the Court stated that it
was not incumbent on the trial court to determine the proper county
but his denial would be sustained if it appeared that the county to
which defendant asked the case be transferred was not a proper one.

CONTEMPT-WITNESS' REFUSAL TO BE SWORN

In In re Williams7 defendant was on trial for rape. A Reverend
Williams was subpoenaed by both the state and the defense as a
witness. He had been consulted by the defendant and the prosecuting witness, both of whom were members of his church.. When
asked to be sworn on the part of the state, the minister declared he
refused to be sworn and that he would not testify in the case under
any circumstances because he felt to do so would violate his concept
of a clergyman's religious duty. He was adamant in his position
even though the court indicated he would not have to reveal any
confidential communication that had been made to him.
In upholding a summary conviction for contempt, the Court declared that the minister's refusal was contumacious and willful regardless of his personal belief as to his moral or religious duty.
The court found no reason to set aside the conviction because the
contemner at the time was not represented by counsel nor supplied
with counsel by the trial court.
8268 N.C. 289, 150 S.E.2d 394 (1966).
1269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317 (1967). In general on contempt see 34
N.C.L. REv. 221 (1956).
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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-SCOPE OF ImPLIED AUTHORITY
In State v. Mason' defendant was on trial for failure to support
his illegitimate child. He entered a plea of not guilty. He denied
paternity and denied prosecutrix had made a demand on him for
support prior to the issuance of the original warrant.
In his charge the judge told the jury that he understood the only
question for them to determine was whether defendant was the
father of the child, the defendant not claiming to have attempted to
support the child but merely denying paternity. The trial judge
asked counsel for defendant if that was correct. Counsel replied it
was.
The jury found defendant guilty. On appeal the Court held
that a plea of not guilty puts in issue each element of the crime
charged. Further, the Court declared that in this type of case the
jury not only had to find the defendant was the father of the child,
but also that he wilfully and without just cause refused to support
it. The statement of defense counsel that the only issue for the
jury was paternity waived a substantial right of defendant and was
not within the implied authority created by the relationship of attorney and client.9
FINDINGS OF FACT BY TRIAL COURT
It frequently occurs that prior to making a ruling the judge must
find facts. If he makes a ruling but fails to spell out the facts he
found, is it to be presumed that he found the necessary facts to
support his ruling, or is the case to be remanded with instructions
to the judge to make specific fact findings so as to enable the appellate court to determine if the facts found support the court's ruling?
The following cases point up the problem.
In State v. Conyers" the trial judge held a preliminary voir
dire examination as to the voluntariness of a defendant's alleged
confession. At the conclusion of this examination the court had
entered in the record a statement that he found the defendant's
declarations in question to have been made to the officers "freely
- 268 N.C. 423, 150 S.E.2d 753 (1966).
' For similar holdings see State v. Barley, 240 N.C. 253, 81 S.E.2d 772
(1954); Deitz v. Bolch, 209 N.C. 202, 188 S.E. 384 (1936); Bank v.
McEwen, 160 N.C. 414, 76 S.E. 222 (1912).
10267 N.C. 618, 148 S.E.2d 569 (1966).
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and voluntarily ... without reward or hope of reward, or inducement, or any coercion from said officers."
On appeal the Court held that while under its earlier decisions
this ruling would have been sufficient, it is now insufficient since
the case of State v. Barnes" in that it is the duty of the trial judge
to make specific findings of facts. The lower court's declaration was
said to be simply a statement of its conclusions. Absent findings of
fact by the judge, the appellate tribunal was said to be in no position
to determine whether the lower court erred in the admission of the
alleged confession.
On the other hand, in Langley v. Langley' the question for the
trial court to determine was whether or not the counsel for defendant in a divorce action had been authorized by his client to inform
the court that she did not wish to pursue the defense. Jury having
been waived in the case, the judge found for plaintiff. Defendant
then appeared through new counsel and moved to have the judgment
vacated asserting that her former counsel had not had authority to
inform the court that her defense was not to be pursued. After
hearing evidence the court declared it was satisfied the judgment
should not be set aside.
On appeal it was urged that there should be a reversal because
the judge did not make any finding of fact. There had been no
request for such finding and the Court held that in the absence of
a request to find facts it would be presumed that the court found the
facts necessary to support his ruling.
"ERASE IT FROM YOUR MEMORY" INSTRUCTION TO JURY

It frequently occurs that improper remarks are made either by a
witness, counsel or the judge which are followed by an instruction
from the judge to the jury that the remarks are to be disregarded
and that the jury is to "erase them from their memory." Uniformity would easily be had if jurors, who are presumed to be intelligent,
were always found capable of following such an instruction. But
no such simple rule has been attained. Occasionally, our Court does
find that it is impossible to unroast a roasted apple and a new trial is
ordered on the assumption that the improper remark could not be
erased from the minds of the jurors. It does appear that improper
"264 N.C. 517, 142 S.E.2d 344 (1965).
1268 N.C. 415, 150 S.E.2d 764 (1966).
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remarks of the trial judge are less subject to "erasure" than remarks of witnesses or counsel.
3 the trial judge, after taking some
Thus in State v. Carter"
testimony in the presence of the jury and other testimony outside
their presence, informed the jury that he found the statements made
by the defendants to a special agent of the State Bureau of Investigation had been voluntarily given. A few minutes later the judge
told the jury that he had inadvertently advised them as to his finding about the voluntariness of the statements and instructed them,
"I charge you now you will not consider that statement made by
the court in any way whatsoever, either for the State or against
the defendants or any of them."' 4
In reversing the convictions that followed, the Court declared
that when once a trial judge, by the slightest intimation, informs
the jury of his opinion of the credibility of a witness, such error
cannot be corrected by asking the jury to disregard the judge's
comments.
On the other hand, in State v. Bruce,15 State v. McKethan8
and Apel v. Queen City Coach Co. 1 7 the Court took the position

that an "erase it from your mind" instruction was sufficient to wipe
out the effect of an improper statement by a witness. In Bruce the
Court quoted from an earlier case to the effect that the assumption
is "that the trial jurors are men of character and of sufficient intelligence to fully understand and comply with the instructions of the
court, and are presumed to have done so."' 8 In Queen City Coach
Co. the improper remark was reference to an insurance adjuster for
the defendant bus company. The Court said it would assume the
jury heeded the court's instruction and did not penalize the bus
company because of it. Doubtless the Court in this instance was
correct, for the defendant corporation by its very name may be said
to already have had two strikes against it and the fact it carried
insurance would hardly create additional jury prejudice.
18268 N.C. 648, 151 S.E.2d 602 (1966).
1 'Id. at 651, 151 S.E.2d at 604.
18268 N.C. 174, 150 S.E.2d 216 (1966).
16269 N.C. 81, 152 S.E.2d 341 (1967).

17267 N.C. 25, 147 S.E.2d 566 (1966). Cf. Fincher v. Rhyne, 266 N.C.
64, 145 S.E.2d 316 (1965), 44 N.C.L. Rtv. 1060 (1966).
" State v. Ray, 212 N.C. 725, 729, 194 S.E. 482, 484 (1938).
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SUMMATION BY COUNSEL-USE OF CHARTS
NOT IN EVIDENCE
0

In Callicutt v. Smith" defendant had counterclaimed in an auto
accident case and sought damages for his personal injuries as well
as property damage to his automobile. In summing up to the jury
counsel for defendant attempted to present to the jury a large chart
setting forth the defendant's life expectancy and a number of computations to support a verdict far in excess of the amount sued for
which was 26,180 dollars. Upon plaintiff's objection, the court excluded the chart. The jury gave the defendant a verdict of 1,000
dollars for his personal injuries. Defendant appealed claiming error
because he was not permitted to argue from the chart to the jury.
In affirming the Court said, "While counsel is allowed wide
latitude in argument to the jury, and to use figures and calculations
in support of his position, he, in effect, was attempting to use this
20
chart as an exhibit which had never been introduced in evidence."
COURT'S CHARGE-EXPRESSION OF OPINION

Once again G.S. § 1-180 has lead to various reversals because
the trial judge was found to have expressed an opinion in his charge
in violation of the statute. Thus in State v. Belk 2 1 the trial judge
was held to have expressed an opinion because he referred to the
defendants on trial as "three black cats in a white Buick" although
the record failed to disclose that any witness had used that term.
In Belk v. Schweizer7 the court referred to the answer a doctor
gave to a hypothetical question and said it was "difficult of comprehension generally." Such statement violated G.S. § 1-180 because it
might lead the jury to believe the trial judge thought the doctor's
testimony was so confused and vague as to be of little probative

value.
In Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt2 3 the trial judge in answering a
juror's question undertook to explain the nature of the judgment
that would be rendered if they answered the issue in favor of the
19267 N.C. 252, 148 S.E.2d 9 (1966).
20 267 N.C. at 253, 148 S.E.2d at 10. Cf. Jenkins v. Hines, 264 N.C. 83,
141 S.E.2d 1 (1965) on use of per unit of time argument and comments
in Baer, Trial Practice, North Carolina Case Law, 44 N.C.L. REv. 1054,
1062 (1966).
21268 N.C. 320, 150 S.E.2d 481 (1966).
22268 N.C. 50, 149 S.E.2d 565 (1966).
28266 N.C. 467, 146 S.E.2d 434 (1966).
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plaintiff and the procedure that would be followed by the plaintiff
under such judgment. On appeal the Court held that by so doing
the trial judge "may well have had the effect of prejudicing the
jury against the position of the plaintiff although that was, of
course, not the intention of the court."2"
In State v. Douglas25 the trial judge overstated the contentions
of the defendant in such a manner as to ridicule the defendant in that
he asserted that the defendant denied a fact which was obviously
undeniable. On appeal the Court said that the jurors in recognizing
the absurdity of the stated contention may have understood that the
judge considered the rest of defendant's contentions on a par with
that one. The Court pointed out that a trial judge need not state
either the state's or defendant's contentions and that when the state's
evidence seems to conclusively establish the guilt of the defendant
so that to state a contention of the defendant would strain credulity,
the court's "obvious solution is to state no contentions at all." 26 A
simple statement of the effect of the plea of not guilty will fulfill
the requirement.
In Pardue v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co. 2 1 the judge in
charging the jury told them that the plaintiff contends that if she
does not recover from this defendant "she is out in the cold." 2 In
reversing judgment for the plaintiff the Court declared that if such
a contention was made by counsel it would be the duty of the court
to give no consideration to it and that when the court stated such
contention to the jury the defendant was materially prejudiced.
"[I]t seems probable," said the Court, that "the chivalry and
compassion of the jurors of Wilkes would move them to take such
action as might be necessary to keep plaintiff from being 'left out

in the cold.'

",29

COERCION OF JURY BY COURT

In State v. 11cKissick30 defendant was on trial for robbery with
a deadly weapon. The jury deliberated several hours without reaching an agreement. The court then told the jury he could not dis"Id. at 475, 146 S.E.2d at 440.
"268 N.C. 267, 150 S.E.2d 412 (1966).
20 Id. at 271, 150 S.E.2d at 416.
'1267 N.C. 82, 147 S.E.2d 575 (1966).
28 Id. at 84, 147 S.E.2d at 576.
20 Ibid.
o268 N.C. 411, 150 S.E.2d 767 (1966).
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charge them lightly. That they should consider the case until they
had exhausted every possibility of an agreement. That a disagreement meant a new trial with further expense and is a misfortune to
any county. He failed to advise the jurors that they were not to
surrender their conscientious convictions in order to reach an agreement. Because of that failure, the Supreme Court reversed holding
that the charge was coercive or at least could be deemed coercive
by the minority of jurors who thought they were obliged to defer
to the views of the majority.
VERDICT-IMPEACHMENT OF BY JURORS

It is a well established rule in this state that jurors may not
impeach their own verdict and testimony may not be received from
them for that purpose. In Seiph v. Selph$3 after the jury verdict
had been rendered on specific issues submitted in a divorce case one
of the jurors told plaintiff's attorney that he and some other jurors
had a question as to the legal effect of their answer to the fourth
issue. The trial judge then, after hearing the juror's statement in
chambers, declared that he found as a fact that some of the jurors
were mistaken as to the legal effect of their verdict and accordingly
he set the same aside in his discretion and ordered a new trial. In
reversing, the Supreme Court declared that although a trial judge has
discretion to set a verdict aside, when as here, it is plain that he set
the same aside on the evidence of a juror, which he had no right
to receive, he will be held to have erred in point of law.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Phillip Thorpe*
COVERAGE

The past year produced a surprising number of cases involving
questions of coverage under the Workmen's Compensation statute.'
The basic purpose of workmen's compensation is to provide com31267 N.C. 635, 148 S.E.2d 574 (1966).
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.

'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1965). [Hereafter referred to as the
Act.]
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pensation to persons injured while employed, and the right to receive
benefits is dependent upon the existence of an employment relationship., However, the exact nature of the required relationship is not
made clear by the Act. 3 The Supreme Court has consistently applied
common law tests to determine whether the requisite relationship
of employer-employee exists.4 At common law, the employer-employee relationship is established by proof of mutual assent, benefit
to the employer, and a right in the employer to control the activities
of the employee.5 The most significant common law test is that of
"right to control." As applied by the Supreme Court, if the person
for whom the work is being done has the right to control the
worker with respect to the manner or method of doing the work,
the worker is an employee." In contrast, if he merely has the right
to require results in conformity with the agreement between them,
7
no employment relationship is established.
In Hicks v. Guilford County,' plaintiff claimed the right to benefits under the Act as an "employee" of defendant county. She was
injured in a fall in the courthouse while serving on a petit jury about
to begin its deliberations. The Supreme Court held plaintiff to be
an "independent contractor" rather than an "employee" and, thus,
not entitled to compensation. Its decision was based upon the
'Hollowell v. Department of Conservation & Dev., 206 N.C. 206, 173

S.E. 603 (1934).
'Neither N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(1) (1965), defining "employment,"
nor N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 97-2(3) (1965), defining "employer," purport to

define the specific required relationship for coverage under the Act. Both

sections specify certain employees who are included or excluded from coverage. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(2) (1965), defining "employee," requires an
"appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship," and excludes "persons
whose employment is both casual and not in the course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of his employer." In addition, specified persons in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(2) (1965) are either included or excluded
from the definition. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13 (1965) also excepts certain
categories from the provision of the Act.
'See, e.g., Scott v. Waccamaw Lumber Co., 232 N.C. 162, 59 S.E.2d

425 (1950); Hayes v. Board of Trustees of Elon College, 224 N.C. 11, 29
S.E.2d 137 (1944).
'RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), AGENCY § 2 (1958). See Birchfield v. Department of Conservation & Dev., 204 N.C. 217, 167 S.E. 855 (1933).
'Hunter v. Hunter Auto Co., 204 N.C. 723, 169 S.E. 648 (1933). So
long as a "right to control exists, it is immaterial whether the employer
actually exercises it. McCraw v. Calvine Mills, 233 N.C. 524, 64 S.E.2d
658 (1951) (dictum).

"Commonly the relationship is described as that of "independent contractor." McCraw v. Calvine Mills, 233 N.C. 524, 64 S.E.2d 658 (1951).
267 N.C. 364, 148 S.E.2d 240 (1966).
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claimed lack of power in county officials to control the manner in
which jurors discharged their duties9 and, in particular, the inability
of the trial judge in all cases to direct jurors to reach a particular
result. This decision is highly doubtful. In the first place, the trial
judge and other court officers are given considerable control over
jurors, particularly while sitting on a case." More significant is the
Court's apparent suggestion that an employer-employee relationship cannot exist whenever the "employment" involves the exercise
of discretion. Many employees, for example retail buyers, do in fact
exercise a good deal of discretion in their jobs and are employed
for that precise purpose, just as are jurors. Thus the suggestion
that "right to control" requires the right to control each and every
duty or function is unrealistic, and is not supported by prior cases. 1
Undoubtedly, the Court was troubled by the short duration of a
juror's service. However the Act excludes only persons whose employment is both casual and not in the course of the employer's
occupation."2 Thus, the short time span should not affect any decision as to whether an employment relationship exists.
Hicks v. Guilford County' is, of course, a case in which the
plaintiff claimed to be covered under the Act. More commonly the
'The Court stated: "obviously a juror is not subject to direction and
control of county officials as to the manner in which the juror discharges
his duties, in the sense that an employee in an industry is subject to direction
by his employer." Hicks v. Gilford County, 267 N.C. 364, 368, 148 S.E.2d

240, 243 (1966).

authorizes juries to be
10 For example, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-17 (1953)
placed in charge of court officers, and permits separation of juries in certain cases. The trial judge does in fact exercise considerable control over
jury deliberations by ruling upon admission of evidence, and by instructions
on the law. His power to set aside a verdict and enter a judgment n.o.v. or
order a new trial is also a mode of exercising control over verdict.
" In Pearson v. Peerless Flooring Co., 247 N.C. 434, 101 S.E.2d 301
(1958), claimant was hired specially to supervise installation of dry kilns
because defendant had no foreman with sufficient skills to do so. See also
Scott v. Waccamaw Lumber Co., 232 N.C. 162, 59 S.E.2d 425 (1950)
(supervisory employee). In Hayes v. Board of Trustees of Elon College,
224 N.C. 11, 29 S.E.2d 137 (1944), the exercise of independent knowledge,
skill or training was held to be only one of several indicia for distinguishindependent contractor from an employee.
ing an
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(2) (1965). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(b)
(1965) apparently excludes all casual employees, but has been construed as
limited by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(2) (1965). Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery
Co., 199 N.C. 38, 153 S.E. 591 (1930). In Moore v. State, 200 N.C. 300,
156 S.E. 806 (1930), a citizen who had been summoned by a game warden
to assist in extinguishing a fire was held not to be a "casual employee"
within the exemption.
1 See note 8 supra.
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question of coverage is raised by a defendant who seeks to defend
a common law negligence action by claiming plaintiff was an "employee" and thus limited to recovery of workmen's compensation
benefits. Once an employment relationship between plaintiff and
defendant is shown to exist, pursuant to the tests previously discussed, compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy available to
the injured employee. 4 In the past the Supreme Court has held
that compensation is the exclusive remedy and thus has barred a
negligence action by the injured employee in cases in which the
particular injury was not compensable under the Act. 5 In Homey
v. Meredith Swimming Pool Co.,'" the Court reaffirmed this position, and barred a wrongful death action brought on behalf of the
deceased employee's estate. In its previous decisions' 7 the injury
was not compensable because it did not "arise out of and in the
course of the employment. ' ' 1s In Horney, however, the death was
not compensable because the employee left no dependents.' 9 Although
these cases seem harsh, the result is clearly called for by the Act.2"
The justification for the exclusive remedy provision is the idea
that the injured employee gives up his rights to potential recovery
in a common law action for the more certain but less munificent
benefits of workmen's compensation. 2 '
Perhaps the largest producer of litigation involving questions of
employment relationship is G.S. § 97-10.2, that permits the injured
14
N.C. G N. STAT. § 97-9 (1965). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1965).
15

See, e.g., Francis v. Carolina Wood Turning Co., 208 N.C. 517, 181

S.E. 628 (1935), 14 N.C.L. Rav. 199 (1936) (injury did not arise out of

and in the course of employment).
15267 N.C. 521, 148 S.E.2d 554 (1966).
1
Tscheiller v. National Weaving Co., 214 N.C. 449, 199 S.E. 623
(1938) ; Francis v. Carolina Wood Turning Co., 208 N.C. 517, 181 S.E. 628
(1935); Pilley v. Greenville Cotton Mills, 201 N.C. 426, 160 S.E. 479
(1931); Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 153 S.E.
266 (1930).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (1965).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-40 (1965), as it read at the time of death, did

not permit payment of benefits to non-dependents. By an amendment to the
section in 1965, "next of kin," as defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-40 (1965),
may recover benefits in a lump sum if the employee dies leaving no dependents, as defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-38 (1965).

'0N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1965). The Supreme Court seems to have
created one exception in cases where the injury arises from activities disconnected with the employment. Barber v. Minges, 223 N.C. 213, 25 S.E.2d
837 (1943). Apparently, disconnected activities are those which are not
within the normal range of activities demanded of the employee by the job.
2 See Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 153 S.E. 266
(1930).
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employee to retain all common law rights of action he may have
against a "third party."2 2 Frequently, in common law actions by
injured employees, the defendant will claim not to be a "third party,"
but instead a party to the employment relationship. If he is held to
be so, workmen's compensation becomes the employee's exclusive
remedy," and his common law action is barred.24 The only statutory language which suggests the proper line to be drawn in defining
"third parties" is contained in G.S. § 97-9. That section requires
employers to secure payment of compensation and provides that
while such security remains in force "he (the employer) or those
conducting his business" shall be liable only as provided in the Act.
Past judicial construction of this provision has resulted in the phrase
being interpreted to include officers of a corporation, 25 superiors of
the injured employee 26 and co-employees.27 During the past year
four cases" involved the meaning of the above quoted phrase.
McWilliams v. Parham was a negligence action by a caddy
against a golfer for whom he was caddying to recover for injuries
sustained when struck by a golf ball. It was conceded by both
parties that the caddy was employed by the country club at which
the defendant alleged he was enjoying membership privileges. The
Supreme Court, commenting upon the lack of proof of defendant's
relationship to the club, had no difficulty in concluding that plaintiff's
action was not barred by the exclusive remedy provision. Since the
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2 (1965) also permits the employer or his
compensation insurer any rights of subrogation they may have against the
third party because of compensation benefits paid to the injured employee.
See Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663, 73 S.E.2d 886 (1953); Rogers v.
Southeastern Constr. Co., 214 N.C. 269, 199 S.E. 41 (1938).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-9 (1965). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1965).
"4See, e.g., Altman v. Sanders, 267 N.C. 158, 148 S.E.2d 21 (1966);
Jackson v. Bobbett, 253 N.C. 670, 117 S.E.2d 806 (1961).
" Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 69 S.E.2d 6 (1951) (dictum). See
Note, 30 N.C.L. REv. 474 (1952).
26 Essick v. Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 60 S.E.2d 106 (1950).
Stanly v.
27Burgess v. Gibbs, 262 N.C. 464, 137 S.E.2d 806 (1964);
Brown, 261 N.C. 243, 134 S.E.2d 321 (1964); Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C.
727, 69 S.E.2d 6 (1951); Bass v. Ingold, 232 N.C. 295, 60 S.E.2d 114
(1950). Two early cases, McCune v. Rhodes-Rhyne Mfg. Co., 217 N.C.
351, 8 S.E.2d 219 (1940), and Tscheiller v. National Weaving Co., 214
N.C. 449, 199 S.E. 623 (1938), permitted a recovery against a co-employee
without
mentioning N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-9 (1965).
8
McWilliams v Porham, 269 N.C. 162, 152 S.E.2d 117 (1967); Bryant
v. Dougherty, 267 N.C. 545, 148 S.E.2d 548 (1966); Lewis v. Barnhill, 267
N.C. 457, 148 S.E.2d 536 (1966); Altman v. Sanders, 267 N.C. 158, 148
S.E.2d 21 (1966).
.29269 N.C. 162, 152 S.E.2d 117 (1967).
2
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club was apparently incorporated,3 0 it would seem that defendant,
even had he been a member, would not have been within the group
of persons "conducting the business" as required by G.S. § 97-9.
Normally Corporate stockholders, as such, do not actively conduct
the business of a corporation. The same would seem to be true of
"members" of a non-profit incorporated association. Thus such
persons would appear to be third party(ies) within G.S. § 97-10.2,
against whom a common law action could be maintained."'
3 2 presented
Bryant v. Dougherty
another aspect of the problem
in interpreting G.S. § 97-9. Plaintiff sued defendant for medical
malpractice. Defendant argued that plaintiff's exclusive remedy was
under the Act since plaintiff's employer had requested the examination, and that G.S. § 97-26 required the subsequent malpractice to
be treated as a part of the original claim against the employer. The
Court noted that this was not a case in which a physician was employed full time by the employer, s and held that plaintiff's action
was not barred by G.S. § .97-9 and G.S. § 97-101. The result is
sound. G.S. § 97-26 speaks only of the employer's liability for
subsequent malpractice, and does not purport to deal with the physician's liability. 3 ' Furthermore, the "exclusive remedy" idea has
'"Although the facts of Mc Williams are not clear on this point, defendant alleged facts from which it can be deduced the Country Club was incorporated, rather than an unincorporated association.
' 1 Although the point was not raised in McWilliams, had defendant
alleged he "employed" plaintiff as a caddy, it is interesting to speculate as
to whether the caddy would have been ruled a "casual employee," pursuant
to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(2) (1965) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13 (1965),
or an employee of a "sub-contractor" under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-19
(1965), or even a "borrowed servant." As to the latter, see the discussion
of Lewis v. Barnhill, 267 N.C. 457, 148 S.E.2d 536 (1966), note 53 infra
and accompanying text. Leggette v. McCotter, 265 N.C. 617, 144 S.E.2d 849
(1965). Presumably, the requirement that five or more employees be employed would, in any event, permit use of a common law action against most
golfers.
267 N.C. 545, 148 S.E.2d 548 (1966).
"As to the results in such a case, see Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781,
249 P.2d 8 (1952), in which the employee was permitted to maintain a
common law malpractice action. But see Hayes v. Marshall Field Co., 351
Ill. App. 329, 155 N.E.2d 99 (1953), in which the second injury was held
compensable, and malpractice action was not permitted.
" The Supreme Court distinguished the somewhat confusing decision in
Hoover v. Globe Indem. Co., 202 N.C. 655, 163 S.E. 758 (1932). In
Hoover the employee sued the compensation insurer for negligence in selecting a physician. The insurer filed a third party action against the doctor,
whose demurrer was sustained. The theory was apparently that the doctor
could not be held liable to the insurer, because the insurer could not be held
by the employee.
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not been extended to independent contractors, who have been permitted to recover in a common law action. 5 Where, as in Bryant,
it is an independent contractor who causes the injury, logic demands
the same result. Perhaps most persuasive is the basic notion that
the Act applies only where an employment relationship is established. Since "right to control" remains the basic test for deciding
this question,36 and since an "independent contractor" cannot be
under the control of the employer to be classed as such," it is difficult to class an independent contractor as a person who conducts
the employer's business under G.S. § 97-9.18
As has already been indicated,3 9 co-employees have been held to
be included under G.S. § 97-9 as persons conducting the employer's
business. Thus common law actions between co-employees are
barred; at least when both are within the course of employment.40
In Altman v. Sanders,4 plaintiff was injured when struck by a car
being driven by a co-employee in a parking lot owned by their common employer. Both were on their way to work. Since both were
within the course of their employment at the time,42 the Court held
the action against the co-employee barred. While this result is supported by earlier holdings,43 it does not appear to be dictated by the
provisions of G.S. § 97-9 as the phrase "those conducting his business" could easily be construed as being limited to situations in
which the "employer" does not actively manage his business, rather
than as it was in Altman to include co-employees. Support for the
narrower construction is obtained from the section itself which deals
"oOdum v. National Oil Co., 213 N.C. 478, 196 S.E. 823 (1938). See
also Greene v. Spivey, 236 N.C. 435, 73 S.E.2d 488 (1952), holding that
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-19 (1965) applies to subcontractors, not independent
contractors.
' See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
' See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
', One of the tests prescribed by the Supreme Court, in Hayes v. Board
of Trustees of Elon College, 224 N.C. 11, 29 S.E.2d 137 (1944), for distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor is whether the person is engaged in an independent calling or trade.
" Note 27 supra and accompanying text.
"'Altman v. Sanders, 267 N.C. 158, 148 S.E.2d 21 (1966); Barber v.
Minges, 223 N.C. 213, 25 S.E.2d 837 (1943).
,1267 N.C. 158, 148 S.E.2d 21 (1966).
"Maurer v. Salem Co., 266 N.C. 381, 146 S.E.2d 432 (1966). See also
Bass v. Mecklenburg County, 258 N.C. 266, 128 S.E.2d 570 (1962); Davis
v. Devil Dog Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 543, 107 S.E.2d 102 (1949).
"'See the cases cited note 27 supra. See also Weaver v. Bennett, 259
N.C. 16, 129 S.E. 610 (1963); Essick v. Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 60
S.E.2d 106 (1950).
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only with the obligation of the employer to secure payment of compensation benefits. Such an obligation is obviously directed at management, not all employees. Since, at common law, actions against
co-employees were permitted,44 and since the General Assembly could
easily have made explicit its intent to bar such actions,4 5 the narrower construction is preferable. The Act is intended as a substitute
for common law actions between employer and employee to provide
prompt and reasonable compensation to injured employees." It was
not designed as a refuge for persons other than the employer.'
Construing G.S. § 97-9 and G.S. § 97-10.1 to include co-employees
creates such a refuge, and removes a large group involved in causing
industrial accidents from the possibly beneficial deterrence effect of
48
common law tort liability.
Altman v. Sanders,4" although barring plaintiff's action against
the co-employee, did permit the action to be maintained against the
co-employee's husband, who owned the automobile and furnished
it to his wife as a "family purpose" vehicle. The Supreme Court
interpreted the bar against actions against co-employees as a type of
immunity. The immunity granted was held to be personal and did
not prevent the action against the husband, despite the fact that
his liability is derivative and dependent upon that of his wife. This
is the position taken by most courts.50
Since the Court has held common law actions against co-employees to be barred under G.S. § 97-9 and G.S. § 97-10.1,51 it has
occasionally been called upon to decide whether an employee has
been "borrowed" by plaintiff's employer so that his common law
" See, e.g., Tscheiller v. National Weaving Co., 214 N.C. 449, 199 S.E.

623 (1938).
" By use of the term "co-employee" or "fellow servant."
" Kellams v. Carolina Metal Prod., Inc., 248 N.C. 199, 102 S.E.2d 841
(1958); Branham v. Denny Roll & Panel Co., 223 N.C. 233, 25 S.E.2d

865 (1943).

"Brown v. Southern R.R., 204 N.C. 668, 169 S.E. 419 (1933).
Apparently, there is no consistent pattern in the United States as to
barring of common law actions against co-employees. In Feity v. Chalkey,
185 Va. 96, 38 S.E.2d 73 (1946) the situation was described as "a hopeless
conflict."

" 267 N.C. 158, 148 S.E.2d 21 (1966).

"See SEAVEY, AGENCY § 93A (1964). RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
AGENCY § 217 (1958) also takes the position that a principal's derivative
liability is not removed because of an immunity preventing an action against
his employee.
"' See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
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action is barred.r In Lewis v. Barnhil it was held that plaintiff
and defendant were not co-employees. In determining whether an
employee has been borrowed, the common law tests for determining
employment relationship are also used. The "right to control" issue
is, of course, crucial to this determination. 4 Until recently, the
Court, through application of the "right to control" test, attempted
to decide which of two persons was the "employer." 55 However, in
the recent decision of Leggette v. J.D. McCotter, Inc.,r the possibility that an individual could be employed by both the lending and
5
the borrowing employer was recognized. In Lewis v. Barnhill,
"
the Leggette case was distinguished on its facts, the Supreme Court
finding that defendant had not been "borrowed" by plaintiff's employer at all. 58 Lewis illustrates a major difficulty with the rule
barring common law actions against co-employees. The injured
employee finds his common law rights of action barred or not, depending upon the details of the arrangement between his employer
and another. Although the details of that arrangement unquestionably must be significant in deciding whether an employment relationship has been created and, thus, whether compensation benefits must
be paid, it is difficult to see their relevance in barring an action
against someone not a part of that relationship. The legitimate
policy of protection provided the employer by the "exclusive
remedy" provision finds no counterpart where a co-employee, a
"borrowed" servant, or an independent contractor is involved.
One other case decided by the Supreme Court this past year deserves mention here, because it makes clear a point as to the Act's
coverage not previously decided. In Laughridge v. South Mountain
Pulpwood Co.59 defendant employer regularly employed less than
five employees. It was thus exempted from the Act by G.S. § 972(1) and G.S. § 97-13(b). However, defendant purchased a policy
" Weaver v. Bennett, 259 N.C. 16, 129 S.E.2d 610 (1963).
267 N.C. 457, 148 S.E.2d 536 (1966).
Lewis v. Barnhill, 267 N.C. 457, 465, 148 S.E.2d 536, 542-43 (1966).
See, e.g., Shapiro v. Winston-Salem, 212 N.C. 751, 194 S.E. 479
(1938).
265 N.C. 617, 144 S.E.2d 849 (1965).
"'267 N.C. 457, 148 S.E.2d 536 (1966).
The distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between Lewis and Leggette rested in large part upon the fact that in Leggette the borrowing employer had the right to terminate the employment, whereas in Lewis he did
not.
5,266 N.C. 769, 147 S.E.2d 213 (1966).
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of compensation insurance to provide coverage for a single full
time employee. Plaintiffs, who were dependents of a deceased corporate officer, 60 claimed death benefits under the Act. Purchase of
the policy was held to be a waiver of the exemption. 6 Defendant
argued that it waived its exemption from coverage only as to its
full time employee. Since G.S. § 97-13(b) makes no mention of
a partial waiver, the Court held that such a right should not be read
into the Act. The difficulties created by allowing a partial waiver
of exemption make this decision eminently sensible. 2
"ARIsING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF THE EMPLOYMENT"
One case decided by the Court last year raised a substantial issue

concerning the meaning of the phrase "arising out of and in the
course of the employment," as used in G.S. § 97-2(6).1 3 In Bryan
v. First Free Will Baptist Church,6 4 claimant was employed by defendant as its minister. Apparently claimant had accepted a call to
another church. He was asked by defendant to move from the
parsonage several weeks before his ° employment was to terminate
so that a part of the parsonage could be refurbished. While moving his stove, claimant injured his back. Compensation was denied
on the theory that the injury did not arise out of and in: the course
of the employment.
The Bryan case is representative of the difficulties which are
presented under the "arising out of and in the course of" test. It is
commonly accepted that two related but different ideas are embodied
in the phrase. "Arising out of" is construed to require that the
injury be incurred because of a condition or risk created by the
job. 5 "In the course of" is construed to refer to the time, place
and circumstances in which the injury occurred.6 Together the
"0Who is entitled to coverage because of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(2)
(1965).
"1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(b) (1965) provides for such a waiver by
purchase of insurance.
2For example, in the absence of a requirement that those employees
who were intended to be covered be named, it would be almost impossible
to discover exactly who the coverage was intended to benefit.
" Petree v. Duke Power Co., 268 N.C. 419, 150 S.E.2d 749 (1966) also
involved an "arising out of and in the course of" problem. A judgment for
defendant was affirmed, due to a lack of evidence establishing the employee's
death as work connected.
0,267 N.C. 111, 147 S.E.2d 633 (1966).
1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 6.00 (1952).

See, e.g., Bell v. Dewey Bros., Inc., 236 N.C. 280, 282, 72 S.E.2d 680,
681 (1952).
00
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phrases are an attempt to separate work-related injuries from nonwork-related injuries. Although this is standard doctrine, its application has caused considerable confusion in the Supreme Court, as
the Bryan case illustrates.
As to the "arising out of" problem, it is difficult to understand
the Court's decision finding claimant's injury non-compensable. His
employer requested the move be made early, thus exposing him to
the risk of injury which he actually suffered. The Supreme Court
has recognized that the employment need not "cause" the injury in
the sense that some job-related activity be the injury producing
cause. It is enough if the employment requires the employee to
expose himself to a risk of injury.6 7 The problem, as Larson points
out," is that there are different classes of risks to which an employee
is exposed while on the job. Some are distinctly job-related in the
sense that the employee is only exposed to this type of risk while
working.69 Other risks are so distinctly personal to the employee
that injury would occur irrespective of whether the employee was
on or off the job."° The troublesome risks are those to which the
employee is exposed both on and off the job.71 A lifting strain, such
as was involved in Bryan, is a risk which could occur either while
working or during leisure time activities. Although the Supreme
Court has held in such cases that the employment must create or
increase the risk, 2 it is clear that such a rule is applied only where
the risk itself is foreign to the employment and the only work-connection is the fact the employment required the employee to be in
the location at the time.7 Whenever the facts have shown that the
risk to which the employee was exposed arose from the job, corn"' In Pope v. Goodson, 249 N.C. 690,. 107 S.E.2d 524 (1959), the claimant was struck by lightning and compensation was awarded on the theory
the employment increased the risk of such a hazard. See also Goodwon v.
Bright, 202 N.C. 481, 163 S.E. 576 (1932).
" 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 7.00 (1952).
" See, e.g., Fields v. Tompkins-Johnstone Plumbing Co., 224 N.C. 841,
32 S.E.2d 623 (1945) (unusual exposure to heat).
' See, e.g., Cole v. Guilford County, 259 N.C. 724, 131 S.E.2d 308
(1963) (fall due to ideopathic condition).
" Plemmons v. White's Serv., 213 N.C. 148, 195 S.E. 370 (1938) (dog
bite).
"2See, e.g., Sandy v. Stackhouse, Inc., 258 N.C. 194, 128 S.E.2d 218
(1962).
" In Sandy the employee was off duty when killed by an automobile.
The only work connection present was a showing that he was sent out of
town by his employer on a repair job, and thus was not living at home.
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pensation has been allowed, despite the fact the risk of injury was
one to which the employee could be exposed as a citizen. 4 Any
other position would require denial of all lifting claims, since exposure to lifting strains may occur both on or off the job. Thus, in
Bryan it seems clear that claimant's employment in this instance
exposed him to the risk of injury, since the move was necessitated
by the employer's request. 75
Although the Supreme Court seemingly decided Bryan as an
"arising out of" case, the same result could have been reached had
the case been treated as an "in the course of" problem. "In the
course of" involves deciding whether the injury occurred within the
time and space limitations of the job."' In addition, however, it
must be shown that the employee, at the time of injury, was in some
way furthering his employer's interests.77 The employee must be on
the job. In Bryan, it would appear that the real difficulty facing
the claimant was establishing that he was furthering his employer's
interests rather than his own.78
The point to be observed from the above discussion of Bryan
is simple but significant. Imprecision in distinguishing "arising out
of" problems from "in the course of" problems has in the past led
to decisions which appear unwarranted.79 Although both tests are
Compare Winberry v. Farley Stores, Inc., 204 N.C. 79, 167 S.E. 475

(1933)

(bill collector killed by debtor), with Hollowell v. Department of

Conservation & Dev., 206 N.C. 206, 173 S.E. 603 (1934) (game warden
killed by person against whom he testified).
" It is on this basis that Van Devanter v. West Side M.E. Church, 10
N.J. Misc. 793, 160 Atl. 763 (1932), relied on by the Supreme Court in
Bryan, can be distinguished. There claimant was injured while carrying

ashes from the parsonage. There was no showing that a request to do so
had been made by the employer, nor was there a showing that the normal
ministerial duties included this type of activity.
"'See, e.g., Alford v. Quality Chevrolet Co., 246 N.C. 214, 97 S.E.2d

869 (1957).
" Thus compensation was denied in Bell v. Dewey Bros., 236 N.C. 280,
72 S.E.2d 680 (1952), because claimant was washing his car, though doing
so with his employer's consent during normal working hours.

" Although arguably the employer's request could serve to expand the
normal scope of activities, this is a difficult position to argue successfully,
since employer requests may do no more than grant permission to cease jobrelated activities for the time being. The easy case here in Barber v.
Minges, 223 N.C. 213, 25 S.E.2d 837 (1943), where the injury occurred at
an employer sponsored picnic. More difficult is Burnett v. Palmer-Lipe

Paint Co., 216 N.C. 204, 4 S.E.2d 507 (1939), where the injury occurred
while0 the employee, a janitor, was mowing his employer's yard.
E.g., Plemmons v. White's Serv., 213 N.C. 148, 195 S.E. 370 (1938).

See also Walker v. Wilkins, 212 N.C. 627, 194 S.E. 89 (1937); Marsh v.
Bennett College, 212 N.C. 662, 194 S.E. 303 (1937).
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part and parcel of the single problem of determining relationship
between injury and employment, there is a big difference between
denying compensation because the claimant was not furthering the
employer's interest, as in Bryan, and in denying compensation to
an employee who is furthering such interests, but who is unfortunate enough to be injured by a cause which is not "peculiar" to the
work."0 In recent years the Court has shown some tendency to treat
"inthe course of" problems as "arising out of" cases.,' Although
in individual cases this may not affect the propriety of the result
reached, it can serve to increase confusion in future cases and may
lead to unjust results.
"AvERAGE WEExLY WAGES"

G.S. § 97-2(5) defines the term "average weekly wages," as
used by the Act in establishing compensation rates for wage losses."2
The section provides several methods for computing average weekly
wages, some of which are designed to permit a method of arriving
at a wage rate in unusual situations. In Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab
Co., Inc.,' claimant was totally disabled as a result of being shot
while "moonlighting" as a taxi driver for defendant. His primary
wage source was his employment as a machine maintenance man
for the National Cash Register Co., for whom he worked a normal
40 hour week. The issue presented was whether, in computing
average weekly wages, claimant could use total wages earned from
both employers or only those earned from defendant. The more
precise issue involved a construction of that portion of G.S. § 972(5) which provides: "But where for exceptional reasons the foregoing would be unfair, either to the employer or employee, such
other method . . .may be resorted to as will most nearly approxi"' The classic illustrations of the denial of compensation in such cases
are Barn v. Travura Mfg. Co., 203 N.C. 466, 166 S.E. 301 (1932) ; Whitley
v. State Highway Comm'n, 201 N.C. 539, 160 S.E. 827 (1931). In both
cases claimant was shot while engaged in his work. Compensation was denied. Compare Perkins v. Sprott, 207 N.C. 462, 177 S.E. 404 (1934), in
which compensation was granted claimant for an injury received when a
baseball struck the windshield of the truck in which he was riding.
"' See, e.g., Perry v. American Bakeries Co., 262 N.C. 272, 136 S.E.2d
643 (1964). See also, Bryan v. First Free Will Baptist Church, 267 N.C.
111, 147 S.E.2d 643 (1966).
" E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29 to -31 (1965).
88 266 N.C. 419, 146 S.E.2d 479 (1966). The same issue was presented in
Joyner v. A. J. Carey Oil Co., 266 N.C. 519, 146 S.E.2d 447 (1966), and
was resolved in accord with Barnhardt.
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mate the amount which the injured employee would be earning were
it not for the injury." Claimant, using the quoted language, argued
that the statute authorized an averaging of both wage sources. The
Supreme Court, in reliance upon the general statutory definition contained in G.S. § 97-2(5), which limits wages to those earned "in
the employment in which he was working at the time of the injury

. .

.

,"

held that only wages received from defendant could be

used in computing the claimant's average weekly wage."4
One can feel a good deal of sympathy for the Court's dilemma.
Although the initial problem involves construction of G.S. § 972(5), the statute is ambiguous as to the result in this situation. The
language of the section, on the one hand, limits wages to those
earned in the employment in which the claimant was working when
injured. On the other hand, it also directs the Court, in exceptional
cases, to the method which is the fairest in approximating the
claimant's wage loss. None of the provisions of G.S. § 97-2(5)
really answer Barnhardt, since the section makes no specific mention of dual employment.8 5 Thus, although the Court's sympathies
clearly lay with the employee, its decision, which did not, is difficult
to criticize."0 One is compelled, however, to point out that the construction of G.S.§ 97-2(5) adopted by the Supreme Court does not
lead inevitably from the statute itself. It rests upon an assumption
that the General Assembly intended the language "in the employment in which he was working at the time of the injury . . ." to

exclude wages earned in another employment. This assumption rests
upon another: that the General Assembly considered the dual em"'Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co., Inc., 266 N.C. 419, 146 S.E.2d 479

(1966).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(5) (1965) does make reference specifically to

volunteer firemen. Although the Supreme Court made mention of this in
Barnhardt, the provision cannot be construed to mean that the General
Assembly considered dual employment problems generally, since volunteer
firemen are an exceptional situation with respect to wage rate determination.
"The only earlier North Carolina case which offers any help on the
dual employment question is Casey v. Board of Educ., 219 N.C. 739, 14
S.E.2d 853 (1941). There claimant was employed as a janitor, and was
paid from two wage sources. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Barnhardt, Casey involved a dispute between employers, and did not purport to
answer the question raised in Barnhardt. Throughout the United States
generally, authorities are unanimous in not allowing accumulations of wages
from dissimilar employments, in the absence of statutory authorization. 2
LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 60.31 (1952). Barnhardt involved the question of whether N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(5) (1965) autho-

rized such accumulation.
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ployment problem in drafting the quoted language. An equally
permissible assumption is that the language relied upon by claimant
evidences an intent to treat dual employment as an exceptional
situation and that the language relied upon by the Court was meant
to apply only to the usual situation in which only a single employment is involved.
The argument favoring the construction adopted by the Supreme
Court in Barnhardtmust rest upon the basic idea that it is unfair to
the employer to require him to allocate, as a part of his cost of
doing business, the cost of premiums to insure against payment of
compensation in excess of wages actually earned and benefits actually
received from employing the employee. 7 Viewed in this light, Barnhardt represents a position that it is unfair to place the total burden
of compensation upon the part-time employer. Two arguments
suggest themselves as justifying an opposite conclusion. First, as
Prof. Larson points out,"8 the increased burden placed upon the
employer or his insurer is minimal, since this type of case does not
arise often. Thus the policy behind the Act to provide adequate
wage compensation should be deemed sufficiently strong to justify
asking the employer to absorb the slight additional premium costs.
Second, it is not unfair to place the burden upon the employer because it was his failure to pay sufficiently attractive wages which
created the employee's need for dual employment. The employer
could eliminate dual employment by work rule or by contract. In
doing so he must face the consequent problem of attracting and
keeping employees. This might require a wage increase. In choosing to keep wage rates lower, he can be said to run the risk of
"moonlighting." It would be proper to ask him to absorb the total
wage loss of employees who are injured while working for him.
This is a risk properly allocatable to his business, because of his relying upon employees to hold more than one job. Thus a construction
of G.S. § 97-2(5) requiring accumulation of all wages would be
just, particularly in light of the "exceptional reasons" language included by the General Assembly.
8 See as to the risk distribution or allocation theory, Calebresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE LJ. 499
(1961). For a discussion of risk distribution as it relates to common law
doctrines, see Douglas, Vicarious Liability and the Administration of Risk,
38 YALE L.J. 584 (1929).
" 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 60.31 (1952).

